Al Maqablh v. Carter
| Decision Date | 10 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-83-DLB |
| Parties | ALI AL MAQABLH PLAINTIFF v. JOHN CARTER, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Plaintiff Ali Al Maqablh, proceeding without an attorney, has filed a Complaint (Doc. # 1) alleging various violations of his civil rights. The Court previously granted Al Maqablh's request to proceed in forma pauperis in this action. (Doc. # 6). Accordingly, the Court now conducts a preliminary screening of Al Maqablh's claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). For the reasons set forth herein, Al Maqablh's claims are dismissed.
Al Maqablh is a native of Jordan and a practicing Muslim who currently resides in Louisville, Kentucky. (Doc. # 1 at 3). Al Maqablh claims that three private individuals—Mary Eade (an attorney), Lindsey Alley (Al Maqablh's former wife), and Derrick Norberg (Alley's new significant other)—conspired together with John Carter, the Special Prosecutor for Trimble County, Kentucky, to subject Al Maqablh to malicious prosecution and other violations of his constitutional rights because of his race and religion. See (Doc. # 1 at 1-4). Al Maqablh names Eade, Alley, and Norberg as individual defendants, and John Carter as a defendant in both his individual and official capacity. (Doc. # 1). Al Maqablh alleges conduct taking place from May 2014 to August 2019.1 Id. at 7-19. Notably, this is not Al Maqablh's first federal lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution against his former wife and county prosecutors. See Al-Maqablh v. Crystal Heinz, et al., Case No. 3:16-cv-289-JHM (W.D. Ky.) (filed May 18, 2016). Because of Al Maqablh's financial status, the Court has allowed him to proceed as a pauper in this case. (Doc. # 6). Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 now provides for a preliminary screening of Al Maqablh's claims. See, e.g., In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997) ().
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court shall dismiss any portion of Al Maqablh's Complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. Because Al Maqablh is proceeding without an attorney, the Court evaluates his Complaint under a more lenient standard. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). At this stage of the proceedings, the Court accepts AlMaqablh's factual allegations as true and liberally construes Al Maqablh's legal claims in his favor. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). Upon review, and even liberally construing the pro se Complaint, Al Maqablh's claims in this case must be dismissed. Al Maqablh claims the Defendants violated several federal statutes and committed a number of state law torts and constitutional violations. The Court addresses the federal claims first and then considers the state law claims.
Al Maqablh claims the Defendants have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Al Maqablh suggests this federal provision guarantees him the right "to be free from racially motivated intimidation, harassment, conspiracy, coercion, arrests, searches, and the filing of false charges." (Doc. # 1 at 21). However, § 1981 "prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts involving both public and private actors." Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 867-68 (6th Cir. 2001)). More specifically, "[t]he statute's protection extends to 'the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.'" Christian, 252 F.3d at 868 (quoting § 1981(b)).
Here, Al Maqablh has not identified any contractual relationships to which he and any of the Defendants were bound. Nor has Al Maqablh alleged any of the Defendants wrongfully modified or terminated a contract. Because Al Maqablh makes no reference to any contracts at play, he has not properly alleged a cause of action under § 1981. See, e.g., Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006) (). This claim is dismissed.
Al Maqablh also accuses the Defendants of violating 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 by committing tortious conspiracy against him, which violated his substantive due process rights. (Doc. # 1 at 21-25). In bringing these claims, Al Maqablh does not clearly articulate which provision of § 1985 he relies upon, but the Complaint references both subsections two and three of § 1985 in passing. Id. at 23. Broadly speaking, § 1985(2) "creates a cause of action for a conspiracy to, among other actions, obstruct justice or to intimidate a party, witness, or juror." Jackson v. City of Cleveland, 925 F.3d 793, 817 (6th Cir. 2019). Also, § 1985(3) "creates a cause of action for a conspiracy between two or more persons to deprive another of the equal protection of the laws." Id.
In this case, Al Maqablh fails to properly plead either a § 1985(2) or § 1985(3) claim. "In order to state a cause of action under the first part of section 1985(2), a plaintiff must allege a nexus between an alleged conspiracy and a federal court proceeding." Allen v. Allied Plant Maintenance Co. of Tenn., 636 F. Supp. 1090, 1093 (M.D. Tenn. 1986). Al Maqablh has alleged no such federal nexus here, instead stating that the Defendants' actions were designed to "deter him from seeking justice in family court." (Doc. # 1 at 23).
The second part of § 1985(2) and § 1985(3) concerns class-based conspiracies to obstruct justice or deprive a person from the equal protection of the law. Both these provisions require the conspirators' actions to be motivated by race or another class-based animus. Moniz v. Cox, 512 F. App'x 495, 499 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal citationsomitted); Bennett v. Batchik, 936 F.2d 572, 1991 WL 110385, *6 (6th Cir. June 24, 1991) (unpublished table decision) (internal citation omitted). While Al Maqablh, a Muslim man of Jordanian descent, repeatedly claims he is a member of a protected class, the Complaint fails to plead a plausible conspiracy among the Defendants in the first instance. It is clear that Al Maqablh dislikes and distrusts the Defendants and that the Complaint is rooted in a longstanding domestic dispute between Al Maqablh and Alley. However, a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations that reasonably link the alleged conspirators in an agreement and establish the requisite "meeting of the minds." See Coker v. Summit Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 90 F. App'x 782, 789 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir.1993). Notably, allegations of conspiracy must involve something more than simply "being involved as an attorney and complainants in the same litigation." See Batchik, 1991 WL 110385, at *6 ().
Upon review, Al Maqablh's claims that the Defendants collectively agreed to pursue legal action against him—specifically based on his religion and/or race—are too conclusory and attenuated to survive screening. After all, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter that, accepted as true, states a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible where the factual matter stated "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Complaint also fails to adequately plead an actual obstruction of justice or deprivation of Al Maqablh's due process rights. According to the Complaint, the Defendants initiated "false legal actions" against Al Maqablh twice, (Doc. # 1 at 2), which were the result of a conspiracy to "harass, intimidate and charge [him] with crimes to deter him from seeking justice in family court," id. at 23. However, § 1985(3) requires a plaintiff to allege and ultimate prove:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.
Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 314 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Here, the Complaint lacks that final element—the injury.
The Complaint states that even after Carter supposedly filed one conspiratorial petition against Al Maqablh in Trimble District Court, Al Maqablh "appeared in family Court and prevailed in accomplishing shared and joint custody." (Doc. # 1 at 14). With respect to the second supposedly conspiratorial petition filed against him, see id. at 16-17, the Complaint states nothing about any injuries sustained by Al Maqablh or actual deprivations of his rights. Instead, the Complaint merely notes that the legal action was ultimately terminated in his favor. Id. at 17. To summarize, instead of specifically explaining how he was injured or what rights or privileges of which he was deprived, Al Maqablh's Complaint actually suggests his rights were protected by and freely exercised during the normal course of state judicial proceedings. See...
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