Manry v. Manry

• Decision Date: 08 July 1943
• Docket Number: 14592.
• Citation: 26 S.E.2d 706,196 Ga. 365
• Parties: MANRY v. MANRY et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

26 S.E.2d 706

196 Ga. 365

MANRY v. MANRY et al.

No. 14592.

Supreme Court of Georgia

July 8, 1943

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The jurisdiction of a court of ordinary and a court of equity, in respect to bringing proceedings against an executor or administrator for an accounting and settlement, is concurrent.

2. Where a testator directed that the executors reduce the residue of his estate into money for the purpose of paying debts and making distribution among legatees without designating any time limit so to do, and where the executors held the residue for fifteen years before reducing it to money, a suit filed by one of the legatees within six years after the residue had been reduced to money was not barred by the statute of limitations.

3. Where the executors collected rents accruing while the residue was so held, they became accountable in such suit to the legatees for such rents.

4. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand, and no one decision constitutes a precedent in the strict sense for another. Each case has to be determined according to its own particular circumstances. A suit of the character indicated in headnote 2 does not on its face show that the plaintiff was guilty of laches.

5. An advancement differs from a debt, in that there is no enforceable liability on the part of the child to repay an advancement during the lifetime of the donor, or after his death, except in the way of suffering a deduction in the child's portion of the estate. Therefore, in a suit against executors for accounting, it was not necessary to allege that the plaintiff had accounted for the advancement made to him.

6. The petition alleged a cause of action for accounting and settlement. The court erred in sustaining the demurrer, and in dismissing the action.

This is a suit by a legatee seeking an equitable accounting for his distributive share of the estate of his father. On September 14, 1942, R W. Manry filed in Randolph superior court, against J. B Manry and Walter L. Allen as executors, a petition which as amended alleged substantially the following: J. H. Manry executed a will on September 10, 1915, in which he named the defendants as executors. He died on January 28, 1922, leaving an estate valued at about $75,000. The defendants probated the will and qualified as executors on February 6, 1922. The estate consisted of farm land, tools, supplies, and live stock, which was inventoried by the executors in 1924 at $59,451.10, with a total indebtedness thereon of $42,912.33. The executors held the estate from the time they qualified on February 6, 1922, until November 3, 1936, at which time the property was sold for a consideration of $30,000. Theretofore the executors had received $6,000 as proceeds from the sale of timber. They collected also $6,000 per year as rent, aggregating $90,000 for the fifteen years they held the property. The total indebtedness against the estate, including interest and taxes for the period it was in their custody, did not exceed $75,000. Petitioner is one of the twelve heirs to whom a share in the estate was given in the will of his father, and he was charged in the will with an advancement of $4,000, while other heirs were charged with some advancements. He admitted that the other eleven distributive shares in the estate would be entitled to approximately $42,000 before he receive anything. He alleged: 'According to the foregoing facts, and after deducting all sums to which said executors are entitled to credit as against this petitioner, said executors are chargeable with a total balance of $38,451.10; and plaintiff is entitled to recover of them jointly and severally, one twelfth of said sum as his distributive share in said estate.' He alleged that the executors had not been discharged, and had never rendered to the court of ordinary any accounting on the estate, and had never had any settlement and accounting with petitioner. A copy of the will was attached to the petition as an exhibit. The plaintiff prayed, that the executors be required to make an accounting and settlement; and that he recover of them his distributive share of the estate; and for service of process.

The defendants interposed a demurrer on the following grounds: The petition sets forth no legal or equitable cause of action; in so far as the plaintiff seeks to recover rents from defendants in their representative capacity, the petition sets forth no cause of action; it shows on its face that the alleged cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations; that plaintiff is guilty of laches; that the difference between the alleged value of the estate and the alleged indebtedness thereon is insufficient to pay each of the other heirs at law an amount which would be equivalent to the advancement charged to the plaintiff in the will; the petition fails to show that plaintiff has accounted for the advancement made to him, or any other fact sufficient to show that he has a right of action against defendants in the absence of such accounting; it fails to show what, if any, disposition was made of the property of the Manry estate, or that the debts of the estate have been paid, or any other facts sufficient to show that the plaintiff has any cause of action against the defendants; the petition does not set forth a copy of the will of the testator, or a sufficient portion thereof to enable the court to determine what rights, if any, the plaintiff has under such will; and paragraph 12 of the petition sets forth a conclusion of the pleader, without setting forth sufficient facts to authorize such conclusion. The exception is to the sustaining of the demurrer and dismissal of the action.

Jesse J. Gainey, of Thomasville, for plaintiff in error.

R. R. Jones, of Dawson, and Joe M. Ray, of Cuthbert, for defendants in error.

ATKINSON, Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).

1. The demurrer on the ground that the plaintiff should have brought his action in the court of ordinary, instead of bringing the same in a court of equity, is without merit. Upon application of any person interested in the estate, where there is danger of loss or other injury to his interest, under the Code, § 37-403, a court of equity will entertain jurisdiction. This section must be construed with § 113-2203, which declares that 'a court of equity shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the ordinary over the settlement of accounts of administrators.' The same rule has been applied to executors, as will appear from citations to follows. The jurisdiction of a court of ordinary and a court of equity in respect to bringing proceedings against an executor or administrator for an accounting and settlement is co-ordinate and equal. If the court of ordinary has first taken jurisdiction of such proceeding, that court will retain it, unless good reason can be given for the interference of equity. Terry v. Chandler, 172 Ga. 715(3), 158 S.E. 572; Clements v. Fletcher, 154 Ga. 386, 114 S.E. 637; Howard v. Boone, 170 Ga. 156, 152 S.E. 462; Darby v. Green, 174 Ga. 146, 162 S.E. 493; Stroup v. Imes, 185 Ga. 422, 195 S.E. 411; Robinson v. Georgia Savings Bank & Trust Co., 185 Ga. 688, 196 S.E. 395. It does not appear from the allegations of the petition in the instant case that the court of ordinary had assumed jurisdiction for any relief for which the petition prayed. Accordingly the suit was properly in a court of equity.

2. One question for decision is whether the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The Code, § 3-709, declares: 'All actions against executors, administrators, guardians, or trustees, except on their bonds, shall be brought within 10 years after the right of action shall have accrued.' The action in the instant case was not on any bond, and consequently the period of limitations was ten years after the right of action accrued. It was alleged that the executors held the property until November 3, 1936, at which time it was sold. The petition was filed within six years of that date. In Citizens & Southern Bank v. Ellis, 171 Ga. 717(3), 731, 156 S.E. 603, 610, it was held: 'As long as a person who is in possession of the property of another, using the same for the owner's benefit, recognizes the latter's ownership, no lapse of time will bar the owner from asserting his title as against the person in possession. Before any lapse of time will be a bar to the owner, it must appear that the person in possession has given notice, or there must be circumstances shown which would be equivalent to notice to the owner that the person in possession claims adversely to him. In such a case the statute will begin to run from the date of such notice. Until the owner has such notice, he has the right to treat the possession of the other person as his own.' See Grant v. Hart, 192 Ga. 153(8), 14 S.E.2d 860; Murray County v. Pickering, 195 Ga. 182(3), 23 S.E.2d 436.

In item 4 of the will in the instant case the testator directed that the executors 'reduce all the residue' of the 'estate into money,' to be equally...