Manly v. Abernethy
| Decision Date | 11 November 1914 |
| Docket Number | 339. |
| Citation | 83 S.E. 343,167 N.C. 220 |
| Parties | MANLY v. ABERNETHY. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Rockingham County; Devin, Judge.
Action by Luther A. Manly against M. B. Abernethy. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
As between two possible constructions of a statute, that one should be adopted which effectuates rather than defeats the legislative purpose.
Johnston Ivie & Dalton, of Reidsville, for appellant.
P. W Glidewell, of Reidsville, and C. O. McMichael, of Wentworth for appellee.
This action was brought to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff, as the result of the negligent running and operation of defendant's automobile, whereby he was knocked down by the said car in a public street, where he had the right to be, and severely injured. There seems to be not the slightest room for doubt, if the evidence of plaintiff is true, that defendant negligently ran his car at an excessive rate of speed, 45 miles the hour, in a much used and frequented public thoroughfare, and without giving any signal of his approach. The case turns upon the applicability of Public Laws of 1913, c. 107, at page 188, which reads as follows: (1) When "approaching a pedestrian who is upon the traveled part of any highway, and not upon a sidewalk and upon approaching any intersecting highway or a curve, or a corner in a highway where the operator's view is obstructed, every person operating a motor vehicle shall slow down and give a timely signal with his bell, horn, or other device for signaling;" and (2) when approaching an intersecting highway, a bridge, dam, sharp curve, or steep descent, and also in traversing such intersecting highway, bridge, dam, curve, or descent, a person operating a motor vehicle shall have it under control and operate it at such speed, not to exceed seven miles an hour, having regard to the traffic then on such highway and the safety of the public. The court charged that the second branch of the statute did not apply to the facts of this case, and defendant (appellee), in his well-prepared brief, states that the instruction was given to the jury "because the accident did not take place at an intersection of a highway, but in front of Walker & Co.'s mill," which is not at a place, as he contends, where one street enters into, or connects with or crosses, another street, and for the further reason that "West Market street enters into a street which runs by Walker & Co.'s mills, but said West Market street does not cross the other (Settle) street, and therefore is not an intersecting street, within the meaning of the statute. The street, which is not given a name by defendant in his brief, and which joined with West Market street, is known as Settle street (by plaintiff's own evidence). Record, p. 8. Plaintiff excepted to the ruling of the court upon the statute and appealed from the judgment. Defendant testified in his own behalf as follows:
So that there was some evidence, proceeding from the defendant himself, who testified in his own behalf, that plaintiff was knocked down and injured at the intersection of two streets, provided it is not necessary that one street should cross another, in order for it to be said that the former intersects the latter, within the meaning of the law and the intent of its makers, for the latter should be added, as every law, when ambiguously worded, should be construed according to its true intent, to be gathered of course, from its language. Webster defines the word "intersect" as follows: "To cut into or between;" and, secondly, "to cut or cross mutually." The ordinary meaning may be "to cross," but its true sense, in the particular statute or writing, must be ascertained by a full reference to the context in which the word appears.
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