Mansfield v. State
| Citation | 227 So.3d 704 |
| Decision Date | 15 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2D15-4325. |
| Parties | Henry MANSFIELD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Matthew J. Salvia, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Donna S. Koch, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.
Henry Mansfield seeks review of the order revoking his drug offender probation based on a new law violation of sale of a controlled substance. We reverse based on the trial court's failure to conduct an adequate preliminary Nelson 1 inquiry and a competency hearing. While a reversal on these issues renders Mansfield's vindictive sentence issue moot, the trial court's treatment of Mansfield based on their prior acquaintance is troubling. We therefore direct that the proceedings on remand be conducted by a different judge.
While he was incarcerated pending the revocation hearing, Mansfield filed a pro se "Request/Grievance/Appeal Form" in which he stated:
Judge James S. Parker Let you know on the 7–8–15 Frank Ribel don't work on my case he is frie [sic]. No show Ribel for 9 months I saw Ribel about 4 time pluse [sic] I have not gone to court on my V.O.P I like to know what gonsing [sic] on about it thank you.
Defense counsel construed this as a request to discharge counsel and filed a "Notice of Nelson Faretta 2 Hearing" to have the request considered. At the hearing, it immediately became clear that the court was a long-time acquaintance of Mansfield. The court began the proceedings by asking, "And, Henry, what's this about you want to represent yourself?" Mansfield replied, "Well, my Nelson, I've been able to take—" before he was interrupted by the court.
The proceedings took a strange turn, and the following exchange occurred:
Mansfield replied, The court started to address Mansfield's dissatisfaction with counsel stating, But then the court abruptly decided to offer Mansfield a plea.
The court offered Mansfield 38.7 months which was the lowest permissible sentence under the guidelines. Mansfield said he needed to get out of jail so he could buy a truck. The court said Mansfield was not getting out of jail. The court told Mansfield that he was subject to a maximum of forty-five years in prison and asked if Mansfield wanted to accept the plea offer.
Mansfield briefly disputed the strength of the evidence against him and then returned to his complaints about trial counsel. Mansfield said, The following exchange then occurred:
Defense counsel responded by saying, "Judge, we've been through quite a few things here with Henry." Counsel said he had Mansfield's competency evaluated "because to me he seemed to be in denial of some of the things that were obvious on the video" of the controlled buy that formed the basis for the new law violation. Counsel said he had also hired an expert to determine whether the video had been altered. It had not. Counsel said that he and Mansfield "had been fortunate enough" to get an offer from the State of twenty-four months in prison followed by two years of drug offender probation. Based on the circumstances, counsel recommended that Mansfield accept the State's offer and noted that Mansfield had already served eleven months.
Mansfield said he had served ten months and would accept a sentence of time served followed by two years of probation. Defense counsel told the court, The court responded:
Well, he is free to get new counsel if he wants to hire them, but it looks like to me you done a lot of work in this case. You got Henry a good offer, and Henry traditionally has always been in kind of denial about the facts of the case, of any case, he has been involved in. And I think this is Henry's self-defense, I guess: you can't convict nobody on mouth-to-mouth evidence.
Counsel told the court that they would lose the case if they went to a revocation hearing and suggested that Mansfield did not appreciate that.
Mansfield was getting agitated and responded, "Maybe I can go in front of another judge, ask for another judge, everything." Mansfield said that the court's action of signing his arrest warrant showed that the court believed he was guilty. The court denied this. Mansfield became more agitated, and the following exchange occurred:
The court reiterated the State's offer. Mansfield reiterated that he would accept a sentence of time served followed by two years of probation. The court said it would not impose probation because Mansfield had already violated. Mansfield told the court, The court understood that Mansfield was refusing the State's plea offer and said to counsel,
The next month Mansfield proceeded to the revocation hearing represented by Mr. Ribel. At that hearing, the court found that Mansfield had violated his probation and sentenced him to eight years in prison.
In Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), the court set forth a procedure for handling a request to discharge court-appointed counsel. Maxwell v. State, 892 So.2d 1100, 1102 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
The first step in the procedure is the preliminary Nelson inquiry in which the court ascertains whether the defendant unequivocally requests court-appointed counsel's discharge and the court asks the reason for the request. The answer to the preliminary inquiry determines the next steps. If a reason for the request is court-appointed counsel's incompetence, then the court must further inquire of the defendant and his counsel to determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that court-appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance and, if so, appoint substitute counsel. If the reasons for the request do not indicate ineffective assistance of counsel, then no further inquiry is required.
Id. (citations omitted). If there is no need for further inquiry or after such inquiry the court determines there is not reasonable cause to determine that counsel is ineffective, then the court must inform the defendant he or she is not entitled to substitute court-appointed counsel and will have to exercise his or her right to self-representation. Id. Before the court may allow a defendant to represent himself or herself, it must conduct a Faretta inquiry to determine that the defendant's waiver of the right to court-appointed counsel is knowing and intelligent. Id.
The preliminary Nelson inquiry is a critical step in the procedure for handling a request to discharge counsel. Maxwell, 892 So.2d at 1102. "Depending on the answer to the preliminary Nelson inquiry, a complex, multi-faceted combined Nelson and Faretta hearing could ensue, or the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Daniels v. State
...court-appointed counsel for incompetence without giving the defendant a chance to be heard on the issue. Id. Mansfield v. State, 227 So.3d 704, 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (emphasis added). While "a Nelson hearing [may be] unwarranted where a defendant presents general complaints about defense c......
-
Yzaguirre v. State
...motion because the allegations in his amended motion were sufficient to warrant further inquiry under Nelson. See Mansfield v. State, 227 So. 3d 704, 708 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (acknowledging that where defendant makes unequivocal request to discharge his counsel and where the reason is court a......