Manning v. State

Decision Date23 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 20040453.,20040453.
Citation2005 UT 61,122 P.3d 628
PartiesCarolyn Roberts MANNING, Petitioner, v. STATE of Utah, Respondent.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Laura Dupaix, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.

Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

DURHAM, Chief Justice:

¶ 1 In this case, the petitioner seeks review of the court of appeals' decision that (1) a criminal defendant claiming denial of the right to appeal must file a separate civil action for relief pursuant to rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and (2) the State is not required to prove a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal before a court may determine that the right to appeal has not been unconstitutionally denied. We conclude that, in light of revisions to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a criminal defendant claiming denial of the right to appeal must file a motion in the trial court for reinstatement of a denied right to appeal under the exceptions outlined in this case, rather than under rule 65C and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. We further hold that criminal defendants who fail to file a notice of appeal within the required time period are presumed to have knowingly and voluntarily waived this right and thus have the burden to prove otherwise by establishing that one of the exceptions defined in this case applies.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On July 12, 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement in which additional charges against her were dropped, the petitioner, Carolyn Manning, pled guilty to one count of failure to render a proper tax return, a third degree felony; one count of unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony; and one count of third degree felony theft.

¶ 3 Manning's written plea agreement explicitly waived various rights otherwise accorded to criminal defendants, expressed understanding that her unconditional guilty plea would "not preserv[e] any issue for appeal relative to the Court's rulings on pre-trial motions or based upon statutory or constitutional challenges," and acknowledged that "by pleading guilty/no contest I am waiving my rights to file an appeal." The plea agreement also acknowledged the thirty-day time limit set by Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(a) for moving to withdraw a guilty plea and recognized that the court would grant such a motion only upon "a showing of good cause."

¶ 4 At Manning's plea hearing, the court reviewed her "right to appeal a conviction" should she proceed to trial and ensured that Manning understood that, by contrast, her "right to appeal these pleas of guilty is very limited." After a thorough colloquy in which the court determined that Manning was "fully competent" to participate in the proceedings, that her attorney had "taken the time to extend himself to adequately and properly serve [her], and [that she was] satisfied with his service," and that Manning understood both the charges and the consequences of her guilty pleas and was entering her guilty plea "of [her] own free will," the court accepted her pleas and informed her that she could move to withdraw them within thirty days.1

¶ 5 Manning was sentenced on September 27, 2001. Fifty-seven days later, while in custody, Manning filed a pro se notice of appeal. The district court dismissed this notice of appeal as untimely under rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

¶ 6 On July 31, 2002, Manning petitioned the district court for an extraordinary writ that would "allow[ ] her to be [re]sentenced nunc pro tunc[,] thereby extending the time in which to file a notice of appeal, pursuant to rule 65B(b) and/or 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." As the basis for this request, Manning claimed that her attorney "did not inform her that she could file a notice of appeal within 30 days of entry of judgment," and that, as a result, her "right to appeal under Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution [had] been violated."

¶ 7 After a hearing on September 27, 2002, the district court denied Manning's petition, finding that Manning "was represented by very competent counsel," "was informed by the court of her limited right to appeal," and had "not established that she was unconstitutionally denied her right to appeal." The court concluded that Manning had been sufficiently notified of her limited right to appeal, but had "failed to timely exercise [that] right" and was "therefore bound by her own failure to exercise her right to appeal."

¶ 8 Manning challenged the district court's denial of her petition in the court of appeals, arguing that her failure to timely appeal did not constitute a knowing and voluntarily waiver of her right to appeal. Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, ¶ 23, 89 P.3d 196. Affirming the district court, the court of appeals ventured "to clarify the correct procedural approach" in cases "where resentencing to resurrect the right to appeal is the objective." Id. ¶ 12. It concluded that the proper procedure was to apply for relief under rule 65C, which it considered the successor to rule 65B(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to which we had previously directed defendants claiming denial of the right to appeal to file their petitions. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13 (citing State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981)). The court also concluded that Manning was not eligible for relief under Johnson, rejecting her argument that the State bore the burden of proving that her failure to timely appeal constituted a "knowing and voluntary waiver" of the right to appeal. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 25. Rather, the court held that a defendant who claims that her right to appeal has been unconstitutionally "denied" must show that her failure to exercise that right was the result of interference that "originate[d] in the criminal justice system" and was not simply the result of missing the deadline for bringing an appeal. Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 9 We granted certiorari to consider (1) whether a criminal defendant who seeks resentencing to revive the right to appeal pursuant to State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), must file a separate civil action pursuant to rule 65C rather than requesting relief from the sentencing court in the underlying criminal case and (2) whether a defendant's request for resentencing must be granted unless the record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, and, if so, whether Manning knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal in this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 10 On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness, without deference to its conclusions of law. In re A.T., 2001 UT 82, ¶ 5, 34 P.3d 228. The underlying issue of the district court's denial of Manning's petition for postconviction relief is a legal issue reviewed for correctness. Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d 211.

ANALYSIS

¶ 11 The first issue presented on certiorari requires us to address whether the procedure previously laid out by this court in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), to restore a denied right to appeal continues to be available. We conclude that, in light of the intervening revisions to rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the promulgation of rule 65C, and the 1996 enactment of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 (2002), the Johnson remedy is no longer able to serve the purpose for which it was designed. We begin our analysis by discussing the nature of the Johnson remedy, concluding that it was essentially a hybrid of both coram nobis and postconviction proceeding remedies. We also explain the evolution of Utah statutory law and procedural rules and why they render the Johnson remedy no longer functional. We then clarify what constitutes a denial of the constitutional right to appeal and outline a new procedure to restore the right to appeal for a defendant who proves, under the framework we provide, that he has not knowingly or voluntarily waived it. We then apply this new framework to the circumstances of this case.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Johnson Remedy

¶ 12 In Johnson, we held that a criminal defendant who reasonably relied on his attorney's assurance that an appeal would be timely filed was unconstitutionally denied his right to appeal his conviction. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). We then established a procedural mechanism to restore this right in Johnson's case and in future situations in which a defendant was prevented from bringing a timely appeal through no fault of his own. We directed defendants to file a motion for resentencing in the trial court so that the thirty-day time period for bringing an appeal set forth in rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure would begin to run anew. Id. at 38.

¶ 13 Manning urges us to retain the Johnson remedy because it allows filing for relief in the underlying criminal case, thus preserving the right to state-paid counsel in seeking an appeal. She argues that the changes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have no impact on the remedy's availability because the remedy is based on the common law writ of error coram nobis2 and may continue to function as such. In adopting the remedy in Johnson, however, we described "[t]he postconviction hearing procedure [under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as] a successor to the common-law writ of error coram nobis," and directed defendants to seek relief under rule 65B(i). Id. The State accordingly argues that since the Johnson remedy originally proceeded under rule 65B(i), it must now be sought under rule 65C, which it considers the successor to former rule 65B(i), and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code sections 78-35a-101 to -110 (2002).

¶ 14 Based on our analysis of Johnson and the Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude that neither party is entirely accurate...

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