Manskey v. Wiggs
| Decision Date | 13 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16 -CV-01368 -MAB |
| Parties | JASON MANSKEY, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD WIGGS, STEPHEN JONES, JEFFREY STALLINGS, JOHN HOBBS, AND JACOB HORN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff Jason Manskey, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), alleges Eighth Amendment claims against correctional officers at Shawnee Correctional Center ("Shawnee") for alleged unauthorized use of force and failing to ensure Plaintiff received medical care for his resulting injuries (Doc. 6). Now before the Court is Defendants Hobbs and Horn's motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum (Docs. 101, 102). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on December 20, 2016 (Doc. 1), alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional violations against officials at Shawnee (Doc. 1). Following a threshold review of the complaint pursuant to 28 USC § 1915A, Plaintiff was permitted to proceed on two Eighth Amendment Claims: 1) an Eighth Amendment claim against Correctional Officer Wiggs and Correctional Officer Jones for using excessive force against Plaintiff on November 14, 2014, and 2) an Eighth Amendment claim against Correctional Officer Wiggs, Correctional Officer Jones, and Correctional Officer Stalling for using excessive force against Plaintiff on December 28, 2014 (Doc. 6, p. 4). In this threshold review, entered on January 11, 2017, the Court instructed Plaintiff that individuals mentioned, but not specifically named as defendants, would be dismissed without prejudice (Id. at 7). One of these individuals named, but not included in Plaintiff's complaint caption, was current Defendant Hobbs (Doc. 6).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion on October 19, 2017, and soon after, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint on October 24, 2017 to add additional defendants, including Hobbs, and facts (Doc. 33). Defendants filed a motion to stay the motion for leave, pending the result of the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 35). The Court conducted a Pavey hearing on November 30, 2017 (Docs. 30, 31, 47). A Report and Recommendation was issued, which the Court adopted, denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (Docs. 49, 53). The Court granted the motion to stay, detailing that it would decide Plaintiff's motion to amend after the Report and Recommendation on the issue of exhaustion was issued (Doc. 51).
Plaintiff was appointed counsel on July 10, 2018 (Doc. 57), and the Court denied, without prejudice, his motion for leave to amend since he was recently appointed counsel (Doc. 57). Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a motion for leave to file an amended complainton September 20, 2018 (Doc. 68), where Plaintiff requested to both add Defendant Hobbs and substitute Defendant Horn for Defendant Stallings (Doc. 68). In this motion, Plaintiff detailed how the claims against both Defendants Hobbs and Horn related back to the original claims under Federal Rule 15(c)(1)(C). Defendants did not file an objection or otherwise oppose Plaintiff's motion to amend, which was then granted on November 16, 2018 (Doc. 71). Plaintiff filed his amended complaint on November 20, 2018 and included Defendants Hobbs and Horn (Doc. 72). Defendants Hobbs and Horn filed their answer to the amended complaint on February 4, 2019 (Doc. 88).
Defendants Hobbs and Horn filed their motion for summary judgment on July 8, 2019 (Doc. 101) at the end of the discovery deadline (See docket entry on June 10, 2019 setting discovery due by July 3, 2019). Plaintiff filed his response on August 7, 2019 (Doc. 104).
Plaintiff's claims stem from his experience at Shawnee from approximately November 2014 through December 2014. On November 14, 2014, Defendants Hobbs, Wiggs, and Jones allegedly attacked Plaintiff (Doc. 102, p. 2). Plaintiff was taken from his cell to segregation processing and was thrown onto the ground by Defendant Hobbs (Doc. 104-1, p. 2). While on the ground, Defendant Wiggs stood on Plaintiff's forehead and Defendant Jones held Plaintiff's arms while Defendant Hobbs punched Plaintiff in the chest multiple times (Id.).
On December 26, 2014, Defendant Wiggs and other correctional staff allegedly entered Plaintiff's cell and threatened to physically attack him (Doc. 72, p. 3). In adeclaration submitted with his response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff details that he was taken from his cell in segregation by a correctional officer he did not recognize who was not wearing a nametag on December 28, 2014 (Doc. 104-1). That unnamed correctional officer dragged Plaintiff to segregation processing where the lights were partially off (Doc. 104-1, pp. 2-3). Plaintiff testified that he was physically attacked by Defendants Wiggs, Jones, and the unnamed correctional officer for a total of two to three minutes (Id.). Plaintiff was unable to identify the unnamed correctional officer because of the lack of lighting in the room and the unnamed correctional officer was not wearing a nametag (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff testified that between December 29, 2014 and January 3, 2015, he filled out a grievance regarding the December 28, 2014 incident and placed it in his door while he was in segregation (Doc. 49, p. 2). Soon after placing it in his door, Defendant Jones ripped it up (Id.). Plaintiff reported the December 28, 2014 attack to Lauren Oestmann in mental health, who reported it to internal affairs via email on January 8, 2015 (Doc. 104-2, pp. 4-5, 8). On or around January 10, 2015, during an internal affairs investigation, Plaintiff informed internal affairs he had been beaten by Defendants Wiggs, Jones, and Hobbs on November 14, 2014 and by Defendant Wiggs, Jones, and the unnamed officer on December 28, 2014 (Docs. 102-2, p. 2; 104-1, p. 3). Internal affairs investigated Plaintiff's claims by discussing the matter with Defendant Horn (Doc. 104-3, p. 5). Defendant Horn stated he was present in segregation on the date and time of the December 28, 2014 attack, but denied ever becoming physical with Plaintiff (Id.).
Plaintiff filed two grievances with the Administrative Review Board ("ARB") about his claims (Doc. 102-1). These grievances were returned to Plaintiff on or around February 23, 2015 for not following proper grievance procedure (Doc. 102-2). Plaintiff was instructed to provide responses from his counselor and grievance officer at the facility level (Id.).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Archdiocese of Milwaukee v. Doe, 743 F.3d 1101, 1105 (7thCir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a), see also Accord Anderson v. Donahoe, 699 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2012)). A genuine issue of material fact remains "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). See also Accord Bunn v. Khoury Enterpr., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 681-682 (7th Cir. 2014).
In assessing a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 699 F.3d at 994; Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011). As the Seventh Circuit has explained, as required by Rule 56(a), "we set forth the facts by examining the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to the non-moving party, giving [him] the benefit of reasonable, favorable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in [his] favor." Spaine v. Community Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2014). The moving party is entitled to judgment where the non-moving party "has failedto make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id.
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants Horn and Hobbs argue that Plaintiff's claims against them are barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Additionally, they argue the legal doctrine of relation back under Federal Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does not apply because there was no mistake as to Defendants Hobbs and Horn's identities (Doc. 102, p. 3). Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff should not benefit from equitable tolling because he has not diligently pursued his claims and there were no extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from bringing his claims in a timely manner (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff disagrees, stating that that a number of legal doctrines apply that act as exceptions to or extensions of the two-year statute of limitations, including relation back, which Plaintiff has argued in multiple filings since 2018 (Doc. 104). In addition, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' arguments as to the appropriate statute of limitations have been waived since Defendants did not appropriately plead these arguments as affirmative defenses in their answer to the amended complaint (Doc. 104, pp. 5-6). Plaintiff's waiver argument could be determinative of the issues presently before the Court, so the Court will address that argument first.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have waived their arguments related to the applicable statute of limitations because they did not plead it as an affirmative defense as required...
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