Mangiafico v. Blumenthal
| Decision Date | 19 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 05-5465-cv. |
| Citation | 471 F.3d 391 |
| Parties | Sebastian MANGIAFICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard BLUMENTHAL, Attorney General, John Armstrong, and Theresa Lantz, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Michelle Holmes, Esq., Waterbury, CT, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Gregory D'Auria, Assistant Attorney General, for Deputy Attorney General (Jane R. Rosenberg, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief), Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before KEARSE, SOTOMAYOR, and B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Sebastian Mangiafico, a Captain in the Connecticut Department of Corrections, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Kravitz, J.), Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, et al., 358 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.Conn.2005), dismissing claims against Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal on the ground of absolute immunity. In August 1998, while assigned to Connecticut's Northern Correctional Institution, Mangiafico and other correctional officers were involved in the removal of an inmate, Duane Ziemba, from his cell. The removal occurred after Ziemba had set off the sprinkler in the cell because the correctional officers allegedly refused to feed him. Ziemba subsequently sued Mangiafico and the other officers contending that he had been injured as a consequence of excessive force used during the extraction.1 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Connecticut law authorizes the indemnification of state employees under certain circumstances. Section 5-141d(a) of the General Statutes of Connecticut provides that the State "shall save harmless and indemnify" any state officer or employee from financial loss arising out of:
any claim, demand, suit or judgment by reason of his alleged negligence or alleged deprivation of any person's civil rights or other act or omission resulting in damage or injury, if the officer, employee or member is found to have been acting in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment and such act or omission is found not to have been wanton, reckless or malicious.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 5-141d(a) (2004).2
Section 5-141d(b) carves out an exception to subdivision (a)'s broad indemnification provisions by affording the state Attorney General considerable discretion in whether to apply it. Subdivision (b) provides that "[t]he state, through the attorney general, shall provide for the defense" of any state officer or employee in any civil action in state or federal court arising out of an act or omission occurring (or alleged to have occurred) while the officer or employee was discharging his duties or within the scope of his employment —
except that the state shall not be required to provide for such a defense whenever the attorney general, based on his investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case, determines that it would be inappropriate to do so and he so notifies the officer, employee or member in writing.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 5-141d(b) (2004). Whether the Attorney General enjoys absolute immunity for his determination that the state shall not provide for a state employee's defense forms the crux of this appeal.
Finally, if the Attorney General declines to provide a defense, the employee has an additional remedy. Section 5-141d(c), authorizes the state to reimburse the employee's legal fees upon resolution of the case if:
(1) the attorney general has stated in writing to the officer, employee or member, pursuant to subsection (b), that the state will not provide an attorney to defend the interests of the officer, employee or member, and (2) the officer, employee or member is thereafter found to have acted in the discharge of his duties or in the scope of his employment, and not to have acted wantonly, recklessly or maliciously. Such legal fees and costs incurred by a state officer or employee shall be paid to the officer or employee only after the final disposition of the suit, claim or demand and only in such amounts as shall be determined by the attorney general to be reasonable.
Conn. Gen.Stat. § 5-141d(c) (2004).
In response to Ziemba's suit, Mangiafico tendered his defense to the Attorney General, who refused him representation. Mangiafico then sued Blumenthal, former Commissioner of Corrections John Armstrong and current Commissioner Theresa Lantz pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the decision not to represent him violated rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He pursued an equal protection theory contending that the decision not to represent him was "in order to use him as a scapegoat." (Am. Compl. at ¶ 28.) The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), contending, among other things that Blumenthal was immune from suit.3 The district court denied the motion of Lantz and Armstrong for failure to state a claim, but granted the motion as to Blumenthal on the ground that he was entitled to absolute immunity. This appeal, principally challenging the grant of absolute immunity, followed, and we affirm.
We review the district court's dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 619 (2d Cir.1999), drawing all reasonable inferences in Mangiafico's favor, Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 691 (2d Cir.2001).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 purports to subject "[e]very person" acting under color of state law to liability for depriving any other person in the United States of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." The Supreme Court has consistently recognized, however, that Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (citations omitted).
Absolute immunity gives "public officials entrusted with sensitive tasks a protected area of discretion within which to carry out their responsibilities." Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 361 (2d Cir.1987). While absolute immunity from liability "defeats a suit at the outset," qualified immunity "depends upon the circumstances and motivations of [an official's] actions, as established by the evidence at trial." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). Supreme Court precedent makes plain that for executive officers in general, qualified immunity represents the norm. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
As an official seeking absolute immunity, Blumenthal bears the burden of showing that it is warranted for the function in question, against a presumption that qualified immunity affords sufficient protection. Burns, 500 U.S. at 486-87, 111 S.Ct. 1934. In determining whether state officials are entitled to absolute immunity, we employ a "functional" approach, looking at "the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988); see also Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 503 (2d Cir.2004). In other words, the critical inquiry is not the official position of the person seeking absolute immunity, but the specific action for which that person seeks immunity.
The Supreme Court has accorded absolute immunity to a limited range of government officials whose duties are deemed, as a matter of public policy, to require that protection to enable them to function without fear of undue interference or harassment. For example, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982), the Court extended absolute immunity to the President of the United States from damages liability predicated on his official acts. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978), a case arising from the court-ordered sterilization of a minor, the Court restated the principle that judges enjoy absolute immunity from damage suits arising from the performance of their official functions. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975), held that the activities of a Senate subcommittee, the individual senators and the committee's chief counsel were, under the speech and debate clause, entitled to absolute immunity in the face of an action to enjoin the enforcement of a subpoena issued by the subcommittee.
Of particular relevance to this appeal is the Supreme Court's extension of absolute immunity to government officials performing prosecutorial functions. In Imbler, a defendant whose murder conviction had been overturned in a habeas corpus proceeding sued the prosecutor pursuant to § 1983, contending that he had knowingly used false testimony and suppressed material evidence at trial. The Court held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity, even at the expense of leaving a genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress. The Court reasoned that qualified immunity would disserve the broader public interest by impairing the vigorous and fearless performance of prosecutorial responsibilities essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424, 96 S.Ct. 984. In the same vein, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), involved a suit by former registered futures commission merchants against the Department of Agriculture seeking damages on the ground that the Department had wrongfully initiated administrative proceedings. The Court held that persons performing adjudicatory functions within federal agencies are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts and that agency officials who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor...
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