Mandis v. New York Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1935
• Docket Number: 14139.
• Citation: 181 S.E. 472,177 S.C. 390
• Parties: MANDIS v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

181 S.E. 472

177 S.C. 390

MANDIS v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO.

No. 14139.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

September 16, 1935

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Greenville County; Wm. H Grimball, Judge.

Action by George Mandis against the New York Life Insurance Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Thomas Lumpkin & Cain, of Columbia, and Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, for appellant.

C Granville Wyche, of Greenville, for respondent.

CARTER Justice.

This suit, by George Mandis, as plaintiff, against the defendant, New York Life Insurance Company, was commenced in the court of common pleas for Greenville county, August 17, 1933, for recovery of judgment against the defendant in the sum of $2,000, alleged to be owing the plaintiff by the defendant under a certain insurance policy issued by the defendant upon the life of Charley Luntos July 27, 1931, in which policy the plaintiff was made beneficiary. The face amount of the policy is $1,000, but the policy contains a double indemnity clause, to the effect that, should the death of the insured result from accidental means, as defined in said provision of the policy, the defendant would pay the sum of $2,000. According to the allegations contained in the complaint, the said Charley Luntos died on or about the 1st day of June, 1933, and his death resulted from accidental means.

By its answer filed in the cause, the defendant admitted the execution and delivery of the policy in question in the face amount of $1,000 on the life of the said Charley Luntos, and further admitted that the beneficiary had been changed so as to make the plaintiff herein, George Mandis, the beneficiary under the policy. The defendant further admitted that the policy contained a provision for the payment of double indemnity in the event the death of the insured resulted from accidental means, as defined under said clause of the policy, and the defendant further admitted that the insured's death occurred about the time alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant denied all liability under said policy, except for the amount of the premiums paid to the defendant on said policy. The defendant also made the following statement in its answer:

"6. In further answer to said complaint this defendant alleges that the said policy of insurance contained as an integral and inseparable part thereof the following clause and condition:

'Self-Destruction.-In event of self-destruction during the first two insurance years, whether the insured be sane or insane, the insurance under this Policy shall be a sum equal to the premiums thereon which have been paid to and received by the Company and no more.'

7. This defendant further alleges that the provisions of said policy with respect to the payment of double indemnity specifically stated and provided that such double indemnity shall not be payable if the insured's death resulted from self-destruction, whether sane or insane.

8. This defendant further alleges, upon information and belief, that the said insured, Charley Luntos, came to his death on or about the 1st day of June, 1933, by his own hand, within the first two insurance years of said contract of insurance, and accordingly alleges that its liability thereunder is limited to the amount of premiums which have been paid thereon and no more.

9. This defendant, upon being furnished with proofs of the death of the said Charley Luntos and ascertaining the cause of his death, on or about the 4th day of August, 1933, tendered to the plaintiff herein, or his attorney, the sum of One Hundred Eleven and 40/100 ($111.40) Dollars, representing the full amount of premiums which were paid to and received by the company under said contract of insurance, in full and complete settlement and satisfaction of its liability thereunder and said tender was declined; that this defendant, on or about August 17, 1933, advised the plaintiff herein that its check, representing a return of such premiums, is being held subject to his order, the defendant claiming no interest thereunder, and this defendant now holds said fund for the use and benefit of the plaintiff or the person who is entitled to receive the same."

Issues being joined, the case was tried at the fall, 1934, term of said court before his honor, Judge W. H. Grimball, and a jury. The jury failing to agree on a verdict, the trial judge ordered a mistrial. The case was again tried at the second session of the fall, 1934, term of said Court, before the same judge and a jury. According to the record before us, at the conclusion of the testimony, both parties, defendant and plaintiff, made motions for a directed verdict. The motions being refused, the issues were submitted to the jury and the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,000 and costs. Motion by the defendant for a new trial being refused from judgment entered on the verdict, the defendant appealed to this court.

Five exceptions are presented by the appellant, imputing error to the trial judge, but, as stated by counsel for appellant, all the exceptions may be considered under the following question:

Question involved: "Did the trial Judge err in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant company on the ground that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the insured committed suicide within the first two insurance years, which risk was expressly excluded by the terms of the policy?"

It is conceded that, if the insured committed suicide within the first two insurance years, the plaintiff cannot recover. It must also be conceded that, in order to entitle the defendant to a directed verdict, it must clearly appear from the record in the case that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence is that the insured committed suicide within the first two insurance years. It is clear that the insured's death occurred within the first two insurance years, but, in our opinion, it is not the only inference to be drawn from the evidence that the insured committed suicide. Under the evidence, as we view it, the court cannot as a matter of law, hold that the insured took his own life. There is a presumption against self-destruction, and, as we view the case, that presumption has not been overcome. As stated, more than one inference can be drawn from the evidence as to how the insured's death occurred. The trial judge could not, under our view of the case, grant the defendant's motion for direction of a verdict, and he therefore properly refused the motion and submitted the issues to the jury. It must be kept in mind that the burden of proving death by suicide as a defense is on the defendant. In this connection we quote the following from Corpus Juris: "In accordance with the rule that the presumption is always against suicide or self-destruction on the part of a sane person, who came to his death under circumstances not explained, where the cause of insured's death is unexplained, and the circumstances are such that it...