Manders v. Dallam

• Citation: 244 N.W. 724,215 Iowa 137
• Decision Date: 25 October 1932
• Docket Number: No. 41562.,41562.
• Parties: MANDERS v. DALLAM ET AL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

215 Iowa 137

244 N.W. 724

MANDERS

v.DALLAM ET AL.

No. 41562.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Oct. 25, 1932.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; W. S. Cooper, Judge.

This was an action by the plaintiff, Harold Manders, a minor, through his next friend, Roy Manders, to recover a judgment against Howard Dallam and Willard D. Patterson, defendants, for personal injuries received by the plaintiff in a collision between a school bus, driven by Dallam, and a truck operated by Patterson. There was a trial to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion for a new trial, and it was conditionally sustained. From this ruling the plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.R. E. Hanke, of Des Moines, and Curtis W. Gregory, of Adel, for appellant.

Strock, Sloan & Dyer, of Des Moines, and Harry Wifvat, of Perry, for appellee Howard Dallam.

White & Clarke and A. M. Fagan, all of Adel, for appellee Willard D. Patterson.

KINDIG, J.

On January 9, 1930, Harold Manders, a minor, was riding in a school bus on his way to the consolidated school at Waukee. The bus was driven by the defendant-appellee Howard Dallam. While operating the bus on the day in question, the appellee Dallam drove across United States highway No. 32, where the vehicle collided with a truck then and there in the control of the defendant-appellee Willard D. Patterson. As a result of the collision, Harold Manders received personal injuries.

Consequently, on February 27, 1931, Harold, through his next friend, Roy Manders, commenced this suit to recover for the aforesaid injuries from the appellees Howard Dallam and Willard D. Patterson. These appellees filed pleadings in which they sought to avoid liability for the personal injuries. Accordingly, a trial was had to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the appellant for $600. Thereafter, and within due time, the appellees filed a motion for a new trial. Included in the motion for a new trial were two grounds, among others, as follows: First, that the verdict of the jury was excessive and the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury; and, second, that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence. All grounds of the motion, except the two above mentioned, were expressly overruled by the district court. On the grounds of the motion not overruled, the district court conditionally granted the appellees a new trial. The condition was that the appellant remit all that part of the judgment over and above $400. In other words, the district court ruled that, if the appellant would accept a judgment for $400, there would be no new trial, but, in the event the appellant would not so accept the reduced amount, then the new trial was to be granted. Thereupon the appellant refused to accept the $400, and appealed to this court.

It is contended by the appellant on this appeal that the district court abused its discretion and acted illegally in failing to overrule the motion for a new trial. Such is the question now before us for consideration. While it is true that the appellees' motion for a new trial contained many grounds, yet the district court overruled all of them, except the two above enumerated. No decision is here made or opinion indicated as to whether, for the purpose of sustaining the action of the trial court, the overruled grounds of the motion may be considered. Under the record, it is not necessary to discuss the proposition here expressly reserved.

Did the district court, then, abuse its discretion or commit error in reducing the judgment from $600 to $400 because it was excessive and not sustained by the evidence, and therefore granting a new trial in the event the appellant failed to accept the decreased amount? According to section 11550 of the 1931 Code:

“The former report, verdict, or decision, or some part or portion thereof, shall be vacated and a new trial granted, on the application of the party aggrieved, for the following causes affecting materially the substantial rights of such party: * * *

4. Excessive damages appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. * * * 6. That the verdict, report, or decision is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law.”

Underlying the appellant's argument is the thought that the district court conditionally granted the new trial on the theory that the verdict was excessive and based upon passion and prejudice. But a careful reading of the trial court's ruling indicates that it did not necessarily do this. What the trial court actually did, as above explained, was to overrule all the motion for a new trial except the part relating to the amount of the verdict. As previously suggested, this portion of the motion contained two grounds. They are: First, that the verdict was excessive and the result of passion and prejudice; and, second, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. An excessive verdict is not necessarily one which results from passion and prejudice. Doran v. C. R. & Marion Railway Co., 117 Iowa, 442 (local citation 450), 90 N. W. 815.

Both of the above-named grounds relate to the question of excessiveness in the verdict. So, when the district court reserved the part of the motion for a new trial relating to the excessiveness of the verdict, both of the foregoing grounds were necessarily retained. By virtue of this record, then, the question is whether the district court abused its discretion or committed an error of law in conditionally sustaining the motion for a new trial on either ground aforesaid. Upon this broader basis, the question now will be considered.

[1] At the outset, appellant maintains that the amount of a judgment in a personal injury case is necessarily a jury question, and that the court cannot interfere with a verdict based upon conflicting facts relating thereto. Generally speaking, this is true. The rule has a special application to a case where the district court refuses to grant a new trial and the defendants complain thereof on appeal. Sterler v. Busch, 197 Iowa, 231, 195 N. W. 369;Kness v. Kommes, 207 Iowa, 137, 222 N. W. 436;Buffalo v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa, 194, 186 N. W. 844;Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa, 329, 177 N. W. 65;Ideal Cream Separator Repair Works v. Des Moines, 167 Iowa, 517, 149 N. W. 640;Hall v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 145 Iowa, 291, 122 N. W. 894. An explanation of this general principle may be found in the following excerpt quoted from Brause v. Brause (190 Iowa, 329), supra, reading on pages 337 and 338, 177 N. W. 65, 68:

“We have said many times that the assessment of damages, both actual and exemplary, is peculiarly within the discretion of the jury. It is true, of course, as said in some of the cases, that this discretion is not unlimited. The test is, not what amount the court would have allowed, but whether the verdict is so large or small, as the case may be, as to shock the conscience. In Hall v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 145 Iowa, 291, 122 N. W. 894, cited in Ideal C. S. R. Works v. City of Des Moines, 167 Iowa, 517, 522, 149 N. W. 640, 642 we said:

‘The mere fact that the amount assessed is more or less than the court would have been disposed to allow were the case submitted without a jury is not controlling, and will not justify the setting aside of the verdict. To call for such action the amount allowed must be so great and excessive, or so small and inadequate, that the just and intelligent mind is forced to the conclusion that the jury has failed to comprehend the case as submitted, or has been influenced to its verdict by passion or prejudice. * * * It cannot be said that the sum actually awarded is so out of proportion to the injury suffered as to shock the conscience and point inevitably to the conclusion that the jury were misled by ignorance, passion, or prejudice. This is especially true in view of the fact that the learned trial court, which saw the plaintiff and the witnesses produced on the trial and heard their testimony, refused to set aside the verdict. Had it sustained the motion and ordered a new trial because of the inadequacy of the verdict, the case would wear a different aspect.’ ”

[2] There is an exception to that general rule. Such exception is indicated in the last portion of the quotation above set forth. If, as said in the quotation, the district court sustains a motion for a new trial, “the case would wear a different aspect.” What is said in the Brause and other cases above cited was called forth upon an occasion where the appellant asked this court to grant a new trial after the district court refused to do so. Consequently, as indicated in the cited cases themselves, the general rule is relaxed in cases where the district court, in the exercise of its discretion, has granted a new trial. This is true because the district court has a broad discretion in granting a new trial. Leake v. Azinger (Iowa) 243 N. W. 196;Lange v. Nissen, 204 Iowa, 1080, 216 N. W. 697;Jelsma v. English, 210 Iowa, 1065, 231 N. W. 304;Thul v. Weiland (Iowa) 239 N. W. 515;Rupp v. Kohn, 210 Iowa, 969, 232 N. W. 174.

[3][4] We are more reluctant to interfere with the granting of a new trial than with the refusal to allow the relief. A trial court is vested with a large discretion in passing upon a motion for a new trial. Unless that discretion is abused, this court will not interfere. Such abuse must affirmatively appear. Leake v. Azinger (243 N. W. 196), supra; Jelsma v. English (210 Iowa, 1065, 231 N. W. 304), supra. It was stated by this court in Blakely v. Cebelka, 199 Iowa, 946, reading on page 948, 203 N. W. 19, 20: “In an early case, Dewey v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 31 Iowa, 373, concerning a new trial we said: ‘They (trial judges) ought to grant new trials whenever their superior and more comprehensive judgment teaches them that the verdict of the jury fails to administer substantial justice.’ ”

That general rule is conceded by the appellant, but he seeks to avoid it on the...