Mansfield v. Sherman

• Decision Date: 06 March 1889
• Citation: 17 A. 300,81 Me. 365
• Parties: MANSFIELD v. SHERMAN.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

17 A. 300

81 Me. 365

MANSFIELD

v. SHERMAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 6, 1889.

Report from supreme judicial court, Hancock county.

Bill by Nathaniel B. Mansfield against Gardiner Sherman for specific performance. Heard on bill, answer, and proofs.

Wiswell, King & Peters, for plaintiff. Deasy & Higgins, for defendant.

EMERY, J. This is a bill in equity, in which the court is asked to decree the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of two lots of land, as marked upon a plan. Such an application is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Not every party who would be entitled as of right to damages for the breach of a contract is entitled to a decree for its specific performance. Before granting such a decree, the court should be satisfied, not only of the existence of a valid contract, free from fraud, and enforceable in law, but also of its fairness, and its harmony with equity and good conscience. However strong, clear, and emphatic the language of the contract, however plain the right at law, if a specific performance would for any reason cause a result harsh, inequitable, or contrary to good conscience, the court should refuse such a decree, and leave the parties to their remedies at law. In an equity proceeding the complainant must do equity, and can obtain only equity. Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. 305; "Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557; Snell v. Mitchell, 65 Me. 48. In this case the answer sets up the defense, among others, that the respondent made his offer to sell the land, and named the price under a material mistake as to the extent and boundaries of one of the lots; that he did not understand that the lots included a certain valuable building site, which he never intended to sell at such a price; that by reason of such mistake he named an inadequate price for the lot; and that for the complainant to seek to compel him to convey at that price is inequitable, and is taking an unfair advantage of his mistake. The facts material to this issue seem to be these: Mr. Sherman, the respondent, living in New York, owned a tract of land in Bar Harbor, which he had caused to be laid out into avenues and building lots, and a plan to be made by a landscape engineer. There were 12 lots, marked on the plan by numbers. In March, 1887, Mr. Mansfield, the complainant, saw these lots, and inquired of a firm of real-estate brokers at Bar Harbor about lot No. 7,—a small lot at the extreme southern end of the tract. The brokers wrote to Mr. Sherman in New York, about this inquiry, and suggested that he authorize them to sell the lots. After some correspondence, Mr. Sherman sent from New York the plan, and a list of prices for the lots, and instructions about selling, the conditions, etc. The scale of prices on this list ranged all the way from $1,500 for lot 7, to $10,000 for lot 10. The price of lot No. 12 was marked $2,500,—the lowest but two on the list. Lot No. 1 was reserved, and the aggregate price of the eleven lots was $44,000. Mr. Mansfield, after learning the prices and examining the lots, not only said he would take lot No. 7, but said he would take lot No. 12, nearly at the other extremity of the tract, at the price named. Mr. Sherman, on being written to, sent to the brokers May 25th an offer to sell both the lots at the price of $4,000. He subsequently came to Bar Harbor early in June, (the 3d or 4th,) and went upon the land with the plan, and immediately afterwards informed the brokers that he had made a great mistake as to lot No. 12; that he found it contained a valuable building site, which he supposed was not included, and which he had not intended to bargain at such a price, and that therefore he could not convey it. The testimony of all the witnesses as to the relative value of the lots is to the effect that lot 12 was one of the most valuable lots in the tract, if, indeed, it was not the most valuable. The real-estate agents called by the complainant so testified, and also that its value was nearly double that of lot No. 11, named at $6,000. This evidence was not contradicted, and shows that from some cause Mr. Sherman named a very inadequate price for lot 12, in comparison with the other lots. If this was owing to an error in judgment, or a mistaken opinion about the relative values, perhaps the court should not consider it. Mr. Sherman, however, testifies that it was owing to a mistake in material matters of fact, and not to a mistake in judgment. He says there are two building sites within the territory of what is now lot 12, and that he directed the engineer to make two lots of what was lot 12, so as to include in lot 12, as left, only the more northern and cheaper building site, and exclude the southern and more valuable site; that he supposed that his directions were followed; and that he made the offer to sell lot 12 for $2,500 under the belief that it did not include the more valuable of the two sites. The engineer corroborates Mr. Sherman. He testifies that he was directed to make such division, but afterwards thought it best not to do so, and so put both sides in one lot. It does not appear that Mr. Sherman was ever informed of this departure from his instructions. It is urged that this story of Mr. Sherman is not natural, and that he should have seen from the plan itself, when sent him by the engineer, that lot 12 included more than one site, or at least that it had not been divided. Mr. Sherman may have been careless in the matter, and perhaps he should have seen the departure from his instructions, but...