Mann v. City of Sacramento
| Decision Date | 24 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:17-cv-01201 WBS DB,2:17-cv-01201 WBS DB |
| Citation | 521 F.Supp.3d 917 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | Robert MANN, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants. |
Mark E. Merin, Paul Hajime Masuhara, III, Law Office of Mark E. Merin, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Sean D. Richmond, City of Sacramento City Attorney Office, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants City of Sacramento, Sacramento Police Department, Samuel D. Somers, Jr.
Bruce Alan Kilday, Derick E. Konz, John A. Whitesides, Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff, LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendants John C. Tennis, Randy R. Lozoya.
Plaintiffs Robert Mann Sr. ("Robert"), Vern Murphy-Mann ("Vern"), and Deborah Mann ("Deborah") (collectively, "plaintiffs") brought this action against defendants City of Sacramento, the Sacramento Police Department, Samuel D. Somers Jr. ("Chief Somers"), John C. Tennis ("Officer Tennis"), and Randy R. Lozoya ("Officer Lozoya") (collectively, "defendants"), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages arising from the killing of their brother, Joseph Mann ("Joseph"), by Officers Tennis and Lozoya on July 11, 2016.1 (See Compl. (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiffs claimed that, by shooting and killing Joseph, Officers Tennis and Lozoya had deprived them of their right of intimate association with their brother under the First and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 (See generally id. )
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (See Docket No. 12); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On September 19, 2017, the court granted defendants’ motion as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for loss of companionship under the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Ninth Circuit has expressly limited such claims to parents and children. (See Docket No. 23); Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1991). The court denied defendants’ motion as to plaintiffs’ claim under the First Amendment, however, holding that, under applicable Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit case law, plaintiffs had adequately alleged a § 1983 claim for deprivation of their First Amendment right to association. (See Docket No. 23); Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987) ; IDK, Inc. v. Clark Cty., 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988).
Defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which issued a memorandum opinion reversing this court's decision as to plaintiffs’ claims under the First Amendment.3 See Mann v. City of Sacramento, 748 F. App'x 112 (9th Cir. 2018) (" Mann II"). The Ninth Circuit explained that plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient facts to establish a violation of an "intimate association" right protected under the First or Fourteenth Amendments:
Plaintiffs did not allege that their relationships with Joseph involved marriage, child rearing, or cohabitation, as in [ Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001) ] or [ Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2018) ]. Nor did they allege specific facts about the ‘objective characteristics’ of their relationships with Joseph to show that they were nonetheless the sort of relationships that ‘warrant constitutional protection.’
Mann II, 748 F. App'x at 115 (quoting Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545-46, 107 S.Ct. 1940 ). "Moreover," the court continued, "even if plaintiffs could plead sufficient facts to satisfy the standards for intimate association set forth in Rotary Club, relief would be foreclosed under Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1991)." Id. The court noted that Ward had held that adult, non-cohabitating siblings do not possess a cognizable liberty interest in their brother's companionship. See id. "Because we analyze the right of intimate association in the same manner regardless whether we characterize it under the First or Fourteenth Amendments, Ward necessarily rejected any argument that adult, non-cohabitating siblings enjoy a right to intimate association." Id. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to this court to consider whether to grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint. See id.
On remand, this court granted plaintiffs leave to amend, and plaintiffs timely filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), adding a number of allegations related to their relationship with Joseph and to Joseph's living situation in the months preceding his death. (See Docket No. 59.) Defendants again moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, even with plaintiffs’ amendments, the complaint still failed to state a claim for relief upon which relief may be granted. (See Docket No. 61); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On March 13, 2019, the court granted defendants’ motion. (See Docket No. 70.) Based on Mann II’s statement that "even if plaintiffs could plead sufficient facts to satisfy the standards for intimate association set forth in Rotary Club, relief would be foreclosed ... [because Ward ] held that adult, non-cohabitating do not possess a cognizable liberty interest in their brother's companionship," Mann II, 748 F. App'x at 115 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), the court held that the FAC failed to state a § 1983 claim under the First Amendment because it failed to adequately allege that Joseph cohabitated with any of the plaintiffs at the time of his death. (See Docket No. 70.)
Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. (See Docket No. 72.) On April 30, 2020, a new panel issued a memorandum opinion, which again reversed the decision of this court. See Mann v. Sacramento Police Dep't, 803 F. App'x 142 (9th Cir. 2020) (" Mann III"). The Ninth Circuit first noted that Mann II’s statement that Ward would foreclose plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim under the First Amendment "even if" they had pled sufficient facts to satisfy Rotary Club was dicta, because Ward neither created a cohabitation requirement nor purported to govern First Amendment claims. See id. at 143 (citing Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass'n, Inc., 195 F.3d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1999) ; Ward, 967 F.2d at 284 ). Rather, Ward had only addressed Fourteenth Amendment intimate-association claims brought by adult siblings. See id.
The Ninth Circuit further stated that Mann II had recognized that cohabitation was "one of several objective indicia that courts may consider when assessing whether plaintiffs were deprived of their intimate-association right" under the First Amendment. See id. at 143-44 (citing Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545, 107 S.Ct. 1940 ; Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236 ; Lee, 250 F.3d at 685-86 ; Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 1995) ). The court remanded the case "for consideration of plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim under the standard set forth in Rotary Club and its progeny." Id. at 144.
On remand, defendants renewed their motion to dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim0, and the parties submitted updated briefs in light of Mann III. 4
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal when the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the complaint has stated "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Although legal conclusions "can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
The court's discussion of whether plaintiffs have adequately stated a § 1983 claim for deprivation of their First Amendment rights is complicated by the fact that the Mann II and Mann III decisions appear to be plainly contradictory. While Mann II stated that the right of intimate association should be analyzed in the same manner regardless of whether it is characterized under the First or Fourteenth Amendments, and that Ward bars intimate association claims by adult, non-cohabitating siblings, Mann III stated that Ward did not create a cohabitation requirement, and addressed only Fourteenth Amendment association claims, implying that the contours of an intimate association claim may differ depending on which amendment the claim is brought under.
Because Mann III was decided more recently, this court will proceed according to the guidance set out in that decision. See Mann III, 803 F. App'x at 144. Mann III did not purport to define exactly how far a claim for intimate association under the First Amendment extends, but the fact that the Ninth Circuit reversed this court's dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim under the First Amendment (see Docket No. 70) implies that, at least in certain circumstances, the right of siblings to intimately associate falls within the First Amendment's ambit.5
This conclusion is supported by the Supreme Court's opinion in Rotary Club. There, the Court was tasked with determining whether the relationship between members of the Rotary Club, an international fraternal organization of almost a million members, was sufficiently intimate to warrant protection under the First Amendment. See Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 539-40, 107 S.Ct. 1940. The Court's analysis began by recognizing that "the First Amendment...
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