Manson v. State
| Decision Date | 23 May 1956 |
| Citation | 88 So.2d 272 |
| Parties | Emmett MANSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Finch & Mosley, Clearwater, for appellant.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and Jack A. Sudduth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Manson seeks reversal of a judgment of conviction entered pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery.
Reversal is sought on the ground that appellant's motion for a separate trial, made prior to the trial, was denied and that this prevented him from having a fair trial within the requirements of due process of law.
Four men, Adams, Rembert, Williams, and the appellant Manson, were informed against jointly for alleged robbery of the Tides Hotel in Pinellas County some time after 1:00 o'clock a. m. on July 6, 1954. Adams, Rembert and Williams were apprehended shortly after the robbery and that night Rembert and Williams gave sworn statements admitting their guilt and implicating Manson who was an employee of the hotel on duty at the time of the robbery. Adams denied participation in the crime but admitted being an occupant of the automobile used in the hold-up while it was in progress
Appellant Manson consistently denied that he was implicated in any way in the robbery. He claimed that he was sleeping in the hotel bellhop room during the early morning hours when someone entered the place, knowcked him out and tied him securely. He stated that he remained in a semiconscious condition until the hotel manager aroused him shortly after the robbery, at which time he was found securely tied, with blood flowing from his nose. When found, he was on the floor by a chair from which he could have fallen. The other three defendants all testified that they had gone to the hotel for Rembert to borrow money from Manson. Rembert and Williams stated that Manson told them he did not have any money but that they could make some money easily by robbing the place. According to their version, Manson was the 'brains' of the scheme and directed them as to how they should go about the act, including binding him for appearance sake.
Prior to the trial, Manson moved for severance on the ground that his defense was antagonistic to that of Rembert and Williams who had confessed and that their confessions were not admissible against him, but would be admissible against them to his injury in the joint trial. The motion was denied and appellant Manson was required to go to trial with the other three jointly. All pleaded innocent.
At the trial, Rembert and Williams, despite their 'not guilty' pleas, took the stand and admitted their guilt and again implicated Manson, under oath from the witness stand. Midway of the trial the State granted immunity to Adams and put him on the stand to testify against the others. This he did. He too implicated Manson.
It is now contended by appellant that certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the codefendants substantially discredits them and that the requirement that he be tried jointly with them resulted in the presentation to the jury of certain evidence including the confessions of Rembert and Williams, as well as other harmful evidence, which resulted in a denial of a fair trial to the appellant. After the verdict, a motion for new trial was presented assigning the same ground and the trial judge denied the motion. Judgment against appellant was accordingly entered and he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment.
Although it might be conceded that the trial judge could have found justification for granting the motion for a severance, if...
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Reddick v. State, 6551
...will not be reversed Except for palpable abuse of judicial discretion. Brunke v. State, 1948, 160 Fla. 43, 33 So.2d 226; Manson v. State, fla.1956, 88 So.2d 272; Rankin v. State, Fla.1962, 143 So.2d 193; Roberts v. State, Fla.1964, 164 So.2d 817; Jackman v. State, Fla.App.1962, 140 So.2d 62......
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Sosa v. State, s. 35131
...for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Suarez v. State, 95 Fla. 42, 115 So. 519 (1928); Manson v. State, 88 So.2d 272 (Fla.1956); Rankin v. State, 143 So.2d 193 (Fla.1962). Before this Court will disturb a ruling denying severance, it must clearly appear that......
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Allee v. Com.
...statements, since the codefendant's testimony was substantially to the same effect as his former statement. In Manson v. State, Fla., 88 So.2d 272 (1956), the court instructed the jury that the confession of the codefendant could not be considered as evidence except against the one confessi......
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Slaughter v. State
...too, appellants have not demonstrated that such testimony, even if given at separate trials, would not have been admissible. Manson v. State, 88 So.2d 272 (Fla.1956); Sosa v. State, 215 So.2d 736 (Fla.1968) and Jones v. State, 59 So.2d 522 The admission of Exhibit 21, a pamphlet containing ......