Mangrum v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Decision Date | 29 January 1997 |
Docket Number | WAL-MART |
Citation | 950 S.W.2d 33 |
Parties | Barbara MANGRUM, Plaintiff/Appellant, v.STORES, INC., Defendant/Appellee. |
Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
E. Covington Johnston, Jr., Franklin, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Bradley Gilmore, Nashville, Charles A. Powell, III, Birmingham, for Defendant/Appellee.
The captioned plaintiff has appealed from the summary dismissal of her suit for age discrimination in her discharge from employment by the defendant.
Plaintiff presents a single issue for review, as follows:
Whether the Trial Judge erroneously granted the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the plaintiff's case.
Defendant presents two issues, as follows:
I. Whether the factual findings of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security are entitled to preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel thereby preventing the plaintiff from relitigating the reason for her termination.
2. Whether Wal-Mart is entitled to summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to produce any evidence that its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for her termination is a pretext for age discrimination.
The complaint alleges violation of T.C.A.App. §§ 4-21-101, et seq, which constitute Chapter 21 of Title 4 entitled "Human Rights," of which Part 4 is designated "Employment Related Discrimination" and § 4-21-401 is entitled "Employer Practices." It reads as follows:
4-21-401. Employer practices.--(a) It is a discriminatory practice for an employer to:
(1) Fail or refuse to hire or discharge any person or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin; or
(2) Limit, segregate or classify an employee or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive or tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of an employee, because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin.
The complaint states:
3. Plaintiff began her employment with Defendant Wal-Mart in March of 1984. At the time of her discharge on May 17, 1989, she was a department manager.
4. In the fall of 1988, Defendant had two stores in the Franklin area. A new store was constructed and both older stores were to be consolidated therein.
5. Prior to the consolidation, Plaintiff and another employee (over 40) were told by their manager that Defendant Wal-Mart was going to have to weed out the older employees because they were too set in their ways.
6. When Plaintiff moved to the new store and took over as department manager, she was treated more harshly than other persons outside of the protective class. Management employees made false reports against her and found fault with her work as part of an effort to remove her from her job because of her age.
7. Plaintiff was discharged on the grounds of insubordination and the management officials gave false and misleading testimony against her when she applied for employment security benefits. These false and misleading statements were a continuation of the effort to have her removed from her employment.
The answer of defendant admits paragraphs 3 and 4 above, and admits paragraph 7 except that false and misleading statements and testimony are denied. The answer denies any unlawful discrimination against plaintiff.
At this stage of the proceedings, defendant's motion for summary judgment placed the burden upon defendant to produce uncontroverted evidence of a fact or facts which require dismissal of the complaint as a matter of law. T.R.C.P. Rule 56.03. Caledonia Leasing & Equipment Co., v. Armstrong, Allen, Braden, Goodman, McBride & Prewitt, Tenn.App.1992, 865 S.W.2d 10; Masters v. Rishton, Tenn.App.1992, 863 S.W.2d 702; Brown v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., Tenn.App.1992, 861 S.W.2d 834.
Defendant insists that plaintiff is collaterally estopped to assert that she was discharged because of her age because her claim for unemployment compensation by the Department of Employment Security was denied because of a finding that she was discharged for insubordination.
The record contains certified copies of records of the Department of Employment Security, including the decision of the Board of Review which states:
In Morris v. Esmark Apparel, Inc., Tenn.App.1991, 832 S.W.2d 563, the plaintiff sued for breach of employment contract by discharge without cause. The Trial Court summarily dismissed because the Department of Employment Security had denied unemployment benefits based upon a finding that the plaintiff was discharged for misconduct connected with his work. This Court affirmed and said:
In 1996 the U.S. Supreme Court expressly applied the doctrine in the administrative law context, stating:
When an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose. (Citations omitted)
Subsequently, in the case of Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S.Ct. 3220, 92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986), that court held:
....[W]e hold that when a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate," [U.S. v.] Utah Construction & Mining Co., supra, 384 U.S. , at 422, 86 S.Ct. [1545], at 1560, [16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966) ] federal courts must give the agency's fact finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.
The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to give conclusive effect to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies. See, Ryan v. New York Telephone Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487 (1984); Bostwick v. Atlas Iron Masters, Inc. 780 P.2d 1184 (Okla.App.1988); Bresnahan v. May Department Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327 (Mo.-Banc 1987).
In 1993, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 169, Public Acts of 1993 which added to T.C.A. § 50-7-304, a new subsection K, reading as follows:
(k) Conclusiveness of Findings. No finding of fact or law, judgment, conclusion, or final order made with respect to a claim for unemployment compensation under this chapter may be conclusive in any separate or subsequent action or proceeding in another forum, except proceedings under this chapter, regardless of whether the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the same facts.
The applicability of this amendment must be decided upon the following facts:
Plaintiff was discharged on May 17, 1989. On September 27, 1989, the State Department of Employment Security Board of Review denied plaintiff's claim for unemployment compensation, finding that plaintiff was discharged for insubordination constituting misconduct. The present complaint was filed on May 16, 1990. On August 16, 1990, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment supported by certified records of the Unemployment Compensation proceeding, the complaint, the answer, and a memorandum of law. There was no affidavit of any official of the defendant regarding the discharge or the reason therefor. This motion was based entirely upon the preclusive effect of the finding of the State Department of...
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