Manning v. Dial

Decision Date05 June 1978
Docket NumberNo. 20703,20703
Citation245 S.E.2d 120,271 S.C. 79
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesC. Heath MANNING, Respondent, v. J. Donald DIAL, Appellant.

Nexsen, Pruet, Jacobs & Pollard, Columbia, for appellant.

Whaley, McCuthen & Blanton, Columbia, for respondent.

NESS, Justice:

This action for fraud and deceit was brought by respondent Manning against appellant Dial in connection with a stock sale. Upon a trial by jury, Manning was awarded $23,750.00 actual damages and $125,000.00 punitive damages. We affirm.

Prior to the difficulties which precipitated this law suit, the parties enjoyed a long-standing personal and business relationship, and engaged in extensive joint real estate development. In the early 1960's they began development of the Woodland Hills Subdivision near Columbia. In 1965 the parties formed Woodland Utilities, Inc. to operate the sewer system, with each owning fifty per cent of the stock and Dial serving as President. When Dial purchased respondent's interest in the Woodland Hills Subdivision in 1968, Manning retained his one-half interest in the utility company.

In 1971, the parties discussed enlarging their joint sewer operation with officials of the SCE&G and the Health Department. However, without Manning's knowledge, Dial purchased a tract of land and began construction of his own sewer treatment plant called the Stoops Creek Plant.

When Manning learned of Dial's proposed plant, the relationship between the parties deteriorated and they began negotiations for the division of approximately $1,700,000.00 worth of jointly owned property, including Woodland Utilities, Inc. As a result, Manning sold his stock in the utility company to Dial for $50,000.00.

Subsequently, Manning learned that several commercial customers of Dial's had tapped onto Woodland Utilities, Inc. in 1972 pending completion of Dial's Stoops Creek Plant. Two of these customers, the Thunderbird Motel and Raintree Apartments, were completed before Dial's new plant was operational, and he connected them onto Woodland's lines and lagoon without informing Manning.

Manning claims he would have assigned a higher value to his stock if he had known of the tap-on by these commercial customers at the time he sold his stock to Dial. Moreover Manning never received any fees for this use, although he owned half the stock in the utility company at the time.

Dial argues the use was worthless because it was temporary. Manning contends Dial was able to avoid defaulting on his contract with these substantial customers by connecting them onto the lines of Woodland Utilities, Inc. The jury apparently concluded that Dial's non-disclosure resulted in Manning's sale of his stock for substantially less than its worth.

Initially, Dial asserts the trial court erred in denying his motions for non-suit, directed verdict and judgment N.O.V. Appellant contends he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the alleged release contained in the agreement for the sale of stock. We disagree.

It is manifest when considering such motions that the trial judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Gilbert v. Mid-South Machinery Company, Inc., 267 S.C. 211, 227 S.E.2d 189 (1976). A review of the record in the light most favorable to Manning demonstrates the trial judge did not err in denying appellant's motions.

The January 12, 1973 agreement contained the following "release":

" . . . Manning will release by appropriate instrument to Dial all right, title, and interest which he claims in the common stock of Woodland Utilities, Inc. or in Woodland Utilities, Inc. itself and any claims that he may have in connection with Woodland Utilities and Alpine Utilities . . ." (Plaintiff's Exhibit # 9).

The language of the release is ambiguous. Respondent asserts the language that "Manning will release by appropriate instrument" indicates the parties contemplated the execution of a subsequent agreement to effect the release. This is one possible interpretation of the language.

Moreover, when viewed in respondent's favor, the evidence creates an inference of fraud by Dial. As the managing officer of Woodland Utilities, Inc., he owed Manning a fiduciary duty to make a full disclosure of all relevant facts when purchasing his shares of stock. Jacobson v. Yaschik,249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967). Non-disclosure is fraudulent when there is a duty to speak. Gilbert v. Mid-South Machinery Company, Inc., supra; Lawson v. Citizens & Southern National Bank of South Carolina, 259 S.C. 477, 193 S.E.2d 124 (1972). The case was thus properly submitted to the jury.

Appellant next excepts to the judge's charge. Appellant's counsel requested the judge to charge that the jury had to return a verdict for Dial if they found he either owned or had an unfettered right to use the sewer lagoon. Appellant asserts the...

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25 cases
  • Regions Bank v. Schmauch
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • June 9, 2003
    ...inform her of Martin Coleman's financial condition. Non-disclosure is fraudulent when there is a duty to speak. Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 83, 245 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1978). In Jacobson v. Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 585, 155 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1967), the court announced the requirements for havin......
  • Parker v. Shecut
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • May 22, 2000
    ...62-7-302 and 62-3-703 (Supp.1998). Where there is a duty to speak, a fiduciary's non-disclosure may be fraudulent. Cf. Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120 (1978). However, as discussed above, the loans were disclosed to Anne and therefore could not amount to fraud. Accordingly, we ......
  • Fisher v. Pelstring
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • January 11, 2012
    ...between the parties.17 Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 582 S.E.2d 432, 445 (S.C.Ct.App.2003) (citing Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1978)). However, a fiduciary relationship is not always required for a duty to disclose to exist. See, e.g., Lawson v. Citizens & S......
  • Jimenez v. Chrysler Corp., CivA. 2:96-1269-11.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • December 2, 1999
    ...243.) Under South Carolina law, nondisclosure is fraudulent concealment if there is a duty to speak. See, e.g., Manning v. Dial, 271 S.C. 79, 245 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1978); Ardis v. Cox, 314 S.C. 512, 431 S.E.2d 267, 270 (Ct.App.1993). This precept mandates that "[f]ailure to speak when fair d......
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