La Mar v. Lechlider

• Decision Date: 03 January 1939
• Citation: 135 Fla. 703,185 So. 833
• Parties: LA MAR et al. v. LECHLIDER et ux.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

185 So. 833

135 Fla. 703

LA MAR et al. v. LECHLIDER et ux.

Florida Supreme Court

January 3, 1939

Rehearing Denied Feb. 3, 1939.

Suit by William T. Lechlider and Maude LaMar Lechlider, his wife against Holmes La Mar and others for specific performance of an alleged agreement to convey an interest in property, or to have a lien declared and enforced against the property to the extent of money expended for improvements, to have plaintiffs subrogated to mortgage, and a mortgage claimed by one of the defendants decreed in ferior to the rights of the plaintiffs. From a decree denying plaintiffs specific performance, but granting the other relief sought, the defendants appeal.

Decree affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; DeWitt T. Gray, judge.

COUNSEL

Will O Murrell and W. C. Johnson, both of Jacksonville, for appellants.

Lee Guest, of Jacksonville, for appellees.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

In 1930 Holmes LaMar, 50 years of age, purchased the property herein involved from Jennie V. Bell through the Florida National Bank of Jacksonville, trustee, for the sum of $3,000 ($800 in cash and the assumption of a first mortgage in the amount of $2,200 in favor of one Elise Blum, executrix). The plaintiffs, William T. Lechlider, 67 years of age, and his wife Maude LaMar Lechlider, 66 years and sister of Holmes LaMar, were residents to Cleveland, Ohio. While visiting the defendants, appellants here, the plaintiffs had often expressed a desire to live in the State of Florida.

In 1932 it was mutually agreed between the two families that an addition should be built on to the house then standing upon the property, the plaintiff Lechlider paying for all the materials and labor necessary for the construction and to receive therefor 'an interest in the property' and a place where the plaintiffs could live during their old age. There was no express agreement, however, for the conveyance to them of any undivided or specific or any other interest in the lands of defendants.

A contractor was called and plans for the erection of an addition to cost $2,600 were made. The construction was immediately commenced and had progressed sufficiently far by April 8, 1933, that at that time the plaintiffs shipped to Florida their household furnishings and placed them in the enlarged dwelling. The cost of construction far exceeded the original estimate of $2,600 and did actually cost $4,650, the last of which was paid October 5, 1933. After the construction of the addition each family considered that the Lechliders had acquired some interest in the land, though the precise nature of that interest does not clearly appear.

There was a $2,200 mortgage on the property (the Blum mortgage above referred to) which Lechlider was informed of in 1933 and when he went to Cleveland he sent LaMar three checks, one for $2,000, one for $100, and one for $50, with instructions to have the mortgage taken up and transferred to plaintiffs. Subsequently the defendant Holmes LaMar, without intending to lay a foundation for defrauding plaintiffs or damaging them in any way, negotiated with Elise Blum and secured, instead of an assignment, a satisfaction of the mortgage. Correspondence developed between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to the defendant LaMar having obtained a satisfaction of this mortgage rather than having it transferred to the Lechliders; and a misunderstanding arose as to the use by the defendants of the words 'you can put value you wish on the mortgage' in a letter in which defendant discussed making a new mortgage to the Lechliders in place of having the old one transferred. The plaintiffs believing LaMar was attempting to defraud them, wrote a letter in answer to that of LaMar above referred to, requesting that the mortgage be for $7,500 at 2 1/2% interest, which, Lechlider wrote, would equal 8% on $2,250.

This, of course, he was not entitled to, but in view of past experiences and LaMar's letter, it was not unreasonable to request it. Lechlider's reply reminded LaMar that because of defects in some transaction, his father once woke up and found himself owning nothin and suggested that with such a mortgage ($7,500 at 2 1/2%) if any one wanted to kick them out in their old days when LaMar and his wife were gone, they would 'still have a share'. The plain purport of this letter was that unless they had something to show for the improvements and advances, upon the death of the LaMars, their only son and heir, 'Bill', would proceed to deprive plaintiffs of what they were to receive, should their agreement with the LaMars be performed.

In the situation thus created nature took its course. The son resented the slur at him, and at first LaMar attempted to be peacemaker. However, in the course of time a situation developed which, aided with a little liquor, resulted in a physical fight between defendant LaMar and the plaintiff during the Christmas Holidays of 1934.

On February 15, 1935, the defendants Holmes LaMar and Sue E. LaMar, his wife, duly executed and delivered to the defendant Hattem their mortgage deed to secure a note of the same date in the amount of $5,200 on the property here involved. The master found that the note and mortgage were not bona fide, but were a fraudulent device to defeat the plaintiffs' claim. However, this mortgage has been satisfied and is no longer a part of this case.

The two families continued to reside together on the premises until March 7, 1935, when the Lechliders moved away, this being one day after the institution of the present suit, and the day before the service of process. They have since been prohibited from returning by Mr. LaMar. Mr. LaMar has not rescinded that prohibition.

The Lechliders filed their bill of complaint praying for specific performance of an alleged agreement to convey an interest in the property; that in the event specific performance is not the remedy to which plaintiffs would be entitled, then that a lien be declared and enforced against the property to the extent of the money expended for improvements thereon: that the plaintiffs be subrogated to the $2,200 mortgage which was satisfied instead of assigned; and that the $5,200 mortgage claimed by defendant George Hattem be decreed to be inferior to the rights and interests of the plaintiffs.

The Lower court refused to grant specific performance, but held that plaintiffs had made valuable improvements on the property involved herein, the reasonable value of which was $4,650; that to secure that amount plus interest plaintiffs were entitled to a lien on the property in question; that plaintiffs were the equitable assignees of the Blum mortgage and were subrogated thereto in the principal amount of $2,000 paid plus interest; that the Hattem mortgage was as to plaintiffs' rights subordinate, inferior, void and of no effect.

It was undoubtedly the intention of both the LaMars and the Lechliders that, by the construction of the improvements thereon, the Lechliders should acquire an interest in the land herein involved, but there was clearly no definite or certain contract in any of the following particulars; the consideration, in terms either of money or of exactitude as to the improvements to be erected; the time when the contract was to be performed or the time when the interest being acquired by the Lechliders was to be vested; or the quantity, (i. e. proportionate interest in the property) or quality (i. e. whether life estate or fee interest in the property) of the interest being acquired by the Lechliders. The lower court correctly concluded that specific performance could not be granted the plaintiffs. Glinski v. Zawadski, 8 Fla. 405; Patrick v. Sears, 19 Fla. 856; Edwards v. Rives, 35 Fla. 89, 17 So. 416; Connor v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 92 Fla. 716, 110 So. 128; Rundel v. Gordon, 92 Fla. 1110, 111 So. 386.

In cases brought to enforce the specific performance of contracts, as a general rule, if the plaintiff fails to make out a case for...