Mansour v. CDCR
| Decision Date | 21 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:19-cv-01325-AJB-LL |
| Parties | MUSTAFFA A. MANSOUR, Booking No. #16137475, Plaintiff, v. CDCR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)
Mustaffa A. Mansour ("Plaintiff"), a state prisoner currently serving his sentence in local custody pursuant to California's Proposition 57, while incarcerated at the San Diego County Sheriff Department's East Mesa Detention Facility ("EMDF") in San Diego, California, initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Eastern District of California on May 24, 2019. (See "Compl.," ECF No. 1 at 1.)
On July 17, 2019, the Honorable Edmund F. Brennan transferred the case to the Southern District of California in the interests of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (See ECF No. 8.) Judge Brennan did not rule on Plaintiff's pending Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 5), or conduct the mandatory initial screening of Plaintiff's Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and/or § 1915A before the transfer.
Therefore, on September 18, 2019, this Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, screened his Complaint, and dismissed it sua sponte for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 15.) The Court granted Plaintiff 45 days leave in which to file an amended complaint that addressed all the deficiencies of pleading it identified. (Id. at 6-11); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) () (citations omitted)).
On November 5, 2019, just as his amended complaint was due, Plaintiff filed a letter addressed to the Court, repeating some of the same allegations included in his original pleading, and requesting an extension of time in which to amend. (See ECF No. 17 at 1-3.) On November 12, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiff's request, reminding him of the need to cure his previous pleading's deficiencies, and directing him to "simply allege the facts that entitle him to relief" and identify a legal cause of action that might plausibly entitle him to relief. (Id. at 3.)
In response, Plaintiff filed another letter addressed to the Court, see ECF No. 20, followed by another adding "a little more about my complaint." (See ECF No. 21). The Court will now liberally construe these two documents together as Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. See Entler v. Gregoire, 872 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2017) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As Plaintiff knows, the Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, likePlaintiff, who are "incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program," at the time of filing "as soon as practicable after docketing." See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27 (citing § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
"The purpose of § 1915A is 'to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'" Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)). "The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim." Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); accord Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) ().
Every complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewingcourt to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. The "mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
While a plaintiff's factual allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts "have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt," Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Even before Iqbal, "[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations" were not "sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Id.
Plaintiff continues to claim, as he did in his original Complaint, that he is serving a state local prison term for a "non-violent offense under AB 109 PC 1170(h)" and that San Diego County Sheriff William D. Gore, "State of California law makers," the former Governor, and CDCR are denying him equal protection because the county jails are overcrowded, and do not offer the same rehabilitative programs, contact visits, or "33%" custody credits available to prisoners who were not sentenced under "Prop. 57."1 (See ECF No. 20 at 1-5; ECF No. 21 at 1-3.)
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff's amended pleadings continue to suffer from the same deficiencies as his original Complaint. Specifically, his suit still appears to challenge the application of Proposition 57 to the circumstances of his confinement and his commitment to local custody as a non-violent offender, and he continues to object to the denial of the "33%" custody credits and to the lack of "early release" opportunities available to "offenders in CDCR" as a violation of equal protection. (See Compl. at 3, 6.)2
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause requires only that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008).
As the Court noted in its previous screening Order, the Constitution does not require individuals who are, in fact, differently situated, to be treated equally under the law. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (citations omitted); Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994) (). Thus, absent threshold allegations that Plaintiff is similarly situated to others who allegedly receive what he perceives as more favorable treatment, he fails to state a plausible equal protection claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (); Michael M., 450 U.S. at 469 (citations omitted). Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992); Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1005-06 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
Thus, to state an Equal Protection claim, the Court advised...
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