Maness v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 January 1914
• Parties: MANESS v. CLINCHFIELD COAL CORPORATION.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

162 S.W. 1105

128 Tenn. 143

MANESS v. CLINCHFIELD COAL CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 20, 1914

Appeal from Law Court of Washington; Dana Harmon, Judge.

Action by R. L. Maness against the Clinchfield Coal Corporation. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and he brings certiorari. Judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed, and that of the law court affirmed.

Harr & Burrow, of Bristol, for plaintiff.

J Norment Powell and J. R. Simmonds, both of Johnson City, for defendant.

LANSDEN J.

This is an action for personal injuries brought by Maness against the Clinchfield Coal Corporation, which resulted in verdict and judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $10,000. The defendant below appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, and in that court the judgment was reversed and the suit dismissed.

The declaration charged that the plaintiff was employed by the defendant to repair a coal chute which was used by the defendant for the purpose of conveying coal from cars which carried it out of the mine to railroad cars below, used in loading it for shipment. Plaintiff was at work in the chute near its bottom when the defendant, without warning or notice to him, dumped a car load of coal into the chute at the top which rolled down the chute and hit the plaintiff.

By an amendment to the declaration made later, it was averred, in addition to the failure to warn, that the defendant had failed to furnish a safe place to work.

The evidence from the plaintiff's view establishes the following facts:

The defendant was operating a certain coal mine, and conveyed the coal from the inside of the mine to its mouth in cars. At or near the mouth of the mine is located what is termed the "head house." The man in charge of the head house would dump the coal out of the cars into a chute which extended downward from the mouth of the mine to a point immediately over two railroad tracks side by side, and the coal would flow out of the chute into cars standing on the railroad tracks. The chute is about 300 feet long, about four feet wide at the bottom, and 3 or 3 1/2 feet high, and slopes inward from the bottom to the top, so that it is about 12 inches wide at the top. It inclines from the head house to the tipple at the railroad tracks at the rate of 7 1/2 inches to the foot so that it was about as steep as an ordinary house roof. A short distance from the foot of the chute was a strong gate. Just below this gate were screen bars, and below the screen bars was a wind or curve in the body of the chute. Coal would be dumped into the chute at the head house and would run down to the gate, where ordinarily it would be caught and held. The gate could be raised by means of a rope which was operated by men on the railroad cars below the chute. When the gate was raised and the coal released, it would flow over the screen bars, and coal of certain fineness would fall through the bars into a railroad car standing on the railroad track under the screen, and the larger coal would flow over the bars and on down the chute until it struck the wind or curve at the mount of the chute, and would by this curve be deflected into a railroad car standing on another track.

This was the condition a short time before the plaintiff was injured. It became necessary to build a new wind at the end of the chute, and the plaintiff, who was the head carpenter in the service of the defendant, was directed to build the wind with his crew of carpenters. He was also directed to place a shield below the grate bars and above the wind for the purpose of catching coal when released by the gate, and cause it to drop through the opening in the chute at the grate bars, which plaintiff was also directed to remove. This left a hole in the bottom of the chute between the shield and the gate about 16 feet long. Plaintiff and his crew were engaged in building the wind for three or four days with the gate in position. While thus engaged, the defendant continued to dump coal into the chute at the head house in the ordinary and usual operation of its mines, with the exception that during these operations the coal would not be screened, but would all pass through the opening left by the removal of the screen bars into a car standing on the track nearest the head house and under the opening. Throughout the time that coal was dumped into the chute while plaintiff was at work on the wind, the man at the head house would give timely warning of the intentions to dump the coal into the chute, and plaintiff and his assistants would get out of the chute. This was done with the knowledge of plaintiff and defendant.

Before the wind was completed, plaintiff was ordered by the defendant to remove the gate, and install a new one. This order was given March 1, 1911, and plaintiff was directed to do the work the next day. On the next day, March 2d, the chute was cleaned out and all coal removed, and the plaintiff was notified that it was ready for him to begin the building and installation of the new gate. Part of plaintiff's crew was still at work on the wind. Work on the gate began at 8 o'clock in the morning. During the progress of the work, the man at the head house called down twice to know if coal could be dumped. At another time, and just a few minutes before plaintiff was injured, plaintiff was informed that because of the congestion of cars brought out of the mines at the head house, cars were getting scarce in the mine, and he was again asked if the gate was completed. He did not notify the man at the head house that the gate was completed. His assistants at work on the wind informed plaintiff that the wind was finished, and requested him to inspect it. He went from his place at the gate to the wind, and from an inspection of it, he discovered that his assistants had not inserted a bolt which he deemed necessary to its proper completion. Plaintiff laid down on his side in the bottom of the chute, and was taking measurement for the required bolt, when the man at the head house dumped coal into the chute, which came down upon the plaintiff and injured him. The plaintiff's head was under a crossbar which passed through the chute at the wind, at a distance of about 18 inches from the floor. He was given no warning that coal would be dumped into the chute at the head house, but he heard it, and endeavored to extricate himself, but was unable to do so because of the crossbar.

The gate was not finished, and it had not been installed. The plaintiff says that he would have finished the work in 15 or 20 minutes if he had not been injured.

The Court of Civil Appeals was of opinion that the plaintiff and the man at the head house were fellow servants, and for that reason the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Among other things, that court said:

"The distinction in the two conditions of a safe place to work in and a safe place made unsafe by the act or negligence of a fellow servant is, it seems, plainly to be seen and recognized, and it is recognized in all the texts and decisions to which we have had access which treated of or dealt with cases involving the fellow-servant doctrine or rule of law. If a safe place furnished for an employé is made unsafe by the negligence of a fellow employé, and injury results for which the employer is liable, the whole foundation of the fellow-servant doctrine, as well as all its incidents, is swept clear out of the realm of court administration of rights, and we need no negligence to abolish and remove it entirely from the field of jurisprudence.

"It is to be understood that we are not dealing with a case where an employer who sees or knows, or ought to know, that an employé, by his negligence or incapacity or ignorance has made or will make a safe place for another employé to work unsafe, stands up and fails to take prompt steps to protect his other employés; in such a case the law, as well as common justice, ought to hold him liable for injury to the nonnegligent employé.

"To hold that an employer is liable for an injury when he puts one of his employés in a safe place to work, in the event another employé or fellow servant by his negligence or omission to perform his duty or performs it recklessly, thereby causing injury to his coemployé and fellow servant, is confining the fellow-servant doctrine within narrower limits than any text or decision that we have been able to find."

There is no evidence to indicate that the coal chute was an unsafe place for plaintiff to work because of any inherent vice or defect in its construction. The very nature of the premises, and the uses to which they were put in the ordinary and usual prosecution of the master's work, would make the place unsafe while the chute was being used. If coal were not dumped in the chute, the place would be safe. It is also shown that plaintiff could have taken himself beyond the zone of danger if he had been warned by the man at the head house that coal would be dumped.

As already stated, it was the custom of the defendant to warn plaintiff before coal was dumped in time for him to protect himself. Learned counsel for defendant contend that the rule or custom of giving warning was suspended at the time of the injury because the chute was "dismantled," and was in no condition to be used for dumping coal, and therefore the man at the head house was not forwarding the master's business when he dumped the coal in upon plaintiff, but was acting in disregard of the master's interest. It is said that the master, when he directed the man at the head house to cease dumping coal, and notified him of the presence of the plaintiff in the chute, discharged his full duty towards plaintiff. The correctness of this position would seem to depend upon whether...