Manley v. Manley

• Decision Date: 27 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 0882,0882
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jeanette MANLEY, Appellant, v. Lewis F. MANLEY, Sr., Lewis F. Manley, Jr., Merry Lynn Manley Kelly and Dr. E.N. Davis, Respondents. . Heard

Page 312

353 S.E.2d 312

291 S.C. 325

Jeanette MANLEY, Appellant, v. Lewis F. MANLEY, Sr., Lewis F. Manley, Jr., Merry Lynn

Manley Kelly and Dr. E.N. Davis, Respondents.

No. 0882.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 27, 1987.

Decided Feb. 16, 1987.

Herman E. Cox, Greenville, for appellant.

Alexander S. Macaulay, Theodore A. Snyder, Jr., Walhalla, William M. Hagood, III, and David L. Moore, Greenville, for respondents.

CURETON, Judge:

In this tort action appellant Jeanette Manley sued her former husband, her two children and a physician for false imprisonment, outrage and defamation. The trial court granted the respondents' motions for summary judgment. The mother appeals the granting of the motions. We affirm.

The respondent Lewis F. Manley, Sr. (father) is the former husband of Jeanette Manley. Respondents Lewis F. Manley, Jr. (Lewis, Jr.) and Merry Lynn Manley Kelly (Merry Lynn) are her children. Respondent Davis (Dr. Davis) is a psychiatrist. The gravamen of the mother's suit is her involuntary commitment to a state psychiatric facility.

The mother's complaint alleges that on January 30, 1984, the respondents "accused [her] of being mentally ill and caused her to be admitted to the South Carolina State Hospital for the insane." She further alleges that she was not mentally ill and was ordered discharged from the Hospital on February 6, 1984. She additionally alleges that as "a direct and proximate result of the actions of these [respondents], [she] has been defamed, falsely imprisoned, and outraged."

The answer of the father is a general denial. The children also assert a general denial and by affirmative defense allege that because the mother threatened to take her own life and the life of their father, it was necessary that they take action to preclude the mother from harming herself and others. They also allege that their actions were both lawful and justified under the circumstances. Dr. Davis filed a motion to make the mother's complaint more definite and certain, but the motion has never been heard.

Thereafter, the mother took the deposition of all of the respondents and Dr. Davis took the deposition of the registrar of the state mental health facility to which the mother was admitted. All respondents then moved for summary judgment and submitted in support of their motions the depositions and the affidavits of Lewis, Jr., Merry Lynn, and psychiatrists Dr. John P. Taylor, Dr. Eloida Villafranca and Dr. Leticia Matawaran.

The affidavits of Lewis, Jr. and Merry Lynn state that in January 1984, their mother called each of them and threatened to take her life and the life of their father. These respondents' affidavits also indicate that after consultation with each other, it was determined that lawful steps had to be taken to prevent their mother from harming herself and others. Both respondents' affidavits denied that their father had anything to do with the mother's commitment to the hospital. The depositions of the father, Lewis, Jr. and Merry Lynn fully support these affidavits. Dr. Davis testified on deposition that although the mother denied she had threatened to kill herself and her former husband, she did admit to a previous suicide attempt. He further testified that after examining the mother and talking to the children, he was convinced that the mother suffered from a mental disorder that required further evaluation and treatment. Other affidavits and depositions submitted by the respondents show that while the mother was found not to be mentally ill on February 6, 1984 and was discharged from the State Mental Hospital, Dr. Davis had acted properly in recommending that she be sent to the Hospital for evaluation.

The mother submitted no affidavits or other evidence in opposition to the motions. The trial judge found from a review of the evidence that the father was not in any way involved in the commitment of the mother to the State Hospital. He also found that the other respondents "acted in a reasonable and lawful manner and were justified in taking the action that they took."

The issue on appeal is whether there is a genuine issue of a material fact that the actions taken by the respondents in committing the mother to the hospital were justified, lawful or privileged.

The purpose of summary judgment is to obviate delay where there is no material issue of fact involved. Hammond v. Scott, 268 S.C. 137, 232 S.E.2d 336 (1977). Where a motion for summary judgment is made and supported by proper affidavits, a plaintiff cannot rest on allegations in his pleadings that are controverted by affidavits and/or depositions submitted by defendants. S.C.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Dyer v. Moss, 284 S.C. 208, 325 S.E.2d 69 (Ct.App.1985).

Citing the case of Bell v. Dixie Furniture Co., Inc., 285 S.C. 263, 329 S.E.2d 431 (1985), the mother argues that the respondents had no excuse or justification in law for committing her to the hospital and their conduct was outrageous. In the seminal case of Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. 157, 276 S.E.2d 776 (1981), our Supreme Court adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 46 as the standard of conduct for recovery in outrage cases. The standard adopted requires that in order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendant's conduct must have been "so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Ford v. Hutson, 276 S.C. at 162, 276 S.E.2d at 778.

The respondents have demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Court that there is no genuine issue of fact that the conduct of any of the respondents approaches this standard. The evidence is undisputed that the respondents acted in good faith and in a reasonable manner. We therefore hold that the trial judge committed no error in granting the respondents' motions for summary judgment on this cause of action.

The appellant next claims that because she was found not to be mentally ill, her custodial detention for examination by Dr. Davis and confinement to the State Hospital constitute false imprisonment. We disagree. Where one is arrested by lawful authority, an action for false imprisonment cannot be maintained. Bushardt v. United Investment Co., 121 S.C. 324, 113 S.E. 637 (1922); Watkins v. Mobil Oil Corp., 281 S.C. 79, 313 S.E.2d 641 (Ct.App.1984). Even if the arrest is improvidently procured, the wronged party's remedy lies in an action...