Manning v. Club

• Decision Date: 28 November 1884
• Docket Number: Case No. 1620.
• Citation: 63 Tex. 166
• Parties: JOHN C. MANNING v. THE SAN ANTONIO CLUB.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

63 Tex. 166

JOHN C. MANNING

v.THE SAN ANTONIO CLUB.

Case No. 1620.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Nov. 28, 1884.

APPEAL from Bexar. Tried below before the Hon. Geo. H. Noonan.

The appellant, who brought this suit, was a member of the San Antonio Club, a corporation created, organized and doing business under the laws of Texas at San Antonio, and formed for literary purposes, to promote social intercourse among its members and to provide them the conveniences of a club house. The club had no capital stock. Its funds are made up of initiation fees and monthly dues; but it owns valuable personal property, consisting of furniture, fixtures and other appointments in the club house, a valuable library and reading room and a stock of wines, liquors and cigars.

The board of directors of the club, moved (as appellant alleged) “by a spirit of malice and a predetermination to expel him; without any cause or provocation, irregularly, without authority, without notice to him of the nature of the charges against him, and without giving him an opportunity to be heard in his defense, on the 23d of November, 1883, expelled and dropped him from the roll of members of the club, and thereby deprived him of all his rights, privileges and franchises as one of its members.”

The appellant immediately, on being informed of his expulsion, demanded of the board of directors that they inform him of the nature of the charges against him, by whom preferred, and that he be given an opportunity to be heard in his defense, which request they refused to grant.

The appellant then applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of directors to restore him to all his rights, privileges and franchises as a member of the club.

An alternative writ of mandamus was issued and due return made thereto, but the court, upon the pleadings, refused to issue a peremptory writ, and an appeal was taken to this court.

The return admitted the expulsion of appellant, and set forth causes unnecessary to here state; they denied that they were prompted by malice, and alleged that appellant knew that charges would be presented against him--knew that his expulsion would be attempted, and failed to attend and make defense.

The directors of the club, to whom the alternative writ was directed, made return thereto, stating that the appellee was a corporation organized for literary purposes; to promote social intercourse among its members and to provide them the conveniences of a club house; that the club had no capital stock, no corporate property, except such furniture and other paraphernalia as are needed and customary, all of which were in constant use, subject to deterioration and wearing out by such use, and none of which was kept or used for pecuniary profit or gain, and that it was no part of its purpose to make such profit or gain; that the club had adopted for its proper government a constitution or by-laws and rules, which are attached to the return; that among other provisions of the constitution or by-laws, the following are contained:

“ARTICLE IV.

The name of every member failing to pay his dues within one month after the same become due shall be placed in the frame provided for notices, of which the treasurer shall inform him in writing; and if the said dues are not paid within thirty days thereafter, he shall cease to be a member of the club, and his name shall be erased from the books, unless he can show satisfactory reasons for the non-payment thereof to the board of directors.”

“ARTICLE XI.

Sec. 6. Any member shall forfeit his membership to the club whose conduct shall be pronounced, by a vote of the majority of the board of directors present at a meeting, to have endangered the welfare, interest or character of the club.”

The assignments of error noticed were as follows:

1st. “The court erred in dismissing the proceedings upon the ground that it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief asked for by the relator.”

2d. “The court erred in holding that the act of the board of directors of the San Antonio Club in expelling the relator from the club, it being a social club, is conclusive, and, whether regular or irregular, their act is not a subject for revision by the courts of the state.”

3d. “The court erred in holding that under sec. VI, art. XI, of the constitution of the San Antonio Club, the board of directors were authorized to expel and disfranchise plaintiff without notice to him of the nature of the charges preferred against him; of the time they would meet to consider the same, and offering an opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself.”

4th. “The court erred in refusing to issue the peremptory writ of mandamus as prayed for, because the return to the alternative writ does not show that the board of directors gave the plaintiff notice of the meeting held on the 23d day of November, 1883, nor that any charges were preferred against plaintiff that would be investigated by them at that meeting, nor that plaintiff had any opportunity to defend himself thereat.”

Breneman & Bergstrom, for appellant, on the proposition that courts will inquire into the acts of incorporated societies which pass on the rights of their members, cited: Pulford v. Fire Department of Detroit, 31 Mich. (9 Post), 458; Fisher v. Keane, 27 Eng. Rep. (Moak's notes), 586 (11th Chanc'y Div., 353); Wachtel v. Noah, 60 How. Pr., 424;State v. Milwaukee, etc., Co., 47 Wis., 670;Commonwealth v. Penn., etc., Co., 2 Serg. & R., 141; Cannon v. Toronto Corn Ex., 27 Grant's Chancery (Upp. Can.), 23; Cannon v. Huron College, 27 Grant's Chancery (Upp. Can.), 605; De Lacy v. Neuse River, etc., Co., 9 Am. Dec., 274;Southern Plank Road Co. v. Hixon et als., 5 Ind., 165; High on Ex. Leg. Rem., sec. 295; Angell & Ames on Corp., secs. 408-420 (9th ed.).

That in such cases mandamus is the proper remedy, they cited: The People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Society, 32 N. Y., 187; People v. New York Society, 5 N. Y. (Supreme Court), 85 (3 How., 361); High on Ex. Leg. Rem., secs. 291-294; Field on Corp., secs. 227, 228, 500; Barrows v. Mass. Med. Soc., 12 Cush., 402.

Waelder & Upson, for appellee, on the proposition that social clubs have the right to adopt their own rules for their own government, cited: 2 Wait's Act. & Def., 257; High on Mand., §§ 292, 296, 297, 298; Field on Corp., §§ 63, 65; Boone on Corp., § 284; State ex rel. Soares v. Hebrew Congregation, 30 La., 205 (33 Am. Rep., 217);Dickenson v. Chamber of Commerce, 29 Wis., 45 (9 Am. Rep., 545);People ex rel. Ditcher v. German United Evangelical Church, 53 N. Y., 110;Crocker v. Old South Society, 106 Mass., 496; Sale v. First Baptist Church (Iowa, 1883), 16 Rep., 749; Green v. Afr. Met. Church, 1 Serg. & R., 254.

DELANY, J. COM. APP.

The first and second assignments of error will be considered together. And these assignments must be regarded rather as presenting inferences drawn by counsel from the judgment rendered, than rulings of the court. The presiding judge did not write out his conclusions of law. He simply gave judgment in the following words: “After argument, it being the opinion of the court that no case is presented which would warrant the granting of a peremptory mandamus, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the alternative writ of mandamus heretofore issued be discharged.”

The first assignment is that the court “erred in dismissing the proceedings on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to grant the relief asked for by the relator.” It is clear that this assignment does not correctly represent the judgment, for we can only conjecture the grounds upon which the court rested its decision.

Upon these two assignments appellant presents this proposition: “Courts will inquire into the regularity of the acts of incorporated clubs or societies, when they undertake to pass upon the rights of...