Manrique v. State
| Decision Date | 19 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 589-97,No. 834-97,589-97,834-97 |
| Citation | 994 S.W.2d 640 |
| Parties | (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) ANTONIO MANRIQUE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS ON STATE'S AND APPELLANT'S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS BEXAR COUNTY |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
The issue is whether Antonio Manrique has been punished twice for the same offense. We hold as a matter of state law that he has not.
The grand jury presented two indictments against Manrique. Each indictment had one count comprising two paragraphs.1 In the first indictment Paragraph A alleged the attempted murder of a person and persons unknown to the grand jurors by shooting at them with a deadly weapon;2 Paragraph B alleged the attempted murder of Edward Avilez by shooting at him with a deadly weapon. In the second indictment Paragraph A alleged the attempted murder of a person and persons unknown to the grand jurors by shooting at them with a deadly weapon;Paragraph B alleged the attempted murder of Donnie Avilez by shooting at her with a deadly weapon. The indictments were consolidated for trial before a jury.
The jury heard evidence that the appellant and David Samudio showed up at a party with a rifle. Samudio said that they were going to "light up" (that is, shoot up) the house of a member of a rival gang, and they left the party. They returned tired and out of breath. The appellant told someone that he and Samudio had shot at a yellow house on a certain street nearby, that he had started the shooting, and that after the gun jammed Samudio had taken the gun and shot some more. The yellow house was riddled by bullets. It was occupied by several members of the Avilez family, including Edward and his wife Donnie, who both were shot. At the scene police recovered 26 shell casings which matched a rifle that was found behind a couch in the appellant's home.
The court's charge instructed the jury to find the appellant guilty on the first indictment if they found he had committed attempted murder on a person or persons unknown to the grand jury or Edward Avilez, and to find the appellant guilty on the second indictment if they found he had committed attempted murder on a person or persons unknown to the grand jury or Donnie Avilez. The jury returned a general form of verdict on each indictment which found the appellant "guilty of attempted murder as charged in the indictment," without specifying which paragraph they found to be true.
The jury later assessed punishments of 20 years' confinement on each indictment. Two judgments were entered, with sentences to be served concurrently as required by law.3
Manrique appealed on two points: that the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to murder, and that he was twice punished for the same offense contrary to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Court of Appeals found the evidence sufficient, and concluded that Manrique v. State, 943 S.W.2d 115, 121 (Tex. App. - San Antonio 1997). It therefore affirmed the first judgment and reversed the second. Ibid. We granted both parties' petitions for discretionary review.
The Court of Appeals decided this case on two assumptions: that the appellant was convicted under Paragraph A of each indictment (that is, the paragraphs that alleged that the appellant had attempted to murder a person or persons unknown to the grand jurors), and that those paragraphs alleged the same offense. See 943 S.W.2d at 120 (). See also id. at 118 n.6 (Court of Appeals would only consider the sufficiency of evidence as it related to Paragraph A of each indictment). Neither assumption is correct.
The assumption that the appellant was convicted under Paragraph A of each indictment is contrary to the law and the evidence. The law is that, when a general verdict is returned and the evidence is sufficient to support a finding under any of the paragraphs submitted, the verdict will be applied to the paragraph finding support in the facts. See Aguirre v. State, 732 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987). In this case the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of guilt under either paragraph of each indictment. The Court of Appeals seemed to conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to prove guilt under Paragraph B of each indictment because the court's charge contained an abstract instruction on the law of transferred intent without an application of the law to the facts. See Manrique v. State, 943 S.W.2d at 118 n.6. As we have subsequently held, the evidence is not to be held insufficient because of a defect in the court's charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Cr. App. 1997).
Although the Court of Appeals reasoning was not in accord with Malik, it was correct in overruling the appellant's point of error on sufficiency of evidence. Therefore we affirm the Court of Appeals decision to affirm the first judgment of conviction.
The Court of Appeals' other assumption was that two convictions for "shooting at a person or persons unknown" must necessarily be for the same offense. Why this should be so was not explained, and we cannot agree that it is so on these facts. The appellant was trying to "light up" a house that contained more than four people, and he and his companion fired at least 26 shots. It seems reasonable to conclude that more than one unknown person could have been the objects of these murderous acts.
The appellant's claim that he has been convicted twice for the same offense fails at the outset, and it is unnecessary to decide whether the Double Jeopardy Clause permits multiple punishments for a single offense.
The decision of the Court of Appeals to reverse the second judgment of conviction is reversed, and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
In No. 0589-97 (), the judgments are affirmed. In No. 0834-97 (), the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
I join the Court's opinion. I write separately to set out my reasons for doing so. This is, among other things, a "multiple punishments" double jeopardy case in which the San Antonio Court of Appeals decided appellant was punished twice for the "same offense" in a single proceeding. Manrique v. State, 943 S.W.2d 115, 121 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997); see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) ().
If the Court of Appeals correctly decided the sufficiency and the double jeopardy issues, then appellant is entitled to walk free based on the claim set out in his discretionary review petition. I agree with the holding in the Court's opinion that the Court of Appeals incorrectly decided the sufficiency issue. I also agree with the holding in the Court's opinion that, as a matter of state law, appellant has not been punished twice for the "same offense." The double jeopardy issue turns on an application of state law as do most double jeopardy questions in cases like this. See Vineyard v. State, 958 S.W.2d 834, 837 fn 6 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998) (). Based on these holdings it is unnecessary to decide the claim raised in appellant's discretionary review petition.
At approximately 4:00 a.m. appellant and a co-actor fired at least 26 rounds from an AK-47 assault rifle into a house which was occupied by various persons. The surviving victims, Edward and Donnie, were the only persons to suffer gunshot wounds. There was some evidence appellant intended to shoot up the house because he believed a rival gang member lived there. Neither Edward nor Donnie were this rival gang member.
Two indictments were returned against appellant with each indictment charging him with the offense of attempted murder. Each indictment alleged in two separate paragraphs that appellant intentionally and knowingly attempted to murder one or the other of the named victims or person and persons unknown to the grand jury.
The cases were tried in a single proceeding. In one case the jury was charged to convict if it found appellant intentionally or knowingly attempted to murder Edward or person or persons unknown to the grand jury. In the other case the jury was charged to convict if it found appellant intentionally or knowingly attempted to murder Donnie or person or persons unknown to the grand jury. The jury returned a general guilty verdict in each case. The jury assessed punishment at twenty years confinement in each case with the trial court ordering the sentences to run concurrently.
Appellant appealed each conviction to the Court of Appeals which disposed of the cases in one opinion. The Court of Appeals decided that, without the inclusion in each case of a transferred intent instruction in the application paragraphs of the jury charges, the evidence...
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