Mangal v. City of Pascagoula, CAUSE NO. 1:19CV232-LG-RHW

• Decision Date: 12 December 2019
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO. 1:19CV232-LG-RHW
• Citation: 426 F.Supp.3d 274
• Parties: Keshav G. MANGAL and Mukesh Mangal, Plaintiffs v. CITY OF PASCAGOULA, JACKSON COUNTY, MS, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

426 F.Supp.3d 274

Keshav G. MANGAL and Mukesh Mangal, Plaintiffs

v.CITY OF PASCAGOULA, JACKSON COUNTY, MS, Defendant

CAUSE NO. 1:19CV232-LG-RHW

United States District Court, S.D. Mississippi, Southern Division.

Signed December 12, 2019

W. Harvey Barton, Barton Law Firm, PLLC, Pascagoula, MS, for Plaintiffs.

Michael R. Moore, Bryan, Nelson, Schroeder, Castigliola & Banahan, Pascagoula, MS, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

LOUIS GUIROLA, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

BEFORE THE COURT is the [19] Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint filed by Defendant City of Pascagoula. The Motion argues that Plaintiffs' Complaint should be dismissed because res judicata bars Plaintiff's claims and Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state a claim for relief. The Motion is fully briefed. Having considered the submissions of the parties, the record, and relevant law, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part. It will be denied to the extent that Plaintiffs state a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment and otherwise granted

I. BACKGROUND

The Court dismissed Plaintiffs' original Complaint for failure to state a claim. (See Mem. Op. & Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their allegations to state a claim for relief and have filed their [15] First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint contains no new factual allegations but attempts to better articulate violations of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiffs Keshav Mangal and Mukesh Mangal owned a four-plex property located on Jackson Avenue in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Plaintiffs allege that the City of Pascagoula attempted to exercise eminent domain and take their property under a "quick take" procedure, see Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-27-81 to 89, for the purpose of expanding city-owned athletic fields. The City filed suit in the Special Court of Eminent Domain of Jackson County, Mississippi, paid 85% of a court-appointed appraiser's determined appraisal value for their property into the eminent domain court's registry, and gained immediate possession of Plaintiff's property. Plaintiffs assert that the City had no right to utilize the statutory "quick take" procedure – and had received legal counsel that the "quick take" procedure was inapplicable under the circumstances – but nonetheless did so and mailed Plaintiffs' four-plex tenants a letter advising that the tenants should vacate the premises because the property was to be condemned.

Filings in the state court record, which are attached to the City's Motion to Dismiss, indicate that the Court of Eminent Domain initially granted the City the right of immediate title and possession of Plaintiffs' property on August 2, 2018 (see Mot. Dismiss Ex. A, at 80-81, ECF No. 19-1), but then set aside that decision by agreed order on October 16, 2018. (See id. at 36.) On January 7, 2019, the Court of Eminent Domain entered an Agreed Final Judgment, which stated the following:

The Court is advised that a compromise settlement has been reached between the parties, fixing Defendants, Keshav G. Mangal and Mukesh K. Mangal, total compensation and damages in the amount of $160,000.00; and that all issues before the Court have now been resolved between the parties. The Court, being fully advised in the premises, accepts said settlement agreement, with the parties being bound hereto as if there had been a complete trial by jury and a Judgment rendered accordingly.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this Agreed Final Judgment be entered in this cause; that the completion of a trial by jury is waived by all parties; that total compensation and damages due to Defendants, Keshav G. Mangal and Mukesh K. Mangal, is $160,000.00; inclusive of any additional amounts that may be allowed by statute or otherwise with the sole exception of Defendants' claims regarding removal of their tenants and the use of ‘quick take’ by the City ....

(Id. at 12-13 (emphasis added).)

The Agreed Final Judgment entered in the Court of Eminent Domain apparently did not dispose of all of Plaintiffs' claims related to the City's exercise of eminent domain over their four-plex. Explicitly not resolved by the Agreed Final Judgment was Plaintiffs' claim that the City's reliance on Mississippi's statutory "quick take" procedure to take immediate possession of the property was unlawful.

Plaintiffs allege that the City "engaged in a course of conduct that resulted in the violation of the Plaintiffs' right[s]" to equal protection under the law and procedural and substantive due process of law pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the corresponding provisions of the Mississippi state constitution. (Am. Compl. 2, ECF No. 15.) They also reassert a takings claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and corresponding provisions of the Mississippi constitution. (Id. at 2-3.)

The City filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on August 22, 2019. The Motion argues (1) that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata and claim splitting and (2) that Plaintiffs otherwise fail to state a violation of their constitutional rights.

II. DISCUSSION

a. Motion to Dismiss Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and views them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. New Orleans City v. Ambac Assur. Corp. , 815 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 2016). But "the complaint must allege more than labels and conclusions, a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Jebaco, Inc. v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc. , 587 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2009). "While legal conclusions can provide the complaint's framework, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 664, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

"Documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim." Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc. , 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). The orders entered in the proceedings before the Special Court of Eminent Domain, though not specifically referred to in Plaintiffs' Complaint, are clearly central to their claim. Moreover, these orders may be considered because they are all matters of public record. See Kaempe v. Myers , 367 F.3d 958, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he cited documents are public records subject to judicial notice on a motion to dismiss."); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc. , 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) ("To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record."). The Court may thus consider these orders without converting the City's Motion to one for summary judgment.

b. Plaintiffs' Claims are Not Barred by Res Judicata

"To determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a federal action, federal courts must apply the law of the state from which the judgment emerged." Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist. , 461 F.3d 584, 588 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted); see also Thompson v. Dallas City Attorney's Office , 913 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Allen v. McCurry , 449 U.S. 90, 94-105, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) ). Accordingly, Mississippi law applies to this case.

Under Mississippi law, plaintiffs must consider carefully the potentially preclusive effect of claim-splitting. "The doctrine of res judicata bars parties from litigating claims ‘within the scope of the judgment’ in a prior action."

Anderson v. LaVere , 895 So. 2d 828, 832 (Miss. 2004). "This includes claims that were made or should have been made in the prior suit." Id. "Res judicata reflects the refusal of the law to tolerate a multiplicity of litigation." Little v. V & G Welding Supply, Inc. , 704 So. 2d 1336, 1337 (Miss. 1997). "It is a doctrine of public policy designed to avoid the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and foster reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibilities of inconsistent decisions." Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Ins., Inc. , 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (Miss. 2005).

Hill v. Carroll County , 17 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Miss. 2009).

The doctrine of res judicata has two primary functions: bar, which precludes claims that were actually litigated in a previous action, and merger, which prevents litigation of any claim that should have been litigated in a previous action. Id. at 1084-85. However, only unasserted "claims that could have been brought in the prior action are barred." Id. at 1085 (emphasis added). Res judicata "does not bar claims that could not have been asserted in the prior case because of limits on the court's subject matter jurisdiction."

McCarty v. Wood , 249 So. 3d 425, 430 (Miss. Ct. App.), cert. denied , 250 So. 3d 1269 (Miss. 2018) (citing Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons , 470 U.S. 373, 382, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274...