Mann v. Griffith

Decision Date25 March 2021
Docket NumberCase No. 4:18-cv-00228 SRC
PartiesBRIAN MANN, Petitioner, v. CINDY GRIFFITH, Respondent(s).
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
Memorandum and Order

Brian Mann, Jerome Jones, and a third accomplice robbed a St. Louis wholesale grocery store at gunpoint, and tragedy ensued. Doc. 6-7 at 4-5. Mann wore a camouflage jacket and wielded a .45 caliber semiautomatic weapon against the store employees. Id. Approaching the front counter, Mann took $1,000 from the clerk at the cash register and then pushed her to the floor. Id. . When the store owner and office manager entered the room, the robbers shot and killed them both. Id. Mann then turned to the clerk on the floor and shot her three times in the legs. Id. The robbers escaped the scene by car, but the police arrested Mann and Jones within an hour. Id.

A state-court jury found Mann guilty of two counts of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree assault, one count of first-degree robbery, and four related counts of armed criminal action. Doc. 6-7 at 4. The state court sentenced Mann to two consecutive sentences of life without parole for first-degree murder, one life sentence for first-degree robbery, one twenty-year sentence for first degree assault, and an additional two life sentences and two twenty-year sentences for armed criminal action. Id. Mann appealed his conviction to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Mann remains incarcerated. Docs. 1, 11. Mann now petitions this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for writ of habeas corpus, alleging various errors by the state trial court. Id. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Mann's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

I. Facts and Background

The Missouri Court of Appeals described the pertinent facts as follows:

On the morning of May 12, 2008, Ms. Cross, the mother of Defendant's [Mann's] one-year-old child, took Defendant's child and her other child to a clinic for an appointment. At the clinic, Ms. Cross received a call from Defendant, who asked Ms. Cross to pick him up from his mother's house. Ms. Cross drove to pick up Defendant in a white Malibu that she had borrowed from her cousin. When she arrived at Defendant's mother's house around 11:00 a.m., Defendant and his friend, Jerome Jones, got in the white Malibu and drove Ms. Cross back to the clinic, dropped her off, and left with the car.
At 12:30 p.m., Defendant, Mr. Jones, and a third man entered Rock Bottom Wholesale Warehouse, a wholesale grocery store, brandishing firearms. Defendant was wearing a camouflage jacket and was armed with a MAC-type semiautomatic weapon equipped with a magazine holding up to thirty .45 caliber rounds of ammunition. As the men approached the front counter, Defendant grabbed nearly $1,000 from Nimisha Patel, the clerk working the cash register. Defendant then pushed Ms. Patel, who was visibly pregnant at the time, to the floor. The store owner and office manager were in an office located behind the counter, and as they opened the door to investigate the commotion, the three gunmen opened fire, shooting the store manager nine times and the office manager eight times, killing them both. Defendant then shot Ms. Patel in the legs three times while she was lying on the floor. Another store employee, Mr. Gado, crouched behind the counter near Ms. Patel, but was not shot.
A man standing across the street from Rock Bottom, James Politte, saw Defendant, Mr. Jones, and the third man get into and leave in the white Malibu.
. . .
Five days later, on May 17, 2008, Mr. Gado, the Rock Bottom clerk, viewed two live lineups and one photographic lineup at the police station. The first live lineup included Defendant, and Mr. Gado identified him as the man who "robbed Rock Bottom, killed [the store owner and office manager], and shot Nimisha [Patel]." The second live lineup included Mr. Jones, and Mr. Gado identified him. The photographic lineup included Timothy Boykins, but Mr. Gado did not identify Mr. Boykins, and Mr. Boykins was not charged.
Thereafter, Defendant's case was set for a jury trial. Prior to trial, the trial court overruled Defendant's motion to suppress evidence of Mr. Gado's identification of Defendant. The trial court also sustained the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the absence of the victims' blood and DNA on the pants and shoes Defendant was wearing when he was arrested. Finally, the trial court sustained the State's motion in limine to exclude evidence pertaining to Mr. Boykins, including his participation in the pretrial lineup, his physical description, a pair of gloves with his DNA found in the white Malibu, and Defendant's acquaintance with Mr. Boykins from the neighborhood.
At trial, the State called Ms. Patel, Mr. Gado, Mr. Politte, Officer Allen, Officer Shrum, Officer Henkhaus, and Ms. Cross. The state also introduced the surveillance video from Rock Bottom, depicting a man matching Defendant's physical characteristics wearing a camouflage jacket with two other men entering the store, taking money from Ms. Patel, and shooting the store owner, office manager, and Ms. Patel. Additionally, the state introduced evidence that Ms. Cross had told police, and later the prosecutor in an oral statement, that Defendant was wearing a camouflage jacket like the one on the man in the surveillance footage when she picked him up forty-five minutes prior to the shooting and robbery at Rock Bottom.
After the State rested, the defense called Defendant's mother, Beverly Mann, and Defendant. Both Defendant and his mother testified in support of Defendant's alibi that he was at his mother's house during the incident at Rock Bottom.
At the close of the evidence, the jury found Defendant guilty on all eight counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a prior and persistent offender to five life sentences, two without the possibility of parole, and three twenty-year sentences.

Doc. 6-7 at 2-3. Mann appealed his convictions to the Missouri Court of Appeals, which affirmed. State v. Mann, 347 S.W.3d 615 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). Mann appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, but the Court denied transfer. Doc. 1, 11. Mann filed a Missouri Rule 29.15 post-conviction relief motion, which the motion court denied without an evidentiary hearing. Doc. 6-17 at 2. He appealed this decision, and the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the motion court's denial of post-conviction relief on the merits. Id. Mann now seeks habeas corpus relief in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

II. Standard

"A state prisoner who believes that he is incarcerated in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254." Osborne v. Purkett, 411 F.3d 911, 914 (8th Cir. 2005). Federal habeas review exists only "as 'a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.'" Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 315 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102-03 (2011)). Accordingly, "[i]n the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the AEDPA [the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254). For a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus brought by a person in custody by order of a state court, the petitioner must show that the state court's adjudication on the merits:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at § 2254(e)(1).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly-established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)).An unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent occurs where the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the case. Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004). Finally, a state court decision may be considered an unreasonable determination of the facts "only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Id.

III. Discussion

Mann asserts four grounds for relief in his habeas petition. Docs. 1, 11. In his first ground, Mann claims that the trial court erred in precluding him from introducing evidence regarding the absence of the victims' blood and DNA on his clothing and shoes. Id. In his second ground, which he combines with the first ground in his petition, Mann claims that the trial court erred by excluding evidence and argument about a third party's involvement in the offense. Id. In his third ground, he claims that the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence of an eyewitness identification at a lineup the police conducted without his counsel present. Id. In his fourth ground, Mann claims that the trial court erred by failing to exclude evidence of a witness's prior statement that the State did not disclose before trial. Id.

A. Ground...

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