Manetta v. County of Macomb
| Citation | 955 F.Supp. 771 |
| Decision Date | 12 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-CV-75919.,No. 95-CV-76267.,95-CV-76267.,95-CV-75919. |
| Parties | Colleen MANETTA, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF MACOMB, et al. and Eric Kaiser, Defendants. Albert SWIECZKOWSKI, Plaintiff, v. Eric KAISER, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Curtis Schram, Individually and in his Official Capacity, Jointly and Severally, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Edward Servitto, Warren, MI, for plaintiff.
Arthur Garton, Warren, MI, Frank Brochert, Detroit, MI, Margaret Nelson, Lansing, MI, for defendants.
Plaintiff Colleen Manetta commenced her case on February 21, 1995 in Macomb County Circuit Court. Thereafter, her case was removed to federal district court and assigned to Judge LaPlata. Meanwhile, on November 3, 1995, Manetta's then fiancee, Plaintiff Albert Swieczkowski, also commenced an action in Macomb County Circuit Court based on the same facts as Manetta's claim. Similarly, his case was removed to federal district court, although the case assigned to this Court. Due to Judge LaPlata's retirement, and the fact that Manetta and Swieczkowski's cases arise from the same facts, their cases have been combined, and Manetta's case re-assigned to the Court. These matters are presently before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment filed by various Defendants.
In its current posture, Manetta's case involves 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Macomb County and Macomb County Assistant Prosecutor Eric Kaiser, individually and in his official capacity.1 Macomb and Kaiser have moved for summary judgment. As for Swieczkowski, his case consists of, at this time, state tort claims and § 1983 claims against both Kaiser and Schram — each of whom have moved for summary judgment.
In November 1993, Manetta resigned from her job with Karam Brothers, Inc. allegedly because of continuing sexual harassment. Immediately after her resignation, Manetta and Swieczkowski sought counsel to pursue a sexual harassment claim on her behalf. In a telephone conversation the following day, Manetta and Swieczkowski advised Ray Karam, owner of Karam Brothers, Inc., of the intended claim and that they had contacted an attorney. Karam offered to engage in settlement discussions.
Subsequently, Karam sought the assistance of the Michigan State Police to investigate the manner in which Manetta and Swieczkowski were settling her claim. Specifically, Karam presented the police with a tape of a conversation between him and Swieczkowski, and claimed that he had been advised that his family would learn of a previous affair between him and Manetta if her sexual harassment claim was not settled. The tape Karam provided to the police, however, did not contain any audible reference from Manetta or Swieczkowski regarding their intent to disclose the affair.
The Michigan State Police assigned the case to Detective Schram, who provided Karam with recording equipment which he used to record 8 conversations between himself and either or both Manetta and Swieczkowski. In particular, Schram advised Karam to try to elicit statements from Manetta and Swieczkowski regarding disclosure of information to his family. None of the conversations that were eventually taped contain threats to disclose the affair to Karam's family. In fact, the tapes contain numerous references from Manetta and Swieczkowski regarding attorneys' handling settlement negotiations.
Around November 23, 1993, Schram allegedly advised Kaiser of his investigation and provided him with tape recordings of the conversations. Thereafter, Kaiser and Schram instructed Karam to advise Manetta and Swieczkowski that he did not want attorneys directly involved in the settlement.
Independent of the unsupported allegations of Karam, neither Kaiser nor Schram had any evidence of any criminal activity by Manetta and Swieczkowski and, to the contrary, they had an abundance of evidence that Manetta and Swieczkowski were simply negotiating a settlement of a sexual harassment claim — albeit one which had not been filed, despite their assertions to the contrary, and one for which Manetta and Swieczkowski apparently refused to disclose their lawyer's name.
Karam and Manetta eventually reached a purported settlement agreement regarding her sexual harassment claim. Thus, Kaiser drew up a release which would evidence the alleged crime and which Karam would provide to Manetta at a settlement meeting that he would arrange. Next, Kaiser and Schram arranged for COMET (County of Macomb Enforcement Team) to monitor and videotape the meeting and to provide the funds which were to constitute the settlement.
At the December 1, 1993 settlement meeting in the parking lot of a restaurant in Shelby Township, Manetta signed the release, in exchange for what apparently was supposed to be $100,000, and was, in fact, only $40,000. After the money was exchanged, Karam drove away and Manetta and Swieczkowski were immediately arrested by undercover agents acting without arrest warrants. Arrest warrants, however, were issued the next day charging Manetta and Swieczkowski with extortion. Schram was the complaining witness on the warrant applications.
Incident to the arrest, officers searched Swieczkowski and found a firearm on his person. It was later determined that he was a Reserve Deputy of the Macomb County Sheriffs' Department, Reserve Mounted Division and as such was licensed to carry a firearm. Moreover, prior to the preliminary examination, Kaiser and Schram were informed that Manetta and Swieczkowski had been in contact with the law offices of Roy Gruenberg regarding the sexual harassment claim.
After the preliminary examination in Spring 1994, Judge Herman Campbell of the 41-A District Court dismissed all charges against Manetta and Swieczkowski related to these events. On February 24 and November 3 of 1995, respectively, Manetta and Swieczkowski commenced the instant actions.
Kaiser has, with respect to Swieczkowski's claims, moved for dismissal, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, based on his contention that Swieczkowski has neither set forth legally sufficient allegations nor pointed to evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his claimed violations. Because Kaiser, and in turn this Court, have referred to materials beyond the pleadings — namely the arrest warrants and the mixed question of law and fact regarding the existence of probable cause — Kaiser's motion to dismiss will be treated as seeking summary judgment and decided with the other pending summary judgment motions.
The relevant Federal Rule holds that summary judgment is proper "`if the pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Three 1986 Supreme Court cases — Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) — ushered in a "new era" in the standards of review for a summary judgment motion. These cases, in the aggregate, lowered the movant's burden on a summary judgment motion.2 According to the Celotex Court,
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.
After reviewing the above trilogy, the Sixth Circuit established a series of principles to be applied to motions for summary judgment. They are summarized as follows:
* Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment.
* The movant must meet the initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.
* The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact, but must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."
* The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.
* The trial court has more discretion than in the "old era" in evaluating the respondent's evidence. The respondent must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Further, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find" for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent's claim is plausible.
Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir.1989). See also, Nernberg v. Pearce, 35 F.3d 247, 249 (6th Cir.1994).
In deciding a prior Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings in Manetta's case, Judge LaPlata stated the following:
[T]he Court concludes that [Manetta] has alleged the necessary elements to sustain her § 1983 claim against the County. However, had this Motion been one for summary judgment, Plaintiff's claim would not have survived for Plai...
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