Mandy v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg.
| Decision Date | 26 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 4-95-774. |
| Citation | 940 F.Supp. 1463 |
| Parties | Gail MANDY, Plaintiff, v. MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING, a/k/a 3M, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Jeffrey Robert Anderson, Teresa Kathleen Patton, Reinhardt & Anderson, St. Paul, MN, for plaintiff.
Thomas Patrick Kane, Kathleen Mary Mahoney, David M. Wilk, Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, St. Paul, MN, for defendant.
Plaintiff Gail Mandy was employed by defendant Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing ("3M") as a laborer from approximately September 12, 1991 to November 1993. Mandy filed a complaint against 3M on August 3, 1995, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") and the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 363.03, et seq. ("MHRA") and claims of negligent training, retention, and supervision. Defendant moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment as to plaintiff's Title VII and MHRA sex discrimination claims and her negligence claims. Defendant argues that plaintiff's discrimination claims are barred by the statute of limitations, that her negligent supervision and retention claims are preempted by state statutes, and that Minnesota law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent training. Defendant also moved to strike paragraph 15 of plaintiff's complaint. Defendant's motion was referred to Magistrate Judge John M. Mason for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
Magistrate Judge Mason filed his Report and Recommendation on April 23, 1996, and recommended that the Court: (1) grant defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss plaintiff's sex discrimination and negligence claims; and (2) strike paragraph 15 from plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter is before the Court on plaintiff's objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the Court dismiss her sex discrimination and negligence claims.1 The Court has reviewed de novo plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation on this dispositive pretrial matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D.Minn. LR 72.1(c)(1). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that plaintiff's Title VII sex discrimination claim and her negligent training claim should be dismissed, but rejects the Magistrate Judge's recommendation as to plaintiff's sex discrimination claim under the MHRA and her negligent retention and supervision claims.
Defendant argues that plaintiff's claims are barred because she did not file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discrimination as Title VII requires, or within 365 days as the MHRA requires. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Minn.Stat. § 363.06, subd. 3. Given that plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination on March 21, 1994, plaintiff's discrimination claims are timely only if the alleged sexual harassment occurred on or after March 21, 1993 for purposes of her MHRA claim, and on or after May 25, 1993 for her Title VII claim.
In support of her argument that her claims are timely, plaintiff relies on her complaint, a signed statement she gave 3M investigators on April 8, 1993, and an affidavit filed with her opposition to defendant's motion.2 Plaintiff's complaint states that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor, William Palmer, beginning on April 22, 1992, and continuing through March 22, 1993. Plaintiff's statement to 3M's investigators and her affidavit contain many specific allegations supporting her claim that Palmer subjected her to repeated and ongoing unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature throughout the time period alleged in her complaint. The allegations include repeated sexual comments about plaintiff's body, sexual advances toward plaintiff, and other unwelcome attention such as telephone calls, cards and gifts. Plaintiff also alleges that Palmer repeatedly referred to his control over her employment status.
Plaintiff's statement to 3M describing specific incidents of unwelcome conduct includes an incident which occurred on Friday, March 19, 1993 at 10:00 a.m., in which Palmer grabbed her sweatshirt, looked down her shirt, commented on her breasts and put his hand on her neck. Plaintiff states that on the next work day, Monday, March 22, 1993, she reported Palmer's behavior. Palmer then came to her work area, grabbed her arm, and, as plaintiff described the incident:
[Palmer] said, "What are you trying to do to me, get me fired? I didn't say anything. He said, "I want you to go tell them guys that what I did was nothing" again. I said nothing. We went to the office, and the 5 of us were talking about what had happen[ed] and Bill [Palmer] said it was nothing, grabbing at my shirt trying to show what he did. I said, "that's not the way it was." He said that he didn't want anything that was said to leave the office. He really didn't want Butch to know. Bill said he was really scared. (punctuation added).
Plaintiff argues that this March 22 incident, which occurred within the statute of limitations period, was part of a series of related acts of discrimination based on plaintiff's sex and that her claims therefore are timely pursuant to the continuing violation doctrine.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that the March 22 incident was not an incident of discrimination based on sex and therefore did not consider whether it was part of a continuing violation. The Magistrate Judge noted only the part of the incident in which Palmer grabbed plaintiff's arm; he apparently did not consider Palmer's later action of grabbing at plaintiffs shirt to demonstrate what he claimed he had done the previous Friday. The Magistrate Judge concluded that the arm-grabbing incident happened to plaintiff, not because she was female, but because she complained about sexual harassment. He therefore characterized the incident as one of retaliation, and not harassment, as a matter of law. Because the incident was not harassment, the Magistrate Judge specifically declined to consider whether it was part of a continuing violation which included the prior conduct of incidents of discrimination based on sex.
The Court disagrees with the Magistrate Judge's analysis for the following reasons. First, in determining whether the incident within the statute of limitations period constituted sexual harassment, the Court must consider "`the record as a whole' and `the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.'" Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2406, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) (citing EEOC Guidelines). The Court must look at "the nature, frequency, intensity, location, context, duration, and object or target" of the language and conduct. Klink v. Ramsey County, 397 N.W.2d 894, 901 (Minn.App.1986), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987) (citing Meritor). As the Magistrate Judge noted, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it clear that incidents which are not of an explicitly sexual nature may still constitute sexual harassment:
We have never held that sexual harassment or other unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of an employee must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents with clearly sexual overtones. And we decline to do so now. Rather, we hold that any harassment or unequal treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII.
Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir.1988); see also Kopp v. Samaritan Health System, Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir.1993) (reaffirming Hall).3 The Court stated that "[i]ntimidation and hostility towards women because they are women can obviously result from conduct other than explicit sexual advances." Hall, 842 F.2d at 1014. The Court also noted with approval other Circuit Court opinions holding that threats of physical violence and acts of physical aggression were properly considered sexual harassment. Id.
Against the backdrop of the definition of sexual harassment, the Court must also apply the continuing violation doctrine. Under that doctrine, there may be redress for unlawful discriminatory acts which occurred prior to the statute of limitations period if they are related to violative acts which occurred within the statutory period. A plaintiff may challenge incidents which occurred outside the statute of limitations period if the various acts of discrimination constitute a continuing pattern of discrimination. Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Hoisting & Portable, 3 F.3d 281, 285 (8th Cir.1993) (); see also Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58, 101 S.Ct. 498, 503-04, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558-60, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1888-90, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). Minnesota courts have adopted the continuing violation theory in discrimination cases. See Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441 n. 11 (Minn.1983); Sigurdson v. Isanti County, 448 N.W.2d 62, 68 (Minn.1989).
Federal courts have recognized two types of continuing violations, a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period, or the maintenance of a discriminatory system both before and during the limitations period. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F.Supp. 847,...
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