Marbley v. Bane
| Decision Date | 15 June 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 1029,D,1029 |
| Citation | 57 F.3d 224 |
| Parties | George MARBLEY; Katie McClain; and Ellen Beauregard, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mary Jo BANE, Individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services; James P. McCaffrey, as Commissioner of the Albany County Department of Social Services; and Ora Langdon, as Commissioner of the Franklin County Department of Social Services, on behalf of themselves and all other county commissioners of Social Services Districts within the State of New York, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 94-7822. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Gerald A. Norlander, Albany, NY (B. Robert Piller, Charles J. Brennan, Public Utility Project of New York, Inc., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Frank K. Walsh, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, NY , for defendants-appellees.
Before: WALKER, JACOBS, and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.
The plaintiffs represent a class of New Yorkers living in federally-subsidized housing who seek an allotment (or a greater allotment) from funds block-granted by the federal government to the State of New York to subsidize the heating costs of low-income individuals. The named defendants are Mary Jo Bane, sued individually and as the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services (the "Department"), and the county social services commissioners of Albany County and Franklin County. Plaintiffs George Marbley, Katie McClain, and Ellen Beauregard allege that the defendants' administration of New York's Home Energy Assistance Program ("HEAP"), violated (a) the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Act of 1981 ("LIHEAA"), see 42 U.S.C. Secs. 8621-8629, which is the federal statute that authorizes funds for HEAP, and (b) the United States Constitution. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and money damages. The plaintiffs have been certified as class representatives of persons who have been excluded from HEAP, or given a lesser subsidy, allegedly in violation of federal law. The two defendant county commissioners have been certified (on plaintiffs' motion) as class representatives of all the county commissioners of social services in the State, on the ground that the commissioners as a group are charged with implementing a state regulation, policy or practice that is challenged as unlawful. No appeal is taken from the certification of the plaintiff and defendant classes.
Both parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (McAvoy, C.J.) granted each party partial summary judgment. By then, the State had altered its position in part. Subsequently, on motion of the defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60, the district court modified the prior order and dismissed the remaining claims on Eleventh Amendment grounds. In addition, the district court rejected plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees. In all but one respect, we affirm; we vacate the part of the order that rejects plaintiffs' application for attorney's fees, and remand for further proceedings on that issue.
The low-income heating assistance program at issue was originally part of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980. Pub.L. No. 96-233, 94 Stat. 288 et seq. This program was designed to mitigate the effects on poor people of the increased costs of oil-based energy imposed by the OPEC cartel. When that Act was repealed in 1981, LIHEAA was adopted in its place in order to devolve certain welfare funding decisions back to the states in the form of block-grant programs. See Rodriguez v. Cuomo, 953 F.2d 33, 38 (2d Cir.1992). LIHEAA provides block grants to participating states to subsidize part of the costs of heating (or air conditioning) incurred by low-income families. This program is very general in its terms, leaving eligibility criteria, and other specifics, largely to the discretion of the states. See Id. at 41.
HEAP was created by the Department pursuant to a New York statute authorizing the development of a program for participation in LIHEAA. See N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law Sec. 97 (McKinney 1992). Exercising the discretion afforded by LIHEAA, New York has elected not to augment the federal subsidy with any state funds, and to provide no subsidy for home cooling.
This appeal requires us to revisit, in light of a recent "clarification" of the law promulgated by Congress, an issue we addressed previously in Rodriguez: whether the defendants violated federal statutory or constitutional law when they categorically denied HEAP subsidies to two groups of persons living in federally-subsidized housing--(1) those whose heating costs are included as an undifferentiated component in their rent; and (2) those who pay separately for home heating fuel.
Prior to 1989--that is, prior to the eligibility changes at issue in this lawsuit--all government-subsidized tenants who paid for all or part of their utility bills were eligible for a HEAP subsidy, and those who were not responsible for any utility payments were ineligible. The term "utility payments" includes gas and electricity, and therefore might include electric home heating, but does not (or does not necessarily) include other home heating fuels. Over time, as the federal funding under LIHEAA diminished, the Department took measures to target available funds more narrowly.
The Regulation. Hearings were held in 1988, and a new regulation was adopted for the 1989-90 HEAP plan year that automatically disqualifies from HEAP anyone who lives in government subsidized housing whose heat is included in rent. See 18 N.Y.Comp.Codes Rules & Regs. Sec. 393.4(c)(3)(i) (the "Regulation"). The Department's rationale in adopting this Regulation was that, because the rent paid by these individuals (including heat) is capped at thirty percent of their income, they are to that extent insulated from increased heating costs and have less need than others for HEAP assistance. We upheld this Regulation in Rodriguez. Plaintiffs Marbley and McClain live in a housing project in Albany. Their heating costs are included in their federally assisted rent. Their eligibility for HEAP subsidies was terminated by the Regulation.
The Policy. Beginning with the 1988-89 plan year, the Department adopted a policy reducing HEAP payments to tenants in federally-subsidized housing who pay their heating costs out-of-pocket, so that they would receive a HEAP subsidy equal to that paid to tenants of unsubsidized housing whose heat is included in their rent (the "Policy"). The Department's rationale in adopting the Policy was that most tenants of subsidized housing live in multiple-dwelling units and have lower heating costs than families living in detached, single-family housing. The Policy was rescinded after the 1992-93 HEAP plan year. Plaintiff Beauregard lives in federally assisted housing in Malone, in Franklin County. Her home is heated by oil for which she pays separately and in addition to her rent. Her HEAP subsidy is therefore unaffected by the Regulation. However, it was reduced by the Policy while the Policy was in effect.
The Utility Allowance. The rent paid by all three plaintiffs is reduced by a factor called a "utility allowance," so that rent together with out-of-pocket utility payments will be subject roughly to the thirty percent cap. The utility allowance is a fixed estimate that is not keyed to each tenant's actual expenditure for particular expenses. In ordinary parlance, the term "utility" would include gas and electric and would not include oil or coal. Plaintiffs Marbley and McClain argue, however, that their "utility" bills include some home heating expense because their electric bills reflect the cost of the electric blowers that conduct heat to or around their apartments. Plaintiffs deem this significant.
The Clarification. As part of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Congress adopted a "Clarification on Utility Allowance." See Pub.L. No. 102-550, Title IX, Sec. 927, 106 Stat. 3885 () ("section 927"). Section 927 provided that tenants who "are responsible for making out-of-pocket payments for utility bills[,] and ... receive energy assistance through utility allowances [under certain federal programs] ... shall not have their eligibility or benefits under other programs designed to assist low-income people with increases in energy costs since 1978 (including but not limited to the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program) reduced or eliminated." Sec. 927(a). Section 927 was amended during the pendency of this lawsuit to address LIHEAA specifically, as we discuss below.
Proceedings. The complaint, filed on March 25, 1993, alleged that the defendants were administering the HEAP in a manner that violated LIHEAA, section 927, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court certified the plaintiff and defendant classes, and granted each side partial summary judgment:
(1) defendants were granted summary judgment
(a) on plaintiffs' claim that the Regulation violates LIHEAA;
(b) on plaintiffs' claim that HEAP violates section 927;
(c) on plaintiffs' claim that HEAP violates the equal protection rights of government-subsidized tenants whose heat is included in their rent; and
(d) on all claims for monetary relief for violations of section 927 in the 1992-93 program year, on the grounds of qualified immunity.
(2) plaintiffs were granted summary judgment in respect of their claim that the Policy, reducing HEAP benefits to government-subsidized tenants who pay separately for heat, violates section 927; plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on this issue was, however, denied as moot, because the Policy...
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