Maranda v. Maranda
| Decision Date | 22 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. C3-88-1306,C3-88-1306 |
| Citation | 449 N.W.2d 158 |
| Parties | In re the Marriage of Mary Elizabeth MARANDA, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Edward Charles MARANDA, Respondent, TCF Banking and Savings, F.A., Garnishee. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The trial court had jurisdiction to consider petitioner's motion to vacate the judgment and decree.
2. In the context of a property settlement stipulation presented to the court as the basis for entry of a marriage dissolution judgment, "fraud on the court" is an intentional course of material misrepresentation or non-disclosure having the result of misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the property settlement grossly unfair.
3. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination of the 1979 value of the marital estate except for the One Hundred Eighty-one Thousand, One Hundred Fifty-nine and No/100 Dollars ($181,159.00) "accumulation adjustment" awarded by the trial court.
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance.
5. Petitioner is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
James P. Michels, Best & Flanagan, Minneapolis, Theodore L. Collins, Collins, Buckley, Sauntry & Haugh, St. Paul, for appellant.
Shirley A. Reider, and Robert H. Zalk, Fredrickson & Byron, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.
This action arose on September 23, 1985, when Mary Maranda moved the court for an order, pursuant to Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(3), (6), to reopen a judgment and decree that vacated the property settlement provisions of a decree of dissolution dated August 23, 1979, which had dissolved the marriage of Mary and Edward Maranda and had incorporated a written stipulation of the parties dividing their assets. Mary claimed that Edward had committed fraud on the court in his failure to disclose all of the assets of the parties and intentionally misleading the court as to the value of the assets that were disclosed. The trial court awarded the relief Mary sought and ordered judgment on her behalf for Five Hundred Seventy-nine Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($579,000.00) and attorney fees and costs.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that there was insufficient evidence of fraud on the court. 435 N.W.2d 621. It further concluded that the method of valuation used by the trial court was too speculative. We reverse the court of appeals and affirm in part and reverse in part the original decision of the trial court.
The facts are very lengthy, but we feel compelled to outline them sufficiently to explain our decision in this case. Respondent, Mary Maranda, and appellant, Edward Maranda, were married on April 1, 1967, when Mary was 19 and Edward was 23. The parties are the parents of two children: John, born October 5, 1967; and Rosemary, born July 19, 1974. Edward obtained a university degree in business in 1967. Mary is a high school graduate who took some English and psychology classes at Anoka-Ramsey Junior College, but discontinued her formal education after the couple was married.
Shortly after the marriage, Edward was employed by Prudential Insurance Company. Beginning in 1974, Edward formed his own insurance agency. Throughout the course of the marriage, Edward received additional education in income tax preparation and prepared the parties' tax returns as well as tax returns of others. During the course of the marriage, Edward handled all the family's financial transactions, except for purchases of clothing and food, and kept all their financial records at his business office. During the years the parties were married, Mary never saw a completed tax return and occasionally signed blank real estate and tax documents presented to her by Edward. When Mary attempted to learn more about the family finances, Edward discouraged her involvement by becoming angry or explaining things in what Mary characterized as a confusing way.
The parties were separated in late June 1978. Between the date of the separation and the entry of the judgment and decree in August of 1979, Mary earned a gross income of approximately Seventy-five and No/100 Dollars ($75.00) per week by providing day care services in her home. During the separation period, the couple maintained a joint checking account into which Edward deposited between $800 to $900 per month to cover family expenses, including a mortgage payment on the homestead of Three Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($300.00) per month. Sometime around August 1978, Mary and a friend went to Edward's insurance agency while Edward was away and attempted to gather information about the Maranda family's finances without Edward's knowledge. This was discovered by Edward, who then became very angry.
Sometime before the stipulation was executed in July 1979, Mary contacted an attorney to represent her in the dissolution proceeding. Mary paid the attorney Three Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($300.00) and Edward paid him Seven Hundred Fifty and No/100 Dollars ($750.00), the remainder of the fee for handling the dissolution. Mary's attorney received all his information regarding the value of the marital estate from Edward. With respect to the financial information provided to Mary's attorney, Edward told Mary that, because the couple's children were involved, he would be fair in dividing up the marital property. Mary had no money for pretrial discovery beyond the initial Three Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($300.00) she gave to her attorney.
Mary maintains that her attorney did not obtain an appraisal of the homestead or the Maranda insurance agency, copies of recent tax records, banking or stock brokerage records, real property records, or a verified statement from Edward as to the nature and value of marital property. After drafting the stipulation, her attorney spent approximately 15 minutes discussing it with Mary.
The 1979 judgment and decree, which was based on the stipulation drafted by Mary's attorney, listed the parties' total assets as follows:
Savings $ 2,000.00
Shares of stock 4,000.00
Value of insurance business 20,000.00
Homestead equity 40,000.00
Interest in two partnerships relating to apartment buildings in 30,000.00
which [Edward] owns one-fourth interest
Other unimproved land located in Pine, Carlton and Kanabec 4,000.00
Counties
-----------
$100,000.00
-----------
-----------
The judgment and decree also stated that the parties' total liabilities were Fifty-five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($55,000.00), resulting in a net worth of Forty-five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($45,000.00). The judgment and decree provided that Mary was to receive the homestead, Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($500.00) per month for 3 years as part of the property settlement and child support of Two Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($200.00) per month per child until the children reached age 18.
Mary first began to question the accuracy of the property settlement when she received telephone calls in the fall of 1984 from people who had earlier purchased real property on contracts for deed from Edward and Mary not listed in the stipulation or judgment and wanted Mary to execute quit claim deeds. In December of 1986, Mary received a phone call from a title company with respect to a parcel of real property located at 1901 Maryland Avenue in St. Paul. The title company wanted Mary to come to a real estate closing because some contract for deed vendees wanted to pay off their contract for deed and needed Mary's signature. The title company provided Mary with a quit claim deed dated January 5, 1979, (7 months before the dissolution) ostensibly conveying the Maryland Avenue property to Edward's father. Mary testified that she did not sign the quit claim deed, that the signature on the quit claim deed was not hers, and that she believed that it was a forgery. A handwriting expert testifying on behalf of Mary opined that the signature on the quit claim deed was not Mary's. Edward denied forging Mary's signature on the deed, but admitted that he was not sure where or when Mary signed the deed.
At the evidentiary hearings on Mary's motions before the referee and the trial judge, lengthy and detailed testimony was given by Mary, Edward, two experts testifying on behalf of Mary, and others concerning the character and value of property owned by Mary and Edward at the time of the judgment and decree. The bulk of the evidence were financial statements provided by Edward to banks between 1977 and 1985 and federal income tax returns from 1981 to 1985. During this period, Edward made the following representations regarding his net worth to various banks:
6/10/77 $166,000
3/21/78 243,600
6/28/78 167,000
9/ 1/80 464,000
9/22/81 691,000
9/14/83 803,375
5/ /86 762,000
By contrast, the July 1979 stipulation showed Edward's net worth at Forty-five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($45,000.00). In addition, Edward alleged in his answers to Mary's interrogatories that his tax returns for 1979 and 1980 were unavailable and that he did not have a personal copy.
In summary, each of the financial statements listed substantially higher values for the marital property than were set forth in the judgment and decree. Both of Mary's experts attempted to estimate the 1979 value of the marital estate by analyzing these financial statements and tax returns and then...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Hutchinson
...to fraud on the court because "the court ... sits as a third party to the stipulation" in marital dissolution cases. Maranda v. Maranda , 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989). South Carolina has held asset nondisclosure is extrinsic fraud if the nondisclosure is "coupled with an intentional sch......
-
Cvitanovich–dubie v. Dubie
...was not a case where the fraud occurred between the parties and had little effect on the judicial proceedings. See Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn.1989) (noting that the court in a stipulated divorce dissolution sits as a third party to the agreement). George's alleged represe......
-
Godin v. Godin
...that a narrow definition of fraud on the court "has no place in family law" where the court "sits as a third party." Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn. 1989). Thus, other courts have found fraud on the court in cases comparable to that before us. See, e.g., In re M.E., 622 N.E.2......
-
Ortega-Maldonado v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civ. No. 06-461 (PJS/RLE).
...358 (Minn.App. 1996), citing Halloran v. Blue & White Liberty Cab Co., 253 Minn. 436, 92 N.W.2d 794, 798 (1958), and Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn.1989). We need not enter that murky issue, here, however, as we find that collateral estoppel is not appropriate to the claims t......