Manning v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 04 May 2011 |
| Parties | Ronald Lee Manning, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan and Arizona Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Currently before the Court is Petitioner Ronald Lee Manning's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, (Doc. 1), and Magistrate Judge Mark Aspey's Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 20). After reviewing the record, the Court issues the following Order.
On November 14, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer on April 1, 2009. (Doc. 14). On June 19, 2009, Petitioner filed a reply. (Doc. 19). Magistrate Judge Mark Aspey filed a Report and Recommendation ("R & R") on January 15, 2010, recommending that Petitioner's habeas petition be denied in full and dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 20). On January 29, 2010, Petitioner filed his objections to the R & R. (Doc. 23).
The state level factual and procedural background of this case is extensively and thoroughly detailed with citation to the record in Section I, "Procedural History," of Magistrate Judge Aspey's R & R. (Doc. 20, pp. 1-8). It does not appear that the Petitioner objects to the R & R's recitation of the facts, which includes detailed accounts of the evidence and testimony brought forth at trial and at the Post Conviction Relief ("PCR") evidentiary hearing. Instead, Petitioner takes issue with Magistrate Judge Aspey's interpretation of those facts as they pertain to his claims for relief. This Court, therefore, fully incorporates by reference Section I of the R & R into this Order, which should be read in conjunction with this Order. The Court also notes that this case stems from a June 22, 2000, Mohave County, Arizona indictment that charged petitioner with one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first degree escape, theft of a gun, and misconduct involving weapons. . On January 26, 2001, a jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree escape, and weapons misconduct. Id., Exh. B. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit escape. Id., Exh. E.
A district court must review the legal analysis in a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In addition, a district court must review the factual analysis in the Report and Recommendation de novo for those facts to which objections are filed. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (). "Failure to object to a magistrate judge's recommendation waives all objections to the judge's findings of fact." Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) a federal court can only consider a petitioner's writ of habeas corpus after the petitioner exhausts all available state remedies. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To properly exhaust state remedies, the petitioner must give each state court the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his claims in a procedurally appropriate manner. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); seealso O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999). A complete round of appellate review, however, does not include discretionary review before the Arizona Supreme Court when the prisoner was not sentenced to death. See Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D.Ariz.2007) (discussing Swoops v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999)); Swoops, 196 F.3d at 1010 (). Therefore, when Petitioner is not sentenced to death, this requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals on either direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief.
A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). A mere reference to the Constitution of the United States does not establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996). Similarly, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, do not establish fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Shimway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). Even if the basis of a federal claim is "self evident" or if the claim would be decided "on the same considerations" under state or federal law, the petitioner must make the federal nature of the claim "explicit either by citing federal law or the decision of the federal courts." Lyons, 232 F.3d at 668. A state prisoner does not fairly present a claim to the state court ifthe court must read beyond the petition to discover the federal claim. Fundamentally, "if a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court." Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir.1996).
If a petition contains claims that were not fairly presented in state court, then the federal court must determine whether any state remedies remain available to the petitioner. See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-70 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982). If remedies are still available in state court, the federal court may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of the state remedies.1 Rose, 455 U.S. at 520. However, if the Court finds that the petitioner no longer has state remedies available, his claims are procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed with prejudice unless petitioner can show a miscarriage of justice, cause and prejudice, or actual innocence that would excuse the default. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002). The standard for "cause and prejudice" is one of discretion and is intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances only. See Hughes v. Id. State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish cause. SeeEngle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n. 10. Status as an inmate and lack of legal knowledge do not constitute cause for failure to present claims to state courts. Tacho v. Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (); Hughes, 800 F.2d at 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (). Failure to establish cause may be excused "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent." SeeMurray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), a federal court "shall not" grant habeas relief with respect to "any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings" unless the state court decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); seeWilliams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established precedent if (1) "the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in reme Court cases," or (2) "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent." Id. at 405-06. "A state court's decision can involve an 'unreasonable application' of federal law if it either correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable." Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, a state court's application of federal law must be more than incorrect or erroneous, it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, "[w]hen applying these standards, the federal court should review the 'last reasoned decision' by a state court." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004).
A. Petitioner's Claims for Relief
Petitioner alleges that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated by his conviction for both conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit escape. Petitioner asserts that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury "as to the...
To continue reading
Request your trial