Harvey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

• Decision Date: 20 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-1119,WAL-MART,94-1119
• Citation: 33 F.3d 969
• Parties: Harry Roland HARVEY, Sr., Appellant, v.STORES, INC., Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 969

33 F.3d 969

Harry Roland HARVEY, Sr., Appellant, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Appellee.

No. 94-1119.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 16, 1994.

Decided Aug. 26, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1994. ^*

Rex Moreland Terry and Roland Metcalf, Fort Smith, AR, argued, for appellant.

Jerry L. Canfield, Fort Smith, AR, argued, for appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Harry Roland Harvey, Sr. appeals from the district court's ¹ order entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in this diversity slip and fall case. We affirm.

Harvey alleged that he sustained injuries when he slipped on an unidentified substance on the floor of a Wal-Mart store. At the close of the evidence, Wal-Mart moved for judgment as a matter of law. The district court, in accordance with our recommendation in Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 379 n. 9 (8th Cir.1983), allowed the case to go to the jury and stated that it would review its ruling, if necessary, upon a properly filed motion after the jury had returned a verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Harvey and awarded him $150,000 in damages. The district court then granted Wal-Mart's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.

We review de novo the district court's decision to grant judgment as a matter of law. See Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV School Dist., 5 F.3d 319, 323 (8th Cir.1993). "Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only where the nonmoving party has presented insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in his or her favor, and this is judged by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving him or her the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the evidence, but without assessing credibility." Abbott v. City of Crocker, 30 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir.1994).

Arkansas law is applicable to this diversity case. A property owner in Arkansas "has a general duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the benefit of the invitees." Mankey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 314 Ark. 14, 858 S.W.2d 85, 86 (1993). The mere fact that a person slips and falls does not give rise to an inference of negligence. Id. 858 S.W.2d at 86. Further, the mere presence of a foreign substance on the floor which causes a slip and fall does not prove negligence. Id. at 87. "In order to prevail in a slip and fall case, a plaintiff must show either (1) the presence of a substance upon the premises was the result of the defendant's negligence, or (2) the substance had been on the floor for such a length of time that the [defendant] knew or reasonably should have known of its presence and failed to use ordinary care to remove it." Id. at 86. A plaintiff seeking to prove negligence based on the length of time the substance has been on the floor has the burden of showing "a substantial interval between the time the substance appeared on the floor and the time of the accident." Id. at 87.

We agree with the district court that Harvey presented insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict under the burden of proof imposed by Arkansas law. Viewed in the light most favorable to Harvey, "[t]here was no evidence from which a jury might determine without speculation or conjecture how the substance got on the floor or how long it remained there prior to the accident." Bank of Malvern v. Dunklin, 307 Ark. 127, 817 S.W.2d 873, 875 (1991).

Harvey contends that he presented evidence from which the jury could infer that there was a substantial interval between the time the substance appeared on the floor and the time of his accident. He relies on his own and his companion's testimony describing the unidentified substance as yellow, dirty, settled, and dried and crusty on the edges. In Sanders v. Banks, 309 Ark. 375, 830 S.W.2d 861, 864 (1992), the plaintiff slipped and fell on a substance that she "guessed" was tobacco juice that had "gelled." The Arkansas Supreme Court held:

Absent some showing that it was actually tobacco juice and evidence as to how long it would have taken it to 'gell,' even assuming, again without evidence, that it does gell, there was no evidence that the substance which was allegedly on the floor had been there long enough that store personnel should have had notice of it.

Id. 830 S.W.2d at 864. Here, Harvey presented no evidence regarding what the substance was or how long it would take it to turn yellow, settle, or become dirty or dried and crusty on the edges. As in Sanders, there was no evidence that the substance had been there long enough that store personnel should have noticed it.

Harvey further contends that the testimony of his companion and a Wal-Mart employee that there was a track running from the substance constituted evidence from which the jury could infer the substance had been on the floor for a substantial time. We disagree. Harvey's companion testified that the track was created by Harvey when he fell and that she did not see any skid marks or cart tracks or indications that others had stepped in the substance. The Wal-Mart employee testified that she did not know what caused the track.

Harvey also argues that the district court erred in excluding his companion's testimony, based on appearance alone, that the substance had been on the floor for at least four to five hours....