Mangum v. United States
| Decision Date | 07 May 1923 |
| Docket Number | 3925. |
| Citation | 289 F. 213 |
| Parties | MANGUM v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Ralph W. Langworthy, of Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiff in error.
Frederick H. Bernard, U.S. Atty., of Tucson, Ariz.
Before GILBERT and RUDKIN, Circuit Judges, and BEAN, District Judge.
The plaintiff in error was charged by an indictment in two counts with assault to commit the crime of rape and the commission of the crime. From the judgment which followed he brings this appeal.
The evidence on behalf of the government tended to show that on the afternoon of July 19, 1921, while the prosecutrix was horseback riding on a military reservation in Arizona, she suddenly met at a turn of the trail a negro soldier on a buckskin horse. The soldier immediately dismounted, grabbed the reins of the prosecutrix's horse, seized her, and notwithstanding her efforts to repulse him, dragged her from her horse, tore her clothing, bruised her body, threw her to the ground, and struggled with her until she became unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she was alone but soon thereafter an officer of the post came along with her horse and that of her assailant, and she accompanied him home, where she informed her husband of her experience. He and other officers immediately took steps to identify and apprehend her assailant.
Investigation pointed to the plaintiff in error as the probably guilty party, and orders were issued for his apprehension; but he was not located until the following morning, when he was taken before his superior officers and interrogated. At first he denied any connection with the affair, but after repeated questioning, and admonitions to tell the truth, he admitted his guilt; but his language was so brutal that the officers naturally, although not justifiably, lost their tempers and assaulted him. He was taken before an examining magistrate where he made a similar statement, and was thereupon committed to await the action of the grand jury. Upon his arrival at Tucson the same day, he was again interviewed by an agent of the Department of Justice and asked, in the presence of some of the military officers and other persons, if he desired to make a statement, but was told that he did not have to do so unless he wanted to, and without any threats, or promises of immunity, or inducements of any kind, he made a statement similar to that previously made to the military officers. After he had been confined in the county jail with other prisoners for about six weeks, he was again interviewed by an agent of the Department of Justice in the presence of a deputy marshal, when the seriousness of the alleged offense was pointed out to him and he was told that, while he did not have to make any statement, unless he desired to do so, if there was anything he wanted to say, or if he had any excuse or reason to offer in mitigation of his conduct or material to his defense, it would be investigated. He thereupon for the first time gave a detailed account of his actions, conduct, and movements on the day of the assault. Before doing so, he was warned of his rights. There was no offer of immunity or reward, and no threats or violence used.
The evidence in relation to these several confessions was heard by the court without the presence of the jury, and after such hearing it ruled that none of them were admissible in evidence, except the one made to the agent of the Department of Justice, some five or six weeks after the plaintiff in error had been committed to the county jail. This latter ruling is assigned as error, on the ground that the confession was not freely and voluntarily made, but was the result of coercion and improper influence.
The general rule is undisputed that a confession, in order to be admissible in evidence, must have been freely and voluntarily made, and not extracted by any sort of threats or intimidation, nor obtained by any direct or implied promise nor the result of any improper influence. Bram v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532, 18 Sup.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568; Sorenson v. U.S., 143 F. 820, 74 C.C.A. 468; Purpura v. U.S. (C.C.A.) 262 F. 473; Murphy v. U.S. (C.C.A.) 285 F. 801. And if a confession is induced by threats or violence or any undue influence, a subsequent confession is not admissible, unless it appears...
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