Many v. Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees

• Decision Date: 03 August 1995
• Citation: 218 A.D.2d 845,629 N.Y.S.2d 868
• Parties: In the Matter of Seth E. MANY, Appellant, et al., Defendants, v. VILLAGE OF SHARON SPRINGS BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 868

629 N.Y.S.2d 868

218 A.D.2d 845

In the Matter of Seth E. MANY, Appellant, et al., Defendants, v. VILLAGE OF SHARON SPRINGS BOARD OF TRUSTEES et al., Respondents.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Aug. 3, 1995.

Seth E. Many, Sharon Springs, in pro per.

Bellcourt, Bartlett & Horowitz (George R. Bartlett, III, of counsel), Cobleskill, for Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, respondent.

Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Woods & Goodyear (Jerrold S. Brown, of counsel), Albany, for Schoharie County Indus. Development Agency, respondent.

Joseph C. Petillo, New York State Urban Development, New York City, for New York State Urban Development Corp., respondent.

Roemer & Featherstonhaugh P.C. (Michael A. Greco, of counsel), Albany, for Wal-Mart Stores Inc., respondent.

Before MIKOLL, J.P., and CREW, WHITE, YESAWICH and PETERS, JJ.

YESAWICH, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hughes, J.), entered September 26, 1994 in Schoharie County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, dismissed the petition due to petitioners' lack of standing.

In this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioners contend, inter alia, that respondent Village of Sharon Springs Board of Trustees (hereinafter the Village), and other agency respondents, failed to comply with the mandates of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art. 8) (SEQRA) during the review and decision-making process that culminated in the approval of a proposal by respondent Wal-Mart Stores Inc. to construct a large warehouse and price-marking facility on the outskirts of the Village in Schoharie County. Supreme Court did not reach the merits of the petition, for it found that petitioners lacked standing to maintain this proceeding. The lone appellant, petitioner Seth E. Many (hereinafter petitioner), is a property owner and resident of the Village.

As Supreme Court aptly observed, the proximity of petitioner's properties to the proposed facility--they are situated one half mile from the site--is insufficient, without more, to confer standing; actual injury must be shown (see, Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v. Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 N.Y.2d 406, 409-410, 515 N.Y.S.2d 418, 508 N.E.2d 130; Matter of Darlington v. City of Ithaca, 202 A.D.2d 831, 609 N.Y.S.2d 378; Matter of Heritage Co. of Massena v. Belanger, 191 A.D.2d 790, 791, 594 N.Y.S.2d 388). The unsavory environmental effects petitioner claims will result from the increased light, noise and traffic generated by the facility do not afford standing, for they are no different in kind or degree from that suffered by all in the general vicinity (see, Society of Plastics Indus. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 775, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034; Matter of Schulz v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 186 A.D.2d 941, 942, 589 N.Y.S.2d 370). Nevertheless, his assertion that by causing changes in the hydrogeologic formations and patterns of stormwater drainage beneath the project site--which is directly uphill from his properties--the proposed construction will adversely affect the springs on his properties, as well as the quality or quantity of water in a private well that he and his family have used for drinking water for 50 years, does confer standing upon petitioner. A direct impact on one's drinking water supply is a concern that is plainly within the zone of interest that SEQRA is designed to protect (see, Society of Plastics Indus. v. County...