Maple Lanes v. Mel Messer
| Citation | 186 F.3d 823 |
| Decision Date | 27 July 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-4158,98-4158 |
| Parties | (7th Cir. 1999) Maple Lanes, Inc., d/b/a Frankie's and Kenneth J. George, Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mel Messer, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Ogle County and Ogle County Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division. No. 98-C-50138--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.
Before Posner, Chief Judge, Coffey and Kanne, Circuit Judges.
On May 9, 1996, Mel Messer, Sheriff of Ogle County, Illinois, issued the following statement to the Rochelle News- Leader, a local newspaper: "We are targeting businesses that supplement their income with cocaine and drug sales, just like we did with Frankie's in Rochelle." The newspaper published this statement, and shortly thereafter the city of Rochelle revoked the liquor license held by Maple Lanes, Inc., d/b/a Frankie's. In response, Maple Lanes and Kenneth George, Sr., its president and principal shareholder (collectively referred to as "Maple Lanes"), filed suit against Messer, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of Ogle County, and the Ogle County Sheriff's Department, claiming that Messer violated their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983. According to the complaint, the alleged false and defamatory statement resulted in the revocation of Maple Lanes's liquor license and caused a loss of property and economic interest without due process of law and a host of other injuries to George.
The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court first noted that the Ogle County Sheriff's Department was an improper party based on the fact that no such governmental entity existed. The court dismissed the remaining claims against Messer because the city of Rochelle, and not Messer, actually deprived Maple Lanes of its alleged property interest, the liquor license. In essence, the district court determined that the defamatory statement made by Messer was separate and distinct from the revocation of Maple Lanes's liquor license, as it was the city and not the sheriff that revoked the license. Maple Lanes appeals only the district court's determination with respect to the claims against Messer.
We review a district court's grant of a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting all of the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Hi-Lite Prods. Co. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 11 F.3d 1402, 1405 (7th Cir. 1993). Such a motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
Within the state of Illinois, the Liquor Control Act of 1934 governs the revocation of liquor licenses and administrative and judicial review of such revocations. See Ill. Comp. Stat. sec. 5/1-1 et seq. According to the Act, the local liquor commissioner may revoke any license issued by him if he determines that the licensee has violated any of the provisions of the Act, any valid ordinance or resolution enacted by the local government, or any rule or regulation established by the local or state liquor commission. See 235 Ill. Comp. Stat. sec. 5/7-5. A liquor license may only be revoked after a public hearing and pursuant to a written order by the local commissioner. Id. The Act provides for administrative review of any revocation to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, see 235 Ill. Comp. Stat....
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