Manross v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

• Decision Date: 26 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-02741,90-02741
• Citation: 598 N.E.2d 226,62 Ohio Misc.2d 273
• Parties: MANROSS v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Claims

Page 273

62 Ohio Misc.2d 273

598 N.E.2d 226

MANROSS v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION. ^*

No. 90-02741.

Court of Claims of Ohio.

Decided March 26, 1991.

Paul Mancino, Jr., Cleveland, for plaintiff.

Lee Fisher, Atty. Gen. and M. Celeste Cook, Asst. Atty. Gen., Columbus, for defendant.

FRED D. GARTIN, Referee.

Plaintiff, Rose Manross, filed a complaint on March 5, 1990, alleging that defendant was negligent in failing to remove ice from a sidewalk at the Ohio Reformatory for Women ("ORW"), at Marysville, Ohio.

This action came on for trial before the referee at the Northeast Pre-Release Center. The findings and conclusions herein are derived from the documents and pleadings in the court file, evidence admitted at trial, and the respective presentations by counsel.

Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody and control of the defendant pursuant to R.C. 5120.16. Plaintiff arrived at ORW on September 13, 1986. Plaintiff completed orientation and attended classes at ORW. On January 14, 1987, at approximately 8:00 a.m., plaintiff was walking from her dormitory (ARN-2) to attend a class.

Plaintiff testified that there was no snow, only ice on the sidewalk. Plaintiff further testified that she had passed two patches of ice. While attempting to walk over a third patch, she slipped and fell, thereby injuring herself. Plaintiff testified she saw the patch of ice, but was afraid to walk off the sidewalk because she feared she would be issued a ticket for walking out of place.

Plaintiff's complaint is construed to set forth a single cognizable action, which is one sounding in negligence. In a claim predicated on negligence, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant breached a duty owed to plaintiff and this breach proximately caused injury. Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 21 O.O.3d 177, 423 N.E.2d 467. Defendant owed to plaintiff the common-law duty of reasonable care. Justice v. Rose (1957), 102 Ohio App. 482, 3 O.O.2d 39, 144 N.E.2d 303. Reasonable care is that which would be utilized by an ordinary prudent person under similar circumstances. Smith v. United Properties, Inc. (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 310, 31 O.O.2d 573, 209 N.E.2d 142.

While we are cognizant of a "special relation" between an inmate and his custodian, no higher standard of care is derived from his relationship. Scebbi v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (Mar. 21, 1989), Ct. of Cl. No. 87-09439, unreported. Although the state is not an insurer of the safety of its prisoners, once it becomes aware of a dangerous condition in the prison, it is required to take the reasonable care necessary to make certain that the prisoner is not injured. Clemets v. Heston (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 132, 20 OBR 166, 485 N.E.2d 287. Consequently, plaintiff bears the burden of proof to demonstrate that defendant was on notice or aware of the condition of the sidewalk where plaintiff fell. Presley v. Norwood (1973), 36 Ohio St.2d 29, 65 O.O.2d 129, 303 N.E.2d 81.

The legal concept of notice is of two distinguishable types, actual and constructive:

"The distinction between actual and constructive notice is in the manner in which notice is obtained or assumed to have been obtained rather than in the amount of information obtained. Wherever from competent evidence the trier of the facts is entitled to hold as a conclusion of fact and not as a presumption of law that information was personally communicated to or received by a party, the notice is actual. Constructive notice is that which the law regards as sufficient to give notice and is regarded as a substitute for actual notice." In re Fahle's Estate (1950), 90 Ohio...