Manning v. Ohio State Library Bd.

• Decision Date: 02 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1567,90-1567
• Citation: 577 N.E.2d 650,62 Ohio St.3d 24
• Parties: , 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 146, 60 USLW 2327 MANNING, Appellant, v. OHIO STATE LIBRARY BOARD, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 24

62 Ohio St.3d 24

577 N.E.2d 650, 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 146, 60 USLW 2327

MANNING, Appellant, v. OHIO STATE LIBRARY BOARD, Appellee.

No. 90-1567.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 5, 1991.

Decided Oct. 2, 1991.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. State courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with federal courts over actions brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ( Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 706[f], as amended, Section 2000e-5[f], Ti tle 42, U.S.Code, construed; Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly [1990], 4 94 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834 followed; Fox v. Eaton Corp. [19 76], 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 2 O.O.3d 408, 358 N.E.2d 536, overruled.)

2. Pursuant to R.C. 2743.03(A)(1), the Court of Claims has exclusive, original subject matter jurisdiction over actions seeking money damages filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a state employer.

Plaintiff-appellant, Deirdre K. Manning ("appellant"), was an employee of defendant-appellee, the Ohio State Library Board ("appellee"). Appellee is a state employer, within the coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code. ¹ Appellee also meets the definition of "state" as set forth in R.C. 2743.01(A) ² and the definition of "employer" as used in R.C. 4112.01(A)(2). ³

In the complaint which forms the basis of the instant appeal, appellant alleged that on April 23, 1986, she filed a charge of discrimination on the basis of sex and/or sexual harassment with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC"). Appellant further alleged that simultaneously she filed a similar charge with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC").

A Negotiated Settlement Agreement was subsequently reached between the parties. As part of the agreement, appellant agreed not to institute a lawsuit in exchange for appellee's agreement to maintain a work atmosphere clear of sex-based harassment.

Later, appellant was laid off from work on December 11, 1987. Claiming that the layoff was in retaliation for filing the charge with the EEOC and the OCRC, and that the appellee had breached the Negotiated Settlement Agreement, appellant filed a charge with the OCRC on December 18, 1987.

The OCRC issued its initial determination on the claim of retaliation on August 18, 1988, in which it concluded:

" * * * Evidence substantiates that Charging Party was harassed by Respondent during the course of her employment in retaliation for filing previous charge on April 23, 1986; however, the investigation substantiates that no remedy exist[s] under the law for the harassment to Charging Party."

On October 27, 1988, the EEOC issued to appellant a "Notice of Right to Sue" informing appellant that she must exercise this right within ninety days or forfeit it. Subsequently, appellant filed her First Amended Complaint in the Court of Claims of Ohio on March 21, 1989. In this complaint, appellant listed seven causes of action, ⁴ claiming essentially that appellee had maintained a work environment that permitted sex-based harassment by various personnel officers and that her layoff was an act of retaliation for the filing of previous charges.

On July 17, 1989, appellee filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. The Court of Claims granted appellee's motion in part and entered final judgment for appellee on causes of action one, two, four and five on September 20, 1989 ⁵ on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing as binding precedent Fox v. Eaton Corp. (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 2 O.O.3d 408, 358 N.E.2d 536. ⁶

On appeal to the court of appeals, appellant raised four assignments of error. Appellant claimed that the trial court erred by holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over: (1) claims alleging violations of Section 2000e, Title 42, U.S.Code, that part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which is known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act; (2) a claim for retaliation for the filing of EEOC claims; (3) an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement; and (4) alleged violations of Sections 1983, 1986, and 1988, Title 42, U.S.Code, and violations of the United States Constitution. The court rejected appellant's contentions on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Fox v. Eaton Corp., supra. ⁷

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., and Christopher L. Lardiere, for appellant.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., David C. Calderhead, Simon B. Karas and Monica Stralka Forman, for appellee.

Louis A. Jacobs, Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman, and Frederick M. Gittes, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Nat. Employment Lawyers Ass'n HOLMES, Justice.

The first issue before this court is whether state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with federal courts for Title VII actions. The second issue presented is which court(s) have jurisdiction to hear such cases filed against the state of Ohio. For the reasons which follow, we find that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over Title VII claims and that such claims, if filed against the state of Ohio, must be filed in the Court of Claims.

Appellant's first cause of action involves an interpretation of subject matter jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 701 et seq., as amended, Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S.Code. As our outcome today overrules Ohio's longstanding interpretation of this issue, a brief history and recount of recent decisions is in order.

In those provisions of the enactment relating to enforcement, Congress afforded room for disagreement on the issue of jurisdiction over Title VII actions. In pertinent part, Section 2000e-5(f)(3), Title 42, U.S.Code provides:

"Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter. * * *"

This provision does not expressly grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts and, therefore, interpretation has varied among jurisdictions. Like many other jurisdictions, this court held that it was "clear from the federal Act" that subject matter jurisdiction for Title VII actions "is vested exclusively in the proper federal court." Fox v. Eaton Corp. (1976), 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 237, 2 O.O.3d 408, 409, 358 N.E.2d 536, 537.

In her first proposition of law, appellant claims, and appellee now concedes, that state courts have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over Title VII actions. The recent United States Supreme Court decision of Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly (1990), 494 U.S. 820, 110 S.Ct. 1566, 108 L.Ed.2d 834, rendered three months prior to the decision of the court of appeals herein, is determinative of this issue.

In Yellow Freight, a female employee brought a Title VII sex discrimination action against her employer in state court. Upon removal to federal court, the employer moved to dismiss due to failure to file (in federal court) within ninety days after the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, as required by the EEOC. Reaffirming Tafflin v. Levitt (1990), 493 U.S. 455, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887, ⁸ the unanimous court held:

" * * * Unlike a number of statutes in which Congress unequivocally stated that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is exclusive, ⁹ Title VII contains no language that expressly confines jurisdiction to federal courts or ousts state courts of their presumptive jurisdiction. The omission of any such provision is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent." Yellow Freight, supra, 494 U.S. at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 1568-1569, 108 L.Ed.2d at 839-840. Thus, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to decide actions arising under Title VII.

Accordingly, in applying Yellow Freight 's presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in Title VII actions, we must overrule Fox v. Eaton Corp., supra, to the extent that it is inconsistent with Yellow Freight or this opinion.

In that we have determined that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over Title VII claims, the proper state court of original jurisdiction must be ascertained for purposes of disposing of this action. In appellee's second proposition of law, the appellee argues that the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. We concur with the appellee's proposition based on our interpretation of R.C. Chapter 2743 and the legislative intent behind the Court of Claims Act.

Prior to the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, it was a fundamental principle of the common law in Ohio that sovereign immunity applied whenever the state was sued without its express consent. Raudabaugh v. State (1917), 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102, writ of error dismissed sub nom. Palmer v. Ohio, supra, overruled in part on other grounds, Schenkolewski v. Cleveland Metroparks System (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 31, 21 O.O.3d 19, 426 N.E.2d 784; State, ex rel. Parrott, v. Bd. of Public Works (1881), 36 Ohio St. 409. See, also, State v. Franklin Bank of Columbus (1840), 10 Ohio 91; Palmer v. Ohio (1918), 248 U.S. 32, 39 S.Ct. 16, 63 L.Ed. 108. And, the 1912 constitutional amendment to Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, permitting suits against the state "as may be provided by law," did not alter this principle. See Schenkolewski, supra. Consequently, where the state had not specifically consented to be sued, an aggrieved party was (and still is) precluded from bringing suit against the state. However, as recognized herein this immunity was waived by the legislature which found its support for the change in Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which states in part, "[s]uits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law."

The Court of...