Manzanares v. Bell

• Decision Date: 07 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 47412,47412
• Citation: 522 P.2d 1291,214 Kan. 589
• Parties: F. G. MANZANARES et al., Appellees, Elizabeth Madden et al. (Intervenors), Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. W. Fletcher BELL, as Commissioner of Insurance, et al., Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1291

522 P.2d 1291

214 Kan. 589

F. G. MANZANARES et al., Appellees, Elizabeth Madden et al. (Intervenors), Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. W. Fletcher BELL, as Commissioner of Insurance, et al.,

Appellants-Cross-Appellees.

No. 47412.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 7, 1974.

Rehearing Denied July 17, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In an action to enjoin the enforcement of the Kansas No-Fault Act (Substitute for House Bill 1129, L.1973, Ch. 198, K.S.A. 40-3101 et seq.) the district court found the Act to be unconstitutional upon three grounds, and the defendant state officials immediately perfected an appeal to the supreme court; while the appeal was pending Senate Bill 918 was introduced in the Legislature to correct the constitutional defects found to exist in the prior No-Fault Act, which bill was duly enacted into law and repealed K.S.A. 40-3101 et seq. in its entirety, it is held: This court will consider the effect of Senate Bill 918 and will make final disposition of the case based upon its provisions, such being the law in effect when final disposition is made. (Following Ash v. Gibson, 146 Kan. 756, 74 P.2d 136.)

2. While the Legislature is restricted in the extent to which it can retroactively affect common-law rights, no person has a vested right in common-law rules governing a negligence action arising out of a motor vehicle accident so as to entitle him to insist the common law remain static for his benefit.

3. The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is a privilege, not a natural right, and that privilege is subject to reasonable legislative regulation affecting the reciprocal rights and duties of all owners, operators or occupants when those rights and duties arise out of the operation of a motor vehicle.

4. Senate Bill 918 containing the provisions of the Kansas No-Fault insurance plan which provides for compulsory third party liability insurance and also personal injury protection benefits, and which modifies traditional tort liability reparation does not impair the fundamental right to travel in this state or nation.

5. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States find their counterpart in Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution.

6. The police power of the state embraces regulatory authority designed to promote the health, safety and welfare of the public.

7. Whether Senate Bill 918 violates the due process clause is determined by whether its provisions bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective, and in applying such a test, the Kansas No-Fault Act is accorded a presumption of constitutionality so that if any state of facts could exist to justify the legislation, it must be presumed to have existed at the time the statute was enacted.

8. The compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance required by Section 4 and the personal injury protection benefits required by Section 7 of Senate Bill 918 bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective of reparation for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership and operation of motor vehicles, and do not violate the due process clause of either the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights of the Kansas Constitution.

9. The constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law does not restrain the normal exercise of governmental power, but only abuse in the exertion of such authority.

10. The provisions of Senate Bill 918 limiting recovery for non-pecuniary damages such as pain, suffering, mental anguish and inconvenience to persons injured in motor vehicle accidents having medical expenses in excess of the reasonable value of $500 or more, or specified injuries enumerated in the Act, bear a rational relationship to the legislative objective of insuring prompt compensation to such injured persons, and those provisions are not arbitrary or unreasonable and do not violate equal protection of the law.

11. The state enjoys a wide range in distinguishing, selecting and classifying, and no preceptible inequality results from granting the owner of a motorcycle the option to reject in writing personal injury protection benefits while requiring that the owner of other motor vehicles purchase such first party insurance.

12. The difference between the subject of a legislative classification need not be great, and if any reasonable distinction between the subject as a basis for the classification can be found, the classification should be sustained.

13. It is not within the province of the supreme court to weigh the desirability of social or economic policy underlying a statute, nor weigh the beneficial results flowing from any particular legislative policy.

14. The constitutionality of governmental action can only be challenged by a person directly affected and such challenge cannot be made by invoking the rights of others.

15. When a statute is susceptible of more than one construction, it must be construed to give expression to its intent and purpose, even though such construction is not within the strict literal interpretation of the statute.

16. The record in an appeal challenging the constitutionality of the prior Kansas No-Fault Act (K.S.A. 40-3101 et seq.) and also the subsequent no-fault act (Senate Bill 918) is examined, and as more fully set forth in the opinion, it is held: (1) The basic no-fault concepts contained in Senate Bill 918 do not violate the due process or equal protection clauses of either the Kansas Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or any other provisions of either the state or federal constitutions as urged by the parties, and (2) the district court erred in finding K.S.A. 40-3101 et seq., to be unconstitutional.

Curt T. Schneider, Asst. Atty. Gen., and L. M. Cornish, J., Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause, and Vern Miller, Atty. Gen., and Mark L. Bennett, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., were with them on the brief for appellants and cross-appellees.

Fred W. Phelps and Gene E. Schroer, Topeka, and Patrick F. Kelly, Wichita, argued the cause and were on the brief for appellees and cross-appellants.

R. R. Barnes, Ratner, Mattox, Ratner, Ratner & Barnes, Wichita, and Schnider Shamberg & May, Kansas City, and Kidwell, O'Keefe & Williamson, Chartered, and Michaud, Cranmer, Syrois & Post, Wichita, were on the brief for appellee Elizabeth Madden, and others.

Raymond L. Spring, Topeka, was on the brief amici curiae for American Insurance Association, American Mut. Ins. Association, and National Association of Independent Insurers.

FATZER, Chief Justice:

This appeal involves the constitutionality of legislation commonly known as the Kansas No-Fault Insurance Act.

In 1973, the Kansas Legislature enacted Substitute for House Bill 1129 which is published as Chapter 198 of the 1973 Session Laws (L.1973, Ch. 198), and is incorporated in the Kansas Statutes Annotated as K.S.A. 40-3101 through 40-3121. The Act was defined by Section 1 as the 'Kansas Automobile Injury Reparations Act' and became effective January 1, 1974. Because of the posture of this case on appeal and events which occurred subsequent to the judgment below, it is deemed necessary to set forth in detail those events and the issues which have arisen as result of their occurrence.

In September 1973, the plaintiff, F. G. Manzanares, a resident of the state of Kansas and the owner of an insured motor vehicle, commenced this action in the district court against W. Fletcher Bell, as Commissioner of Insurance, James T. McDonald, as Secretary of Revenue, and Elton D. Lobban, as Director of Vehicles. The plaintiff filed the action individually and on behalf of all motor vehicle owners and operators in Kansas. (K.S.A.1973 Supp. 60-223.) His first amended petition alleged the unconstitutionality of Substitute for House Bill 1129 upon several grounds and prayed judgment declaring the Act unconstitutional, and for an order permanently enjoining the defendant state officials from implementing and enforcing the terms and conditions of the Act. (K.S.A. 60-907.) He also sought declaratory relief pursuant to K.S.A. 60-1701.

On October 5, 1973, Elizabeth Madden, a resident of Kansas and the owner of an insured motor vehicle, intervened and prayed for relief similar to that sought by the plaintiff. Her intervening petition was filed as a class action. (K.S.A.1973 Supp. 60-223.)

Evidence was heard, and on January 4, 1974, the district court found Substitute for House Bill 1129 unconstitutional upon the grounds that (1) the title of the Act was defective because it made no mention of first party coverage and violated Article 2, Section 16 of the Kansas Constitution; (2) Section 13(a) was invalie because its language required the injured party to repay his insurer all damages recovered from a negligent tort-feasor, and (3) Section 17 was invalid as ambiguous and accorded dissimilar treatment to injured persons depending upon whether the tort-feasor was insured as required by the Act in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. The district court announced it would file a memorandum decision and journal entry at a later date, and that its judgment would not be effective until the journal entry was filed. (K.S.A. 60-258.)

On January 24, 1974, the district court filed its memorandum opinion and journal entry and ordered that its judgment be stayed until February 7, 1974. This appeal was immediately perfected. On January 25, 1974, Senate Bill 918 was introduced in the Kansas Legislature to correct the constitutional infirmities of Substitute for House Bill 1129 as determined by the district court, and to repeal that Act in its entirety. Upon application of the defendants, this court stayed the judgment of the district court 'until the...