Mansbacher v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America

• Decision Date: 09 March 1937
• Citation: 273 N.Y. 140,7 N.E.2d 18
• Parties: MANSBACHER v. PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

273 N.Y. 140

7 N.E.2d 18

MANSBACHER

v.PRUDENTIAL INS. CO. OF AMERICA.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 9, 1937.

Action by Henni Mansbacher against the Prudential Insurance Company of America. A determination of the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court (154 Misc. 796, 278 N.Y.S. 225), reversing a judgment of the City Court in favor of plaintiff and directing judgment for defendant dismissing the complaint, was reversed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (247 App.Div. 378, 287 N.Y.S. 486), and the judgment of the City Court was reinstated, and defendant appeals by permission of the Appellate Division.

Affirmed.

LEHMAN, J., dissenting. Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First department.

Solon Weit, Joseph G. Telchin, and Abraham Gruber, all of New York City, for appellant.

Joseph L. Hochman and Emanuel Morganlander, both of New York City, for respondent.

J. Alvin Van Bergh, of New York City, for policyholders amici curiae.

CRANE, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff, a widow, brought this action as beneficiary under a policy of life insurance issued by the defendant, wherein her deceased husband, Paul Mansbacher, was the insured. The policy provided for $2,000 life insurance which was paid to the plaintiff after the insured's death, and $2,000 ‘accidental death benefit.’

The insured died on January 3, 1934, by accidentally having taken an overdose of veronal. His death was not intentional, and, therefore, was accidental. The family doctor, about two weeks before the insured's death, had advised him to take one and a half tablets each morning and evening to cure his sleeplessness. This amounted to a total of fifteen grains per day. About two years before, the insured had also taken veronal for an earache. On the mornign of December 31, 1933, Mr. Mansbacher was suffering from earache and, not finding any aspirin in the home, went to an adjoining apartment occupied by friends, to see if they had any. Not being successful in obtaining aspirin, he told his wife he would take veronal, which he did, apparently to an excessive amount which resulted in his death three days later.

His death was found by the trial court to be accidental, not intentional. The evidence of friends and associates as well as the circumstances surrounding the occurrence justified the trial court in concluding that the case was not one of suicide. The death was accidental, but the insurance company claims that although the death may have been an accident, it was not occasioned by ‘accidental means.’ The policy in large letters refers to accidental death benefit. The clause referring to this coverage is headed ‘Accidental Death Benefit’ and provides for the payment of $2,000. Accidental death benefit, if the death of the insured occurred ‘as a result, directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries, effected solely through external, violent and accidental means * * * provided, however, that no Accidental Death Benefit shall be payable if the death of the insured resulted from suicide-whether sane or insane.’ Other exceptions are mentioned not now material.

Any one reading this policy would take it to mean-would understand it as meaning-that the insurance company would pay $2,000 for death caused solely by accident through external means; if death is caused by any external accident, the company pays. The only exception, pertinent here, is suicide. The insurance company now emphasizes the words ‘accidental means,’ and would have an exception drawn between ‘accidental death’ and ‘death caused by accidental means' as though any ordinary person seeking a $2,000 policy would understand this logomachy. The large type letters refer to accidental death, and the attention of the insured by the signs and pointings of the company is directed to accidental death. The company now says that this policy does not refer to accidental death; that it has not insured against accidental death; that the accidental death must be caused by an accidental means. In other words, it concedes that the deceased may have taken an overdose of veronal to cure his earache, but, as he intended to take veronal, he intended the means of death although he did not intend his death. We have said more than once that insurance policies upon which the public rely for security in death, sickness, or accident should be plainly written, in understandable English, free from fine distinctions which few can understand until pointed out by lawyers and judges. Accidental death means death by accident, and excludes suicide; death occurring through ‘accidental means' in this case and under these circumstance is the same as death occurring ‘by means of an accident.’

The plaintiff's case comes within the coverage of this policy. Her husband intended to take veronal, but he never intended to take a lethal dose, nor did he intend to take enough to do him any harm; he desired to get relief from pain, not relief from life. He took too must veronal; it was a mistake, a misstep, an unexpected effect from the use of his prescribed medicine. It was an accident, and must have been an accident unless it was intentional. In other words, if the insured did not intend to kill himself, he intended to take enough veronal, as he had done theretofore, to relieve the pain of earache. By mischance he took too much. His death was accidental and, as we use these words in common parlance, we would speak of it as an accidental death. Contracts are to be interpreted in the light of the language which we commonly use and understand; in other words, our common speech. Such at least should be the rule applied to the interpretation of these policies, and which we sometimes refer to as a liberal construction. Abrams v. Great American Ins. Co. of New York, 269 N.Y. 90, 199 N.E. 15;Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N.Y. 303, 146 N.E. 432, 38 A.L.R. 1115.

The authorities in this state sustain this conclusion. Lewis v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp., Limited, of London, England, 224 N.Y. 18, 120 N.E. 56, 7 A.L.R. 1129, where the puncturing of a pimple on the insured's lips causing death was held to be death by accidental means....