Marable, Matter of, Docket No. 78-731

• Decision Date: 01 May 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-731
• Citation: 90 Mich.App. 7,282 N.W.2d 221
• Parties: In the Matter of Karen MARABLE, a Minor. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF DETROIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Karen MARABLE, a Minor, Defendant-Appellee. 90 Mich.App. 7, 282 N.W.2d 221
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 221

282 N.W.2d 221

In the Matter of Karen MARABLE, a Minor.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the CITY OF

DETROIT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Karen MARABLE, a Minor, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 78-731.

90 Mich.App. 7, 282 N.W.2d 221

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

May 1, 1979.

Released for Publication Aug. 22, 1979.

[90 MICHAPP 8] Lynne E. Metty, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas M. Harp, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

Before RILEY, P. J., and KELLY and BEASLEY, JJ.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit, filed a petition in the Juvenile Division of the Wayne County Probate Court, asserting that defendant-appellee, Karen Marable, a 14-year-old public school student, had been truant from school and, therefore, should be determined to be a juvenile delinquent under M.C.L. § 712A.2(a)(4); M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.2)(a)(4).

Defendant's motion to dismiss was denied by a juvenile court referee, which denial was upheld by a probate judge. On appeal to the circuit court, the order of denial was reversed and the proceedings dismissed. Plaintiff appeals to this court by leave granted.

The sole issue is whether Karen Marable's attendance in school is required by law.

The juvenile court's jurisdiction arises from M.C.L. § 712A.2(a)(4); M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.2)(a)(4):

[90 MICHAPP 9] "Sec. 2. Except as provided herein, the juvenile division of the probate court shall have:

"(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction superior to and regardless of the jurisdiction of any other court in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age found within the county

"(4) Who, being required by law to attend school, wilfully and repeatedly absents himself therefrom, or repeatedly violates rules and regulations thereof;"

The trial court interpreted this statute as only conferring jurisdiction over children who are "being required by law to attend school". The court then went on to determine that no statute specifically requires a child to attend schools and that the statutes only relate to penalties imposed upon a parent who does not send school-age children to school.

The compulsory education statute in effect at the time of this action was M.C.L. § 340.731; M.S.A. § 15.3731, which states:

"(a) Except as provided in section 732 and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), every parent, guardian or other person in this state, having control and charge of any child between the ages of 6 and 16 years, shall send such child, equipped with the proper textbooks necessary to pursue his school work, to the public schools during the entire school year, and such attendance shall be continuous and consecutive for the school year fixed by the district in which such child is enrolled. In school districts which maintain school during the entire year and in which the school year is divided into quarters, no child shall be compelled to attend the public schools more than 3 quarters in any one year; but a child shall not be absent for any 2 consecutive quarters.

"(b) A child becoming 6 years of age before December 1 shall be enrolled on the first school day of the school [90 MICHAPP 10] year in which his sixth birthday occurs. A child becoming 6 years of age on or after December 1 shall be enrolled on the first school day of the school year following the school year in which his sixth birthday occurs."

The first sentence of this section applies specifically to parents and guardians. The second sentence is a more general reference to when a child should be compelled to be present. It would be unreasonable to hold that the Legislature intended to require parents to send their children to school without a requirement that the children must attend. The purpose of the statute is obviously to require attendance of the child at school and not merely to insure that a parent sends the child off in that direction. ¹ A statute must be construed so as to avoid absurd or unreasonable consequences. ²

We further find that defendant's claim that the compulsory education statute cannot be applied to children through the jurisdictional statutes for juvenile court because such a statutory construction would be unconstitutionally broad and vague to be without merit. Although M.C.L. § 340.740; M.S.A. § 15.3740 and M.C.L. § 340.743; M.S.A. § 15.3743 ³ impose direct penalties on parents whose duty it is to send their children to public schools, the specification of the pertinent enforcement provision for children is found in the probate code. ⁴ A child need not guess as to the circumstances which require attendance or the type of behavior to be avoided.

In Flint Board of Education v. Williams, ⁵ the [90 MICHAPP 11] Court dealt with the issue at bar in considering the presently in...