Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 2300-7468.

• Decision Date: 20 March 1940
• Docket Number: No. 2300-7468.,2300-7468.
• Citation: 137 S.W.2d 997
• Parties: MANSELL et al. v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO. et al.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

137 S.W.2d 997

MANSELL et al. v. TEXAS & P. RY. CO. et al.

No. 2300-7468.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section A.

March 20, 1940.

Certified questions from Court of Civil Appeals, Second Judicial District.

Action by Guy Mansell and others against the Texas & P. Railway Company and others for damages for wrongful discharge from employment. From a judgment sustaining a general demurrer to the petition, plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals which certifies questions to the Supreme Court.

Questions answered.

W. F. Young, Alexander & Bird, and Frank J. Knapp, all of Fort Worth, for appellants.

Adair Dyer, of Dallas, Robert Harrison and Sewell, Taylor, Morris & Garwood, all of Houston, and Allen & Gambill, Cantey, Hanger & McMahon, Wren, Pearson & Jeffrey, Thompson & Barwise, and Fred L. Wallace, all of Fort Worth, for appellees.

HICKMAN, Commissioner.

The trial court sustained the general demurrer to the petition of appellants. The Court of Civil Appeals, after preparing a tentative opinion in which the conclusion was reached that the petition was good as against a general demurrer, has certified certain questions to this court. Appellants, in their petition, alleged that twelve railroad companies entering Fort Worth created for their mutual benefit, profit and advantage, an agency known as the "Joint Car Association of Fort Worth Railways"; that the purpose of the creation of the association was to set up an agency to employ men to make uniform inspection of railroad cars passing in interchange between the railways; that the association was organized by the railway companies with a president, vice-president, chief joint car inspector, secretary, executive committee and efficiency committee; that the chief joint car inspector had the authority to employ and discharge laborers and to supervise them; and that it was the duty of the executive committee to hear all appeals from decisions of the chief joint car inspector. Appellants alleged that they were all employees of the said railroad companies, being employed as joint car inspectors by the chief joint car inspector and engaged in the work which the joint car association was created to do; and that the duties of plaintiffs were to inspect and repair interchange freight and passenger cars entering into the City of Fort Worth over the lines of the railroad companies.

They alleged that for many years prior to the date of their discharge they had been operating under a working agreement or employment contract, a copy of which was attached to their petition; that one of the provisions of the working agreement was that no employee should be discharged or suspended without a fair investigation; that he should be furnished with a copy of the charges against him twenty-four hours in advance and be granted a trial, and, within ten days, be given a decision by the chief joint car inspector, and that he should have the right to appeal his case to the highest ranking officer of the association. They alleged that on October 19, 1933, without cause or previous notice, they were discharged by defendant railways; that no investigation was given any of them, nor were they furnished with any charges against them; that they requested the railways and their agent, the chief joint car inspector, to comply with their working agreement as to filing charges and granting an investigation and appeal, but defendants wholly failed and refused to comply with that agreement.

It was further alleged that the railway companies, as an excuse for their wrongful act of discharging the plaintiffs, fraudulently pretended that they had revoked their agreement creating the joint car association and, by so doing, had prohibited the officers of said association from thereafter representing them and had refused to allow such officers to represent them, under the pretext that, by the pretended revocation of the agency agreement, the offices had been abolished and the holders thereof were no longer employees of the defendants. It was alleged that all of this was a fraudulent pretext to create an apparent excuse for discharging the plaintiffs and to escape legal liability for a breach of the contract. It was further alleged that, after discharging plaintiffs, the railroad companies employed others to do the same work formerly performed by plaintiffs; that such work is still being performed by men employed to take the...