Manuel v. Ivey

• Decision Date: 13 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 2:19-cv-105-MHT-JTA
• Parties: DE'ANGELO MANUEL, #266919, Plaintiff, v. KAY IVEY, et al., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

DE'ANGELO MANUEL, #266919, Plaintiff,
v.
KAY IVEY, et al., Defendants

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-105-MHT-JTA

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division

December 13, 2021

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JERUSHA T. ADAMS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint, as amended, filed by De'Angelo Manuel (“Manuel”), appearing pro se, alleging that the defendants deprived him of due process by voiding his grant of parole and violated his equal protection rights by discriminating against male prisoners. (Docs. 1, 5). Manuel further alleges that overcrowding, health hazards, and lack of security in Alabama prisons warrant his release on parole. Id. As relief, Manuel seeks a jury trial and a “court order upon the defendants to end their gender discrimination practice at once, and relieve their overcrowded prison of their male prisoner and stop upholding the parole board in its constitutional forbidden practices by reinstating Manuel's parole taken without due process.” (Doc. 1 at p. 4).^[1] Later Manuel amended his complaint to seek money damages from the defendants in their individual capacities for alleged retaliation and

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malicious prosecution based upon the delay in scheduling a subsequent parole consideration. (Docs. 52, 59).

Manuel names as Defendants Lyn Head (“Head”), the current Chairman of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles, Kay Ivey (“Ivey”)^[2], the current Governor for the State of Alabama, and Jefferson Dunn (“Dunn”), the current Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections. (Doc. 1). Defendant Head voted to deny Manuel parole, but maintains she denied parole for proper reasons and denies all Manuel's allegations. (Docs. 19-2, 19-4). Neither Defendant Governor Ivey nor Defendant Dunn voted in Manuel's case and Defendant Dunn denies all Manuel's allegations. (Docs. 19-2, 19-4, 24-1, 28-1). Manuel sues Defendants in both their official and individual capacities. (Docs. 1, 5, 52, 59).

Defendants filed special reports and relevant evidentiary materials addressing the claims for relief raised by Manuel. (Docs. 19, 24, 28). In these filings, Defendants deny violating any of Manuel's constitutional rights, including due process and equal protection of the law. (Docs. 19-2, 24-1, 28-1). Defendant Head, the only defendant who took part in the decisions to grant and then rescind Manuel's parole, denies that Manuel's parole file contains any false or incorrect information. (Doc. 19-2). Defendant Head further asserts she did not knowingly rely on any false information in denying

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Patterson's parole. Id. Defendant Dunn states that he did not vote in Manuel's parole hearing and took no actions that violated any of Manuel's constitutional rights. (Docs. 24-1, 28-1). The basis of Manuel's complaint is Executive Order No. 716, issued by Defendant Governor Ivey on October 15, 2018. The Order imposes a temporary moratorium on early parole hearings but does not require or recommend that the Board void or reconsider any previous grant of parole. (Docs. 19-2 at pp. 1-2, 19-3). Defendants further deny that they retaliated against Manuel for filing this action by delaying his subsequent parole hearing. (Doc. 64 at p. 9).

After reviewing the initial special report and supplemental special reports filed by Defendants (Docs. 19, 24, 28), the court issued an order on June 11, 2019 directing Manuel to file a response to each of the arguments set forth by Defendants in their reports, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary materials. (Doc. 29 at pp. 1-2). The order specifically cautioned that “unless within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response to this order] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law.” (Doc. 29 at p. 3). Manuel filed multiple responses to these reports. (Docs. 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 50, 51).

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Following Manuel's subsequent amendments to his complaint (Docs. 52, 53, 59, 63), the court ordered Defendants to file supplements to their special reports. (Doc. 63). Defendants complied. (Docs. 64, 70). The court instructed Manuel to file responses to these supplemental special reports. (Doc. 72). Manuel has filed multiple responses to these supplements. (Docs. 82, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105). Pursuant to the directives of the orders entered in this case, the court now treats Defendants' reports collectively as a motion for summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of Defendants.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute “is ‘genuine' if the record as a whole could lead a reasonable trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party . . . . [A dispute] is ‘material' if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law.” Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).

The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and alerting the court to portions of the record that support the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). However, once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmovant is similarly required to cite portions of the record showing the existence of a material factual dispute. Id. At 324.

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To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In determining whether a genuine dispute for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See Beard, 548 U.S. at 525; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Manuel's pro se status alone does not compel this court to disregard elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case.

The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence contained in the record. After this review, the court finds that Manuel has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Absolute Immunity - Official Capacity Claims

To the extent Manuel requests monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities, they are entitled to absolute immunity. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all

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respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). As the Eleventh Circuit has held,

the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining suits by private parties against States and their agencies [or employees]. There are two exceptions to this prohibition: where the state has waived its immunity or where Congress has abrogated that immunity. A State's consent to suit must be unequivocally expressed in the text of [a] relevant statute. Waiver may not be implied. Likewise, Congress' intent to abrogate the States' immunity from suit must be obvious from a clear legislative statement.

Selensky v. Alabama, 619 Fed.Appx. 846, 848-49 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, a state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the State's immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).

Neither waiver nor abrogation applies here. The Alabama Constitution states that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14. The Supreme Court has recognized that this prohibits Alabama from waiving its immunity from suit.

Selensky, 619 Fed.Appx. at 849 (citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (consent is prohibited by the Alabama Constitution)). “Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in § 1983 cases, nor has Congress abated it.” Holmes v. Hale, 701 Fed.Appx. 751, 753 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990)). In light of the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Selensky, 619 Fed.Appx. at 849; Harbert Int'l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that state officials

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sued in their official capacities are protected under the Eleventh Amendment from suit for damages);...