Manfre v. Shinkle

• Decision Date: 05 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 5D14–3368.,5D14–3368.
• Citation: 184 So.3d 641
• Parties: James MANFRE, in his Official Capacity, etc., Appellant, v. Kathleen SHINKLE, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

184 So.3d 641

James MANFRE, in his Official Capacity, etc., Appellant,

v.Kathleen SHINKLE, Appellee.

No. 5D14–3368.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Feb. 5, 2016.

Lisa M. Truckenbrod, of Jolly & Peterson, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Mark A. Matovina, of Politis & Matovina, P.A., Port Orange, for Appellee.

SAWAYA, J.

On a dark and unlit road shortly before sunrise, Kathleen Shinkle was driving her automobile in a rural part of Flagler County when she struck a dead horse lying on the roadway. She was traveling at approximately forty-five miles per hour, and the collision with the dead animal caused her vehicle to flip over and land on its roof. Shinkle suffered serious injuries. She filed suit against James Manfre as Sheriff of Flagler County, whom we will refer to as "the Sheriff." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Shinkle. The trial court subsequently granted Shinkle's motion for additur and rendered judgment in her favor with the additur included in the final amount of damages.

The issues presented are whether the Sheriff owed a duty of care (either common law or statutory) to Shinkle and, if a duty was owed, whether the action is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Proper resolution of these issues requires discussion of the following: 1) general principles of duty of care and sovereign immunity; 2) the public-duty doctrine relating to common law and statutory duties of care; 3) the special tort duty exception; and 4) the undertaker's doctrine. Each will be discussed seriatim after we present the factual and procedural background of the case. As we progress, we will explain why the principles of sovereign immunity are not a salient issue. As an initial matter, we note that the Sheriff raised the issue of whether the additur was proper. Because that issue is rendered moot by virtue of our resolution of the other issues presented, we will address it no further in this opinion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The essence of the underlying lawsuit is the Sheriff's limited involvement with two horses that had escaped the confines of their pasture prior to Shinkle's accident. The fate of one was its demise on the roadway. The facts are undisputed and do not require lengthy discussion.

About an hour and a half prior to Shinkle's accident, the Flagler County Sheriff's Office received a phone call reporting two horses roaming on the side of the road. There is no evidence that Shinkle had any contact with the Sheriff prior to her accident. A deputy responded to the location, watched as the horses ran up a driveway towards a residence and went back into what appeared to be a pasture. Evidence was presented at trial that the glow from the lights on the patrol car may have spooked the horses and caused them to return to the pasture. The deputy then cleared the call without getting out of his car or attempting to make contact with the property owner.

One of the horses apparently reemerged from the pasture and proceeded to the roadway, where it was struck and killed by a motorist. The dead animal was lying on the roadway when Shinkle subsequently came along, struck it, and flipped her vehicle.

Shinkle filed a negligence action against the Sheriff alleging that the deputy owed a duty of care to all those on the county roads (including Shinkle) and that the deputy breached the duty owed to Shinkle by negligently responding to the call and by failing to contact the presumed owners of the horses or otherwise ensure that the horses would not return to the roadway. The trial court denied the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment and motion for a directed verdict at trial, which were both premised on the Sheriff's argument that he owed no common law or statutory duty of care to Shinkle pursuant to the public-duty doctrine. Shinkle argued that even if the Sheriff owed her no common law or statutory duty of care under the public-duty doctrine, he owed her a special tort duty of care or, in the alternative, a duty of care pursuant to the undertaker's doctrine. The Sheriff presented an alternative argument that even if he owed Shinkle a duty of care, the acts alleged were discretionary acts for which sovereign immunity applies to bar the claim.

II. General Principles of Duty of Care and Sovereign Immunity

The doctrine of sovereign immunity derives from English common law and the medieval notion that the king could not be sued in his own courts without his consent and, thus, "the king can do no wrong." Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So.2d 379, 381 (Fla.1981). Sovereign immunity made its way into American jurisprudence via the federal courts, eventually becoming accepted doctrine in Florida law. The justification for the sovereign immunity doctrine in American jurisprudence mirrors that of the English courts and is based on "the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 908 So.2d 459, 471 (Fla.2005) (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, 27 S.Ct. 526, 51 L.Ed. 834 (1907) ). From this premise, the courts found further justification for sovereign immunity by reasoning that immunity was necessary to preserve the separation of powers doctrine by preventing courts from encroaching on legislative authority by judgments rendered against the government without its consent; to prevent encroachment on the government's authority to make decisions based on governmental discretion; and to preserve the public treasury by restricting damage awards against the government for its torts. Id.

Just as the king may consent to being sued, so too may the government, and the principles just discussed form the basis for the limitations placed on the Florida Legislature's eventual consent to waive sovereign immunity. Id.; Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1014 (Fla.1979). The underpinnings of this consent are found in the Florida Constitution, which grants to the Legislature the authority to enact general legislation to waive the state's sovereign immunity. See art. X, § 13, Fla. Const.¹ The Legislature enacted section 768.28, Florida Statutes, to provide for a limited waiver of the state's sovereign immunity "in tort actions for any act for which a private person under similar circumstances would be held liable." Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 534–35 (Fla.1999) ; see also § 768.28(1), (5), Fla. Stat. (2008). Therefore, as a threshold matter, there can be no governmental liability unless a common law or statutory duty of care was owed to the injured party. Wallace v. Dean, 3 So.3d 1035, 1044–45 (Fla.2009) ; Am. Home, 908 So.2d at 471 ; Pollock v. Fla. Dep't of High. Patrol, 882 So.2d 928, 932–33 (Fla.2004) ; Henderson, 737 So.2d at 535 ; Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 733–34 (Fla.1989). Thus, the prominence of duty of care in the realm of tort law as a "minimal threshold legal requirement for opening the courthouse doors," McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla.1992) (footnote omitted), renders it an equally important element in cases where injured parties seek to hold a governmental entity accountable for their damages. Wallace, 3 So.3d at 1047. As the court explained in Wallace, "[u]nder traditional principles of tort law, the absence of a duty of care between the defendant and the plaintiff results in a lack of liability, not application of immunity from suit." Id. at 1044 (citing Clay Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Johnson, 873 So.2d 1182, 1185 (Fla.2003) ). Therefore, only if a duty of care was owed to the injured individual does the analysis shift to a determination of whether sovereign immunity bars the action. Id. at 1053 ; Am. Home, 908 So.2d at 471 ; Pollock, 882 So.2d at 933 ; Henderson, 737 So.2d at 537.

III. Common Law and Statutory Duties of Care: The Public–Duty Doctrine.

Analysis of the duty of care requirement poses a question of law for the court to decide rather than the trier of fact. Wallace, 3 So.3d at 1046 ; McCain, 593 So.2d at 502. Because there is no catalogue that lists every circumstance that may give rise to a duty of care, the court in Wallace explained that "[w]here questions of duty arise in connection with potential governmental liability, we have provided a ‘rough,’ general guide concerning the type of activities that either support or fail to support the recognition of a duty of care between a governmental actor and an alleged tort victim." 3 So.3d at 1047 (citing Trianon Park Condo. Ass'n v. City of Hialeah, 468 So.2d 912, 919 (Fla.1985) ). Generally referred to as the public-duty doctrine, this guide was initially formulated by the court in Trianon and consists of four general categories that inform whether a duty of care is owed by a governmental entity to an individual. 468 So.2d at 919–21. Of those categories, "enforcement of laws and protection of the public safety" applies to the instant case.

Central to the public-duty doctrine is the principle consistently applied by the courts that government liability may not be established unless there is a common law or statutory duty of care owed by the government to the individual rather than to the general public. Wallace, 3 So.3d at 1045 ; Pollock, 882 So.2d at 933 ; Henderson, 737 So.2d at 537 ("Having concluded that the deputies owed the plaintiffs' decedents a duty of care separate from the general duty owed to the public as a whole, we must now decide whether the deputies' actions are, nevertheless, protected by sovereign immunity."); Vann v. Dep't of Corr., 662 So.2d 339, 340 (Fla.1995) ; Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936, 938 (Fla.1985) ; Willingham v. City of Orlando, 929 So.2d 43, 50 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) ("There could be, however, no governmental liability unless a common law or statutory duty of care existed that would have been applicable to an individual, as opposed to the general public, under similar circumstances." (citing Poll...