Mansfield Beauty Academy v. Board of Registration of Hairdressers

• Decision Date: 03 January 1951
• Parties: MANSFIELD BEAUTY ACADEMY, Inc. v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF HAIRDRESSERS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 145

96 N.E.2d 145

326 Mass. 624

MANSFIELD BEAUTY ACADEMY, Inc. v. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF HAIRDRESSERS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 8, 1950.

Decided Jan. 3, 1951.

S. Silverman, Boston, for plaintiff.

Francis E. Kelly, Atty. Gen., by Jeannette C. Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS, and COUNIHAN, JJ.

WILKINS, Justice.

The plaintiff is engaged in the business of conducting a school in Boston for the purpose of teaching students hairdressing and manicuring, and is registered under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 112, § 87BB, as amended. This bill in equity seeks a binding declaration as to the constitutionality of St.1949, c. 345, which amends c. 112, § 87U, as appearing in St.1941, c. 626, § 3, entitled, 'An Act prohibiting hairdressing schools charging for services or materials used in connection with hairdressing or manicuring.' The statutory provision is: 'No student shall practice hairdressing or manicuring upon any paying customer, and no school shall directly or indirectly make any charge for services or materials in connection with such practice of hairdressing or manicuring.' The defendant board appeals from a final decree (1) adjudging that in so far as c. 345 'provides that no hairdressing school shall directly or indirectly make any charge for materials used by said school in connection with the practice of hairdressing or manicuring [it] is not a valid exercise of the police power of the Legislature and is in violation of the Constitutions of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,' and (2) permanently enjoining the board from enforcing that portion of the statute. The plaintiff did not appeal, and no argument has been addressed to us based upon the absence of a ruling as to that part of the statute prohibiting a charge for services.

The defendant board contends that the declaratory judgment statute, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231A, as inserted by St.1945, c. 582, § 1, does not cover questions relating to the action of boards under c. 112, which it is argued, provides an exclusive procedure. Among the cases doubtless relied upon, but not cited, are Flynn v. Board of Registration in Optometry, 320 Mass. 29, 67 N.E.2d 846, 166 A.L.R. 571; and Kenworthy & Taylor, Inc., v. State Examiners of Electricians, 320 Mass. 451, 70 N.E.2d 247. See Ullian v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 325 Mass. 197, 89 N.E.2d 780. Such cases, however, concern the procedure of an administrative board or officer validly empowered by statute. A controlling authority, adverse to the defendant board's contention, is Davis v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 251 Mass. 283, 146 N.E. 708, where a physician, facing possible removal by the board of registration in medicine under c. 112, was allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the statute in a bill brought under the general equity jurisdiction of the Superior Court. See Lawrence v. Board of Registration in Medicine, 239 Mass. 424, 132 N.E. 174.

The present case, dealing with the validity of the enabling act, cuts in ahead of procedural questions arising under the act, and raises issues appropriate for consideration upon a bill for declaratory relief. A similar result has been reached in decisions elsewhere. Sage-Allen Co., Inc., v. Wheeler, 119 Conn. 667, 179 A. 195, 98 A.L.R. 897; Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237, 257 P. 959, 57 A.L.R. 100; Faulkner v. Keene, 85 N.H. 147, 155 A. 195; Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 153, 9 N.E.2d 814; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., v. New York, 276 N.Y. 198, 206-207, 11 N.E.2d 728; Richfield Oil Corp. of New York v. Syracuse, 287 N.Y. 234, 39 N.E.2d 219.

The judge made a report of the material facts found by him. Some of these we summarize. In the plaintiff's school the students work on one another and on models. Models are friends or relatives of students, or persons with previous experience as models. The school does not advertise for or solicit models. When a model enters the plaintiff's place of business, she announces the work she wants done, and is then assigned to a student. No charge is made to a model for services. The statute in question was passed as a result of a bill filed by an association of private 'beauty shops.' Following the passage of the statute the defendant board charged the plaintiff with its violation and set a date for a hearing. The board intends to enforce c. 345. The use of live models is of advantage both to students and to the general public. It makes possible a diversified training, and enables students to become more proficient when, after graduation, they serve the general public. The making of a charge to models for the cost of materials used upon them tends to be in the public interest. In so doing the students become accustomed to the use of 'standard brands' of materials rather than 'inferior brands.' The prohibition against charging for the cost of materials has no rational tendency to promote the safety, health, morals, or general welfare of the public. It has no rational or reasonable bearing on cleanliness, sanitation, or the prevention of communicable diseases....