Manning v. State

Decision Date09 March 2006
Docket NumberNo. 2001-DR-00230-SCT.,2001-DR-00230-SCT.
Citation929 So.2d 885
PartiesWillie Jerome MANNING a/k/a "Fly" v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtMississippi Supreme Court

Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel by David Voisin, Robert M. Ryan, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Marvin L. White, Jr., attorneys for appellee.

EN BANC.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

CARLSON, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is denied. The original opinion is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted therefor.

¶ 2. Willie Jerome Manning was convicted of capital murder of Jon Steckler and Tiffany Miller in Oktibbeha County in 1994. He was sentenced to death one day later, on November 8, 1994. Manning's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court in Manning v. State, 726 So.2d 1152 (Miss.1998). The motion for rehearing was denied on October 8, 1998. The United States Supreme Court denied Manning's petition for writ of certiorari on April 5, 1999. Manning v. Mississippi, 526 U.S. 1056, 119 S.Ct. 1368, 143 L.Ed.2d 528 (1999).

¶ 3. After denial of the petition for writ of certiorari, in accordance with Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187 (Miss.1999), we remanded the matter to the Circuit Court of Oktibbeha County for appointment of post-conviction counsel. The circuit court then appointed the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel (OCPCC) to represent Manning in post-conviction relief proceedings.

¶ 4. We find no merit in Manning's petition to proceed in the trial court on post-conviction relief. Therefore, the petition for post-conviction relief is denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5. On December 11, 1992, Tiffany Miller and Jon Steckler, both Mississippi State University students, were shot and killed in Oktibbeha County, Mississippi. They were last seen leaving Jon's fraternity house around 1:00 a.m. on December 11, 1992. Tiffany drove a Toyota MR2 sports car and lived off campus at the University Hills Trailer Park.

¶ 6. A motorist discovered Jon Steckler lying on the right side of Pat Station Road at approximately 2:15 a.m. When Deputy Sheriff Robert Elmore arrived at the scene at 2:33 a.m., Jon still had a pulse. While waiting for an ambulance, Deputy Elmore noticed drag marks through the gravel road into the woods, and there he discovered Tiffany's body. She had been shot twice in the face at close range. Jon was shot once in the back of the head and had extensive abrasions occurring prior to his death, which were consistent with being run over by a car at low speed. Tiffany's car was found the next morning parked in front of apartments on Old Mayhew Road, approximately one hundred yards from her residence at the University Hills Trailer Park.

¶ 7. In the early hours of the morning of the murder, John Wise, Jon Steckler's fraternity brother, went to his car which was parked outside the fraternity house. At that time, he did not notice anything suspicious and locked his car. Later in the morning, Wise found that his car had been broken into and several items stolen. Several of the stolen items were later linked to Willie Jerome Manning through testimony of several of the State's witnesses. One of the items reported stolen from Wise's car was a gold-colored token. Subsequently, a gold token, very similar to the one reported stolen from Wise's car, was recovered at the murder scene.

¶ 8. The prosecution initially indicted Manning for murder in the course of a kidnapping, but later amended the indictment, substituting a robbery charge. The State introduced evidence purporting to link the stolen items, including a leather jacket, a CD player, the gold token, and a silver engraved beverage holder to Manning. The State also introduced testimony that Manning attempted to sell a watch and ring matching the description of the watch and ring that Jon Steckler was wearing the night he was killed. Much of the testimony regarding the stolen items came from Manning's former girlfriend, Paula Hathorn. More testimony came from two jailhouse informants who testified that, while incarcerated, Manning admitted killing the students and selling the gun he used.

¶ 9. Manning argues that the lack of physical evidence linking him to the crime, together with questionable testimony from witnesses was inadequate to support a capital murder conviction. There were no matching fingerprints or footprints at the scene linked to Manning. Manning asserts the testimony of Hathorn was not credible because she was induced by a $25,000 reward for solving the crime and the State's lenient treatment on a number of charges pending against her. Manning seeks to discredit the testimony of the jailhouse informants, noting one of the informants initially gave a false statement to the police implicating two other suspects.

DISCUSSION

¶ 10. This Court has long recognized that post-conviction relief actions have become part of the death penalty appeal process. Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187, 190 (Miss.1999). Our standard of review of capital convictions and sentences is one of "heightened scrutiny" under which "all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused." Flowers v. State, 842 So.2d 531, 539 (Miss.2003) (citing Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 739 (Miss. 1992)); Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 872 (Miss.1987) (citing Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360, 1363 (Miss.1978)).

¶ 11. In his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Manning raises numerous claims. The majority of those claims relate to the State's failure to disclose evidence and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. While the Court has considered all of Manning's claims separately, the claims have been combined for clarity as: I) failure to disclose exculpatory evidence; II) polygraph examination; III) ineffective assistance of counsel; and, IV) cumulative errors.

I. Exculpatory Evidence

¶ 12. Manning argues the State presented testimony from Frank Parker that included numerous lies and misrepresentations; that the State knew or should have known Parker was lying; and, that despite exercising due diligence, defense counsel was not able to uncover impeachment material, the truth about Parker's pending charges in Texas, or other evidence of his motivation for testifying. Manning asserts Parker lied about pending criminal charges against him and lied about the severity of those charges, and that he denied his testimony was motivated by the possibility of reward money. Further, Manning asserts it was never disclosed that authorities in Mississippi had actually shown Parker crime scene photos and promised to help him with the criminal charges pending in Texas. Manning argues Parker's testimony was crucial to the prosecution and was the only link between Manning and the gun used to kill the students. Manning argues the State knowingly presented false testimony, and that due to the crucial nature of this testimony, the State cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt the use of the false testimony was harmless.

¶ 13. Manning points out that Fifth Circuit case law and precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court mandate that "a new trial is required if the false testimony could have . . . in any reasonable likelihood affected the judgment of the jury." Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 756 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972)). Manning also cites Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), holding that the suppression of favorable evidence is a violation of the defendant's due process rights. Favorable evidence includes that which is either directly exculpatory or items which can be used for impeachment purposes. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153-155, 92 S.Ct. 763.

¶ 14. The State asserts this allegation was addressed on direct appeal and is now procedurally barred. The State argues that the existence and nature of the charges pending against Parker were brought out on direct examination and, in more detail, on cross-examination. The State also points out the affidavits that Manning now uses to purportedly show Parker had a deal with the State for his testimony, reveal instead that Mississippi authorities never made an explicit promise to help Parker with the criminal charges in Texas until after he had testified. The State also asserts that Manning fails to show actual prejudice sufficient to overcome this procedural bar. Wiley v. State, 750 So.2d 1193, 1210 (Miss.1999). Furthermore, the State argues Manning fails to establish this material to which he points is "exculpatory" material under this Court's analysis of Brady, citing Todd v. State, 806 So.2d 1086, 1091-92 (Miss.2001).

¶ 15. In determining whether a Brady violation has occurred, thus mandating a new trial, this Court applies the four-prong test articulated in King v. State, 656 So.2d 1168, 1174 (Miss.1995) (adopting four-prong test from United States v. Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir.1992)). The defendant must prove: (a) that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (b) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (c) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (d) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Todd, 806 So.2d at 1092.

¶ 16. Manning argues that U.S. Supreme Court precedent instructs the State that its knowing use of or its failure to correct false testimony, or its presentation of evidence which creates a materially false impression of the evidence, violates a defendant's right to due process. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed.2d 690 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
38 cases
  • Thiersaint v. Comm'r of Corr.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • April 14, 2015
    ...(La. 2013); Carmichael v. State, 927 A.2d 1172, 1176-81 (Me. 2007); State v. Houston, 702 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 2005); Manning v. State, 929 So. 2d 885, 897 (Miss. 2006); State v. Egelhoff, 272 Mont. 114, 125-26, 900 P.2d 260 (1995); State v. Reeves, 234 Neb. 711, 750, 453 N.W.2d 359 (1990......
  • Manning v. Epps, Civil Action No.: 1:05CV256-WAP.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • March 2, 2010
    ...of certiorari on direct appeal. Post-conviction relief was denied on March 9, 2006 in a substituted opinion. See Manning v. State, 929 So.2d 885 (Miss.2006) ("Manning II").1 Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the decision. Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on Octob......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • December 10, 2020
    ...of the proceedings would have been different. Havard , 86 So. 3d at 900 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Manning v. State , 929 So. 2d 885, 891 (Miss. 2006) ).¶60. Much of the testimony in the affidavits is hearsay or rumor. Florence Mitchell states via affidavit that "I had hear......
  • Moffett v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • April 24, 2014
    ...the prosecution ¶ 97. Moffett expands his argument in this claim by challenging the prosecution's biblical references. In Manning v. State, 929 So.2d 885 (Miss.2006), however, this Court held:[W]e find this claim has no merit because this Court has found Biblical or scriptural references in......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT