Maples v. Myers
| Decision Date | 10 June 2004 |
| Docket Number | 2004-UP-364 |
| Parties | Michael Andrew Maples, Appellant. v. Donald V. Myers and Samuel R. Hubbard, III and Wayne Wilson, Respondents. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NOT PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted June 8, 2004.
Appeal From Lexington County Marc H. Westbrook, Circuit Court Judge.
Michael A. Maples, of West Columbia, for Appellant.
Lake E. Summers and Thomas C. R. Legare, Jr., both of Columbia and Vinton DeVane Lide, of Lexington, for Respondents.
Michael Andrew Maples (Appellant”) appeals a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Donald V. Myers Samuel R. Hubbard, III, and Wayne Wilson (collectively Respondents”) dismissing all of Appellant's claims against them. We affirm.
This matter arises from the seizure of Appellant's 1988 Pontiac Firebird and a number of weapons in connection with his arrest on multiple charges including Trafficking in Marijuana” and Trafficking in Marijuana Within Proximity of a School.”
On April 22, 1995, respondent Wayne Wilson, then Chief of Police for the town of South Congaree, was informed a citizen had discovered a number of small cups containing plants which he believed were marijuana while walking in a wooded area within town limits. Later that day, a South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED”) agent accompanied Wilson to the site. On April 25, SLED agents set up a motion activated video camera at the grow site. During this period of video surveillance, Appellant visited the area several times and tended to the marijuana plants. On June 7, one hundred and ninety-four (194) marijuana plants were confiscated from the grow site. During the search of the area, an army duffel bag was found containing an M-1 rifle and ammunition.
Following the seizure of the marijuana crop, SLED agents arrested Appellant in West Columbia and transported him to the South Congaree Police Department. After the arrest, other SLED agents took custody of Appellant's personal vehicle, a 1988 Pontiac Firebird, at his place of work in Richland County and towed it to the South Congaree Police Department. [1]
While in custody and after being advised of his rights, Appellant voluntarily executed a detailed written statement. In the statement, Appellant admits he germinated marijuana seeds and hauled the germinated seeds, plant food, and potting soil to the grow site in his Pontiac Firebird. He told Wilson he germinated the marijuana seeds in his bedroom. Appellant also admitted his involvement in three earlier shooting incidents one in which Appellant fired the weapon found at the grow site seven times into an occupied mobile home. Following the statement, Appellant gave Wilson written consent to search his padlocked bedroom in his mother's home. In the course of this search, seven loaded weapons were found and seized. On June 8, 1995, Wilson filed an Initial Report of Seizure” covering the property seized from Appellant's bedroom. On June 14, he filed a similar report concerning Appellant's vehicle. The solicitor's office, however, did not file a final forfeiture complaint against any of this property until May 2000, almost five years after the property's seizure.
Appellant was indicted by the grand jury for Manufacturing and Possession of Marijuana With Intent to Distribute Within Proximity of a School” and Trafficking in Marijuana” in violation of South Carolina Code section 44-53-370(e)(1)(b). Although Appellant pled guilty to the proximity charge, the trafficking charge was pled down to Manufacturing in Marijuana 2 nd.” For these offenses, Appellant was sentenced to a total of seven years imprisonment. He later pled guilty to discharging a firearm into a dwelling and three counts of assault with intent to kill, for which he received two consecutive ten-year prison terms.
In 1998, Appellant brought a civil action against Wilson, both individually and in his official capacity as chief of the South Congaree Police Department, alleging unlawful conversion of the above mentioned seized property. After several amendments to his original complaint, Appellant served Respondents with the final version of the underlying lawsuit in June 2000. The final complaint, among other claims, added Respondents Donald V. Myers, circuit solicitor, and his assistant, Samuel R. Hubbard, III, as new defendants under a theory of civil conspiracy. The thrust of Appellant's lawsuit appeared to be that Wilson improperly seized his vehicle and weapons, and, by failing to comply with the forfeiture statutes in a timely manner, Respondents conspired to deprive Appellant of his property and are liable for conversion.
In November 2000, Wilson moved for summary judgment on all causes of action. Following a grant of this motion, Appellant filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. In June 2001, while Appellant's motion was pending, Myers and Hubbard filed their own motion for summary judgment. Wilson joined this motion, as it pertained to issues raised against him in Appellant's pending motion to alter or amend. Following a combined hearing on both motions, summary judgment was granted to Myers and Hubbard and Appellant's motion to alter or amend was dismissed. This appeal follows.
The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite the disposition of cases which do not require the services of a fact finder. Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 69, 580 S.E.2d 433, 438 (2003); George v. Fabri, 345 S.C. 440, 452, 548 S.E.2d 868, 874 (2001). When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Laurens Emergency Med. Specialists, P.A. v. M.S. Bailey & Sons Bankers, 355 S.C. 104, 108-9, 584 S.E.2d 375, 377 (2003); Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002). In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, the evidence and all factual inferences drawn from it must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sauner v. Public Serv. Auth. of South Carolina, 354 S.C. 397, 404, 581 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2003); Hendricks v. Clemson Univ., 353 S.C. 449, 455-56, 578 S.E.2d 711, 714 (2003).
Appellant raises several issues on appeal, all ostensibly pertaining to his underlying claims against Respondents for the illegal conversion of the above mentioned seized property, allegedly perpetuated by civil conspiracy. Conversion is an unlawful act defined as the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the rights of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging to another... to the exclusion of the owner's rights.” Powell v. A.K. Brown Motor Co., 200 S.C. 75, 78, 20 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1942); Green v. Waidner, 284 S.C. 35, 37, 324 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ct. App. 1984) (emphasis added). The tort of conversion, therefore, cannot spring from the exercise of a legal right.” Steele v. Victory Sav. Bank, 295 S.C. 290, 296, 368 S.E.2d 91, 94 (Ct. App. 1988). Appellant asserts, due to several alleged statutory violations, the seizure and subsequent forfeiture of his property was not a proper exercise of Respondents' legal rights, and therefore, each is personally liable for the conversion of his property. We disagree.
Appellant seems to contend that each respondent is individually liable for the acts of the other respondents under a theory of civil conspiracy. We find this theory of imputation without merit.
In South Carolina a civil conspiracy requires: (1) a combination of two or more persons; (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff; (3) which cause the plaintiff special damages. Vaught v. Waites, 300 S.C. 201, 208, 387 S.E.2d 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1989). [I]n order to establish a conspiracy, evidence, direct or circumstantial, must be produced from which a party may reasonably infer the joint assent of the minds of two or more parties.” Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 601, 358 S.E.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1987).
Appellant failed to provide any evidence from which one could infer a meeting of the minds between Respondents. In fact, the only alleged communication of any kind between Wilson and the Solicitor's Office is the statutorily required seizure notice. Notwithstanding this court's standard of review, an argument based on mere suggestion and speculation should not survive a motion for summary judgment when no evidence is presented which creates a material issue of fact on the issue. See Rule 56(e), SCRCP. We therefore agree with the trial court in that, as a matter of law, the conspiracy claim must fail. As such, we address the possible personal liability of Myers and Hubbard (circuit solicitor and assistant solicitor who commenced final forfeiture proceedings against Appellant's property) separately from that of Wilson (sheriff who initially seized the property).
Appellant contends that Myers and Hubbard are personally liable for the value of his seized property because the final proceedings for forfeiture were commenced in an untimely fashion. We disagree.
There is no need to address the merits of Appellant's various assertions that the proper statutory forfeiture procedures were not followed to the letter. It is uncontested that section 44-53-530 grants the solicitor's office the power to petition the circuit court for the forfeiture of property seized under 44-53-520. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-530 (2002) (...
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