Manning v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | 96-3711 and 96-3779,Nos. 96-3710,s. 96-3710 |
| Citation | 127 F.3d 686 |
| Parties | 75 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 129, 13 IER Cases 558 Joe Earl MANNING, Jr., Plaintiff/Appellant, Tomi Foust, Constance A. Pritchett, Plaintiffs, Gerald M. Elliott, Plaintiff/Appellant, Cheryl V. Miller, Becky C. Smith, Deborah D. Williams, Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendant/Appellee. Joe Earl MANNING, Jr., Plaintiff, Tomi Foust, Constance A. Pritchett, Plaintiffs/Appellees, Gerald M. Elliott, Plaintiff, Cheryl V. Miller, Becky C. Smith, Deborah D. Williams, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendant/Appellant. Joe Earl MANNING, Jr., Plaintiff, Tomi Foust, Constance A. Pritchett, Plaintiffs/Appellants, Gerald M. Elliott, Plaintiff, Cheryl V. Miller, Becky C. Smith, Deborah D. Williams, Plaintiffs/Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Defendant/Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Kent Rubens, West Memphis, AR, argued (Timothy O. Dudley, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for appellants/cross-appellees.
Byron Freeland, Little Rock, AR, argued (Mark N. Halbert, Little Rock, AR, on the brief), for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before FAGG, LAY and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Joe Earl Manning, Jr. and Gerald Elliott appeal from the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law (JAML) on their tort of outrage claims. Plaintiffs Deborah Williams, Cheryl Miller, Becky Smith, and Tomi Foust appeal from the district court's grant of JAML on their claims of retaliation under Title VII. Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Metropolitan Life) cross-appeals from the district court's denial of JAML on the outrage claims of Williams, Miller, Smith, Foust, and Constance Pritchett. Metropolitan Life also cross-appeals from the denial of JAML on Pritchett's retaliation claim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a trial on the issue of damages only on Pritchett's outrage claim.
This case has its genesis in the West Memphis, Arkansas, office of Metropolitan Life, where the plaintiffs were employed prior to its closing in May of 1994. The West Memphis office was not an agreeable place to work. Most of the conduct that resulted in the plaintiffs' allegations was connected, at some level, to an adulterous affair that was alleged to have occurred between West Memphis branch manager Denise Mitchell and account representative and executive trainee candidate Charles Craig.
The sexual relationship between Mitchell and Craig pervaded the office environment. Craig, whom Mitchell referred to as "like an assistant manager," and who described himself as the "dominant male" of the office, flaunted his intimate influence with Mitchell over his fellow employees. Craig boasted openly and explicitly of sexual acts with Mitchell and of the preferential treatment that his relationship with Mitchell afforded him. Craig described his own sexual prowess in graphic terms, detailing his performance of oral sex upon Mitchell, and describing and fondling his genitals in front of female employees on an almost daily basis. He would often place his crotch in front of a seated female employee and demand that she address his penis, which he referred to as "Harvey." He also engaged in speculation about the sexual habits of others, such as accusing female account representatives of sleeping with their clients in order to secure business.
Additionally, Craig made crude, intimidating attempts to utilize his influence with Mitchell to solicit sexual favors from account representatives, who depended on Mitchell's support in order to satisfy Metropolitan Life's strict production requirements, and from other female employees under Mitchell's supervision. Craig made a frequent practice of approaching Smith, for example, to inform her that he would buy her lunch in exchange for oral sex. On one occasion, he told Pritchett, who was pregnant at the time, that he knew that she would like him to touch her breasts. Craig also informed at least one of the plaintiffs that if she would have sex with him he would intervene on her behalf with Mitchell and prevent what he said was her impending termination for low production.
Plaintiffs' complaints to Mitchell protesting Craig's conduct were initially met with indifference and eventually returned with hostility and threats of termination. Describing himself as a former CIA mercenary and assassin, Craig seems to have taken pleasure from his veiled suggestions that he would have Pritchett and Smith, among others, killed for complaining about Mitchell's and Craig's behavior. Mitchell and Craig openly encouraged the perception that Craig had authority over the other employees, that his activities and behavior were not to be questioned, and that he was being groomed for a position in management. Plaintiffs' complaints were similarly dismissed without investigation by other Metropolitan Life supervisory personnel, including agency vice president Danny Gleason.
The plaintiffs also testified to having been encouraged by their supervisors to engage in various illegal or unethical practices, including the writing of policies in a state for which the agent was not licensed, the forgery of policyholders' signatures, and the targeting of elderly policyholders to convince them to use the accrued cash value in their existing policies with Metropolitan Life to purchase new and more substantial policies, an illegal practice known as "churning."
Eventually, persistent complaints by Pritchett, in particular, to the New York headquarters of Metropolitan Life produced an investigation. As a result, Mitchell was "repositioned," as Gleason termed it, as an account representative in the Jonesboro office of Metropolitan Life. Rather than being terminated, Craig was transferred to a similar office in Olive Branch, Mississippi (for whatever reason, Craig did not report for work at this new location, although it appears to be only some twenty-five to thirty miles distant from West Memphis).
The plaintiffs ultimately brought suit, alleging that Metropolitan Life's response to their complaints constituted retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The plaintiffs further alleged that by tolerating various forms of sexual harassment and other clearly inappropriate behavior by its supervisors and employees, Metropolitan Life was guilty of the tort of outrage under Arkansas law. 1
At the close of the plaintiffs' case, Metropolitan Life moved for JAML on all claims of retaliation. The district court granted JAML on all but one of the retaliation claims, holding that the requisite adverse employment action had not been shown. Pritchett's retaliation claim was allowed to proceed. Metropolitan Life then moved for JAML on all claims of outrage. The district court denied the motion on the outrage claims of Pritchett, Williams, Miller, Smith, and Foust, and reserved a ruling on the claims of Manning and Elliott.
After the conclusion of all evidence, Metropolitan renewed its motions for JAML on the plaintiffs' outrage claims and on Pritchett's retaliation claim. The district court again took under advisement the motion for JAML on the outrage claims of Manning and Elliott, and denied the other motions. After the jury returned a verdict for each plaintiff on the claims of outrage and for Pritchett on her retaliation claim, the district court granted JAML on the outrage claims of Manning and Elliott, and entered judgment on the remaining claims.
We conduct a de novo review of a district court's rulings on motions for JAML, applying the same standard employed by the district court. See Feltmann v. Sieben, 108 F.3d 970, 974 (8th Cir.1997). We resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences and assuming as true all facts favoring that party which the evidence tended to prove. See Gathright v. St. Louis Teacher's Credit Union, 97 F.3d 266, 267 (8th Cir.1996). We will affirm a grant of JAML where the nonmoving party has presented insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in his favor. See Harvey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 33 F.3d 969, 970 (8th Cir.1994). Similarly, we will affirm the denial of a motion for JAML if a reasonable jury could differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn. See Gathright, 97 F.3d at 268.
The tort of outrage under Arkansas law is essentially that of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Hamaker v. Ivy, 51 F.3d 108, 110 n. 2 (8th Cir.1995). Four elements must be proved to establish such a claim: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. See Doe v. Wright, 82 F.3d 265, 269 (8th Cir.1996) (citing Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760, 762 (1992)).
We have recognized that the Arkansas courts take a very narrow view of claims of outrage. See Freeman v. Bechtel Const. Co., 87 F.3d 1029, 1031 (8th Cir.1996). The tort is clearly not intended to provide legal redress for every slight insult or indignity that one must endure. See Hamaker, 51 F.3d at 110. Review of outrage claims in employment situations has been particularly strict, as "an employer must be given a certain amount of latitude in dealing with employees." Freeman, 87 F.3d at 1031 (quoting Sterling v. Upjohn Healthcare Servs., Inc., 299 Ark. 278, 772 S.W.2d 329, 330 (1989)).
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