Mankins v. Paxton

• Decision Date: 20 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00AP-1152.,00AP-1152.
• Citation: 142 Ohio App.3d 1,753 NE 2d 918
• Parties: MANKINS, Appellant, v. PAXTON, Executive Dir., Washington County Department of Human Services, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

142 Ohio App.3d 1

753 NE 2d 918

MANKINS, Appellant, v. PAXTON, Executive Dir., Washington County Department of Human Services, et al., Appellees.

No. 00AP-1152.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided March 20, 2001.

Gary M. Smith, for appellant.

Lambert & McWhorter and Randall L. Lambert, for appellee Washington County Department of Human Services.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Ann E. Henkener, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and Jacqueline Romer Sensky, Director.

TYACK, Judge.

On January 11, 1999, Valerie Mankins filed suit against the director of the former Washington County Department of Human Services, Washington County, the then director of the former Ohio Department of Human Services, and the former Ohio Department of Human Services. The Ohio Department of Human Services is now known as the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, and the Washington County Department of Human Services is now known as the Washington County Department of Job and Family Services. The lawsuit was filed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Mankins set forth claims for relief of violation of Section 1983, Title 42, U.S.Code, violation of Section 12131 et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code (the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990), violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Section 794, Title 29, U.S.Code), breach of contract, violations of the Ohio Constitution, and violation of R.C. 5107.01 et seq. (Ohio Works First program). Mankins also sought review of an administrative determination made pursuant to R.C. 5101.35. Declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief was sought.¹

After service of process, an answer was filed on behalf of the Washington County defendants. On February 26, 1999, counsel for the state defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On August 14, 2000, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over all of the claims. Due to the finding as to subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety.

Mankins ("appellant") has pursued a direct appeal, assigning a single error for our consideration:

"The trial court erred as matter of law in dismissing causes of action one through five and seven through nine of Ms. Mankins' complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction since she did not fail to exhaust remedies and the trial court would still have jurisdiction over the remaining claims."

The trial court found that the essence of appellant's claims was that she was wrongly denied benefits under the Ohio Works First program. (Trial court decision at 7.) The trial court concluded that R.C. 5101.35 was an insurmountable impediment to jurisdiction of the court. Id. R.C. 5101.35 sets forth the appeals process from a denial of assistance under the Ohio Works First program.

The Ohio Department of Job and Family Services receives federal funding for the administration of the federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program ("TANF"). In Ohio, TANF is called Ohio Works First ("OWF"). In January 1998, appellant injured herself on the job. By April 1998, appellant could no longer work due to these injuries. She therefore applied for assistance through OWF in April 1998.

Under TANF, a state must reduce or terminate assistance to an individual who refuses to engage in work activities required under the law, subject to such good cause and other exceptions as the state may establish. Section 607(e), Title 42, U.S.Code. Pursuant to Section 608(b), Title 42, U.S.Code, Ohio has made it mandatory that a person wishing to receive assistance under OWF enter into a written self-sufficiency contract with the county department of job and family services. R.C. 5107.14. This contract sets forth the rights and responsibilities of the applicant for and participant in OWF, including work responsibilities. Id.

According to the complaint, Washington County required appellant to sign a boilerplate self-sufficiency contract that provided no services or assistance appellant needed in order to become economically self-sufficient. Appellant alleges that the county "ordered" her to work in a county manual labor crew, performing repair, maintenance and janitorial services. Such work was to begin May 11, 1998. In early May 1998, appellant's doctor permitted her to work on a limited basis. However, on May 7, 1998, appellant re-injured herself while working.² On May 8, 1998, appellant saw her doctor, who significantly restricted her work activities.

According to the complaint, appellant's doctor telephoned the county, informing it of appellant's restricted activities. Appellant believed that she had therefore verified her inability to work in May. In June 1998, Washington County sent notice to appellant proposing to sanction her OWF assistance for her failure to work in May. Appellant was sanctioned for her failure to work and for failing to establish good cause for such failure. Washington County determined that appellant failed to provide a written medical statement verifying illness. Appellant appealed to the state hearing bureau, and a state hearing officer affirmed the county's sanction. Appellant then appealed to the state office of legal services pursuant to R.C. 5101.35. On December 11, 1998, a hearing examiner affirmed the hearing officer's decision, finding the county's good-cause standard of "a medical statement is required to verify illness" could imply the need to submit written documentation.

Appellant averred in her complaint that the above actions have caused her to suffer irreparable injury to her constitutional and legal rights without adequate remedy at law and have caused her emotional and economic harm and personal injury. She therefore set forth the claims listed above.

Counsel for appellant apparently acknowledges that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the sixth claim set forth in the complaint. The sixth claim was a purported administrative appeal of the December 11, 1998 decision made by the hearing examiner pursuant to R.C. 5101.35. At the time of the hearing examiner's decision, R.C. 5101.35(E) stated:

"(E) An appellant who disagrees with an administrative appeal decision of the director of human services or the director's designee issued under division (C) of this section may appeal from the decision to the court of common pleas pursuant to section 119.12 of the Revised Code. The appeal shall be governed by section 119.12 of the Revised Code except that:

"(1) The person may appeal to the court of common pleas of the county in which the person resides, or to the court of common pleas of Franklin county if the person does not reside in this state."³ (Emphasis added.) Appellant is a resident of Washington County; therefore, she had to appeal the director's decision to the Washington County Court of Common Pleas, not the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. See Richardson v. Ohio Dept. of Human Serv. (May 23, 1991), Franklin App. No. 91AP-148, unreported, 1991 WL 96346. However, appellant asserts that the remaining claims could be pursued in Franklin County, given the fact that the state defendants are located here.

We begin with the standard applied to motions to dismiss. In order to grant a motion to dismiss, it must appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling her to relief. Vail v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 279, 280, 649 N.E.2d 182, 184. In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and the complaining party must be afforded all reasonable inferences possibly derived therefrom. Id. Here, the trial court dismissed the entire complaint against all parties on the basis that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the matters. In so concluding, the trial court cited Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 586 N.E.2d 80. For the reasons that follow, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims.

In Jones v. Chagrin Falls (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 456, 674 N.E.2d 1388, syllabus, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the doctrine of failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional defect to a declaratory judgment action: it is an affirmative defense that may be waived if not timely asserted and maintained. The trial court found, in essence, that appellant's claims could have been addressed in an administrative appeal to the Washington County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to R.C. 5101.35 and, therefore, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. However, as held in Jones, appellant's failure to exhaust any alleged administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional bar to the declaratory judgment action asserted against the state defendants.

In the case at bar, the state defendants raised only the affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to appellant's sixth and eighth claims for relief. As indicated above, the sixth claim is not at issue in this appeal. In her eighth claim for relief, appellant sought, essentially, a declaration that her rights under R.C. Chapter 5107 (the statutes governing OWF) were violated. In their motion to dismiss, the state defendants contended that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's claim for eligibility for OWF benefits because appellant had an adequate administrative remedy.

First, we disagree with the state's assertion that appellant's eighth claim contains a jurisdictional defect. The eighth claim is a declaratory judgment action over which the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas would otherwise have jurisdiction. The state asserts that appellant had an adequate remedy through the administrative appeals process. Again, the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative...