Manuel Concepcion v. Warden

• Decision Date: 27 April 2023
• Docket Number: Civ. Action 20-5133 (RMB)
• Parties: MANUEL CONCEPCION, Petitioner v. WARDEN, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

1

MANUEL CONCEPCION, Petitioner v. WARDEN, et al., Respondents.

Civ. Action No. 20-5133 (RMB)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey, Camden Vicinage

April 27, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter has been opened to the Court by Manuel Concepcion's (“petitioner” or “defendant”) filing of a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Having reviewed the Petition Respondent's answer, Petitioner's traverse, and the record in this matter, the Court denies the Petition for the reasons stated in this Opinion and denies a certificate of appealability (“COA”).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was acquitted or murder but found guilty of aggravated manslaughter and two weapons offenses in connection with the stabbing death of Ignacio Castro (“Castro or “victim”). The Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division provided the following factual background for the crime:

During the early morning hours of July 11, 2011, near Bellevue and Pacific Avenues in Atlantic City, Ignacio Castro met Megan Cassidy, a prostitute, and solicited her services. Cassidy told Castro she charged sixty dollars, and led him to the back of an alley. When Cassidy asked for the money up front, Castro objected and said sixty dollars was too much. Cassidy then demanded twenty dollars from Castro for wasting her time. They argued and Castro threw a $20 bill at Cassidy. After cursing at each other, Castro slapped Cassidy and she continued to yell at him as they left the alleyway.

A man, street-named “Boo,” who knew Cassidy, overheard the commotion and asked Cassidy what was happening. Cassidy explained, and Boo asked Castro why he hit Cassidy. A second man, “Papi,” walked by and began to speak to Castro in Spanish. As Castro, Boo, and Papi were speaking, Cassidy's ex-boyfriend “Miz” came by. They were soon joined by defendant, Manuel Concepcion.

Cassidy testified that Boo, Miz, and defendant each hit Castro in the chest. Castro began bleeding, and staggered away. Castro had been stabbed with scissors and, when paramedics responded, he was unconscious, not breathing, and without a pulse. Castro never regained consciousness and sustained anoxic brain injury as a result of prolonged lack of oxygen. He was maintained on life support for a few weeks, but was removed on August 3, 2011, and died shortly thereafter.

On September 21, 2011, defendant was indicted on a charge of possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). Defendant was indicted again on February 15, 2012, on charges of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d), and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (2012 indictment). Tried by a jury, defendant was acquitted of murder but convicted of the lesser included offense of aggravated manslaughter and the two weapons offenses. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to the possession of cocaine charge and was sentenced to an aggregate forty-year custodial sentence, with an eighty- five-percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

State v. Concepcion, No. A-3884-13T4, 2015 WL 9694377, at *1 (N.J.Super. App. Div. Jan. 5, 2016).

On direct appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentence in an unpublished opinion. See id. at *4; see also ECF No. 6-20, Exhibit 20, State v. Concepcion, No. A-3884-13 (App. Div. Jan. 5, 2016). On May 6, 2016, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification. ECF No. 621, Exhibit 21, State v. Concepcion, 225 N.J. 339 (2016).

On or about June 15, 2016, petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in state court. See ECF No. 6-22, Exhibit 22, Petitioner's PCR Brief and Appendix at 40-44. On or about August 22, 2017, the PCR court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. See Exhibit 22 at 69-79, PCR Letter Opinion dated Aug. 22, 2017, at DA 51-61.

On December 4, 2017, petitioner filed a late notice of appeal.^[1]ECF No. 6-23, Exhibit 23, Notice of Appeal dated Dec. 4, 2017. On November 26, 2018, the Superior Court Appellate Division affirmed the denial of petitioner's PCR in an unpublished opinion. ECF No. 6-24, Exhibit 24, State of New Jersey v. Manuel Concepcion, N.J. App. Div. (No. A-1589-17T2) (Nov. 26, 2018). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification. ECF No. 6-25, Exhibit 25, State of New Jersey v. Manuel Concepcion, 238 N.J. 60 (May 14, 2019).

On April 27, 2020, Petitioner filed a counseled habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.^[2] ECF No. 1. The state filed its answer on June 8, 2020. ECF No. 6. Petitioner filed his reply brief on July 22, 2020. ECF No. 7.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Prior to bringing a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), a state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies. Nevertheless, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” § 2254(b)(2). If a state prisoner's constitutional claim has been barred in the state courts on independent and adequate state law grounds, there has been a procedural default, and a habeas court cannot review the claim absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 750 (1991).

If a constitutional claim has been exhausted,

[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Third Circuit directed habeas courts to follow a two-step analysis under § 2254(d)(1). See Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy SCI, 972 F.3d 245, 253 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 888 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied 528 U.S. 824 (1999)). First, courts should “determine what the clearly established Supreme Court decisional law was at the time Petitioner's conviction became final” and “identify whether the Supreme Court has articulated a rule specific enough to trigger ‘contrary to' review.” Id. at 253 (quoting Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2004)). “The ‘clearly established Federal law' provision requires Supreme Court decisions to be viewed through a ‘sharply focused lens.'” Id. Clearly established law “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A decision is “contrary to” a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), only if the state court applies a rule that “contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a [different result.]” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06.

Second, if Supreme Court precedent is not specific enough to trigger contrary review, habeas courts should “evaluate whether the state court unreasonably applied the relevant body of precedent.” Rosen, 972 F.3d at 253 (quoting Matteo, 171 F.3d at 888)). Under § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). For relief under this provision, the state court's decision “evaluated objectively” must have “resulted in an outcome that cannot reasonably be justified under existing Supreme Court precedent.” Rosen, 972 F.3d at 252 (quoting Matteo, 171 F.3d at 890)). A habeas court must frame the “relevant question as whether a fairminded jurist could reach a different conclusion.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S.Ct. 517, 524 (2020), or, in other words, whether “every fairminded jurist would disagree” with the state court. Mays v. Hines, 141 S.Ct. 1145, 1149 (2021).

A petitioner who claims that the state court's adjudication of his claim was based on an unreasonable factual determination under § 2254(d)(2), faces a similarly heavy burden of proof because “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Miller-El v. Cockerell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). “The petitioner must show that the state court verdict was based on an unreasonable determination of the evidence and that a reasonable factfinder could not have reached the same conclusion.” Rosen, 972 F.3d at 252 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2000)).

“Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new evidence in federal court,” the habeas statute, “is designed to strongly discourage them from doing so.” Cullen v Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 186 (2011). “Provisions like §§ 2254(d)(1) and (e)(2) ensure that ‘[f]ederal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.'” Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 437 (additional citations omitted)). Review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the...