Manchester v. Parsons
| Citation | 84 S.E. 885,75 W.Va. 793 |
| Parties | MANCHESTER ET AL. v. PARSONS. |
| Decision Date | 16 March 1915 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
Submitted February 23, 1915.
Syllabus by the Court.
Payment to a prior holder does not discharge a negotiable instrument in the hands of a subsequent holder in due course. Subsection 4 of section 119, Negotiable Instruments Act (Code 1913, c 98a, § 4290), does not apply in such case.
In a suit by the holder in due course against the maker of a negotiable note, the genuineness of the indorser's signature is not material if he has either authorized, or subsequently ratified, such indorsement.
When the evidence is such as to warrant a finding by the jury in favor of one of the parties only, the court may properly direct a verdict for that party.
Error to Circuit Court, Tucker County.
Action by Jason Manchester and others against L. W. Parsons. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
L Hansford and A. R. Stallings, both of Parsons, for plaintiff in error.
A. Jay Valentine, of Parsons, for defendants in error.
By this writ of error defendant seeks to reverse a judgment recovered against him by Jason Manchester and L. M. Elliott, upon notice and motion, under the statute. The recovery was upon a negotiable note made by defendant, payable to Burton & Co., a partnership composed of L. A. Burton and D. J. Grindell, and indorsed to plaintiffs. Defendant filed three pleas on which issues were joined. The substance of the pleas are: (1) That defendant had discharged the note by payment to the legal owner and holder, before the suit was brought; (2) denial that plaintiffs are bona fide holders for value in due course; and (3) that the name of Burton & Co., indorsed on the note, is not the firm's genuine signature, and was not placed there by any one having authority from them to do so. This last plea is verified by affidavit.
After the evidence had all been introduced the court, on motion of plaintiffs, excluded defendant's evidence, and directed the jury to return a verdict for plaintiffs. A motion to set aside the verdict was overruled exceptions taken, and judgment entered.
Burton & Co. was a Kenton, Ohio, firm, engaged in importing and selling horses for breeding purposes. Defendant lived at Parsons, W. Va., and was engaged in breeding horses. The note is for $800, payable 18 months after date, to the order of Burton & Co., at the First National Bank of Parsons, with 6 per cent. interest, and bears date September 22, 1910. It is proven that the note was negotiated to plaintiffs by one Lee Whorton, about the 1st of November, 1910. Whorton was then employed in selling horses for Burton & Co.
Defendant's pleas set up affirmative matters entailing on him the burden of proof. Any one of them, if sustained, would defeat recovery. But there is no evidence to support any of them. To sustain his first plea, defendant proved that on the 3d of June, 1911, he sold and delivered to Burton & Co. some Percheron colts for $1,675, with the understanding and agreement that it was to pay his note, and that they were to execute to him their note for the balance. He produced a letter from D. J. Grindell, then a member of the firm, but now deceased, dated June 15, 1911 acknowledging receipt of the colts in good condition, and promising defendant to send him his note and the firm's note for the balance, soon. Counsel contends that defendant's note was thus discharged. But the uncontradicted testimony of L. A. Burton, the surviving partner, and of Lee Whorton, is that it had been indorsed to plaintiffs, for value, about the 1st of November, 1910, and therefore payment to the original holders did not discharge it. Counsel invokes subsection 4 of section 119 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as authority for his contention. Section 119 describes how a note may be discharged, and subsection 4 reads: "By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money." This subsection must be interpreted with reference to the general purpose of the negotiable instrument act. It must be read in connection with its other provisions, and made to harmonize with the general scheme and plan of the act. Thus viewing subsection 4, it is apparent that it was never the legislative intent to make so radical a change in the general law respecting negotiable instruments, as would be wrought by the literal interpretation contended for. It is clear, from other provisions of the act, as well as from the preamble thereto, that the Legislature did not contemplate making so vital and radical a change in the law, as to permit equities between the original parties to a negotiable instrument to defeat the title of an innocent holder for value in due course. That would counteract the purpose of the statute which was not to revolutionize the law, but to amend, enlarge, and re-enact certain sections of the statute law respecting negotiable...
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