Marbury v. Pace Univ. (In re Columbia Tuition Refund Action)

Decision Date26 February 2021
Docket Number20-CV-3208 (JMF), 20-CV-3210 (JMF)
Citation523 F.Supp.3d 414
Parties IN RE COLUMBIA TUITION REFUND ACTION Xaviera Marbury, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Pace University, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Eric Poulin, Roy T. Willey, IV, Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC, Charleston, SC, John MacLeod Bradham, Morea Schwartz Bradham Friedman & Brown LLP, Edward G. Toptani, Toptani Law Offices, New York, NY, for Plaintiff Student A.

Eric Poulin, Roy T. Willey, IV, Anastopoulo Law Firm, LLC, Charleston, SC, Thomas James McKenna, Gainey & McKenna, John MacLeod Bradham, Morea Schwartz Bradham Friedman & Brown LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs Chris Riotta, Lisa Guerra, Alexandra Taylor-Gutt.

Roberta Ann Kaplan, David Shieh, Gabrielle Tenzer, Joshua Adam Matz, Kaplan Hecker & Fink LLP, New York, NY, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:

In the Spring of 2020, after the novel coronavirus arrived in the United States, colleges and universities throughout the country did their part to stop the spread of COVID-19 by moving classes online and halting various in-person activities and services. For the most part, this response earned institutions of higher education praise for acting in the interests of public health. But it also earned them a host of lawsuits from students seeking partial refunds for tuition and fees that they had allegedly paid for in-person learning and other services. Thus far, these kinds of claims have received a mixed reception in the courts. To the extent that students have brought claims based on the quality of their educations or general promises of excellence, they have fared poorly, as courts have been reluctant to second guess schools when it comes to academic matters. But to the extent that students have identified specific services or facility access that schools promised in exchange for tuition or fees, they have met with greater success.

These putative class actions are two of the many that have been brought against colleges and universities in the last year raising such claims. In one, students bring claims against Columbia University. In the other, a student brings claims against Pace University. In each case, the University now moves to dismiss — in the case of Columbia, by way of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the case of Pace, by way of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c). The cases are not formally consolidated, but the Court addresses the two motions together because they raise similar issues. Applying well-established principles of New York law governing the relationship between educational institutions and their students, and consistent with the decisions of most courts that have addressed these kinds of claims, the Court holds that some of the students’ claims can proceed, while others must be dismissed. More specifically, to the extent that the students plausibly allege that their University violated specific contractual promises for particular services or access to facilities, their claims survive; to the extent that they fail to identify such promises, their claims must be and are dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Student A, Chris Riotta, Lisa Guerra, and Alexandra Taylor-Gutt (the "Columbia Plaintiffs") were students at Columbia University during the Spring 2020 semester. 20-CV-3208, ECF No. 42 ("Columbia SAC" or "Complaint"), ¶¶ 11-14. Plaintiff Xaviera Marbury was a student at Pace University during the same semester. 20-CV-3210, ECF No. 28 ("Pace FAC" or "Complaint"), ¶ 10. When the COVID-19 pandemic reached New York in March 2020, Columbia and Pace took similar actions to prevent the spread of illness. Most relevant here, both Universities moved all classes online from the middle of March through the end of the Spring 2020 semester; closed certain campus facilities; canceled various campus activities; and encouraged students who lived on campus to vacate their dormitory rooms. See Columbia SAC ¶¶ 45, 52-55; Pace FAC ¶¶ 41, 43, 51, 153.

Plaintiffs do not question the wisdom of the actions the Universities took to prevent the spread of a highly contagious, sometimes fatal disease. (In fact, in their original Complaints — which the Court may consider as "controvertible, not conclusive, admissions," Barris v. Hamilton , No. 96-CV-9541 (DAB), 1999 WL 311813, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) they went further, conceding that the actions at issue were, in fact, "the right thing ... to do." 20-CV-3208, ECF No. 1, ¶ 2; 20-CV-3210, ECF No. 1, ¶ 2.) Nevertheless, they contend that the actions breached the Universities’ contractual obligations to provide in-person instruction and various on-campus services in exchange for tuition and fees. See Columbia SAC ¶¶ 80-155, 171-96; Pace FAC ¶¶ 73-123, 140-57, 170-77. On this theory, the Columbia Plaintiffs bring a putative class action against the Board of Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York ("Columbia") pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act ("CAFA"), 28 U.S.C. § 11. Columbia SAC ¶ 16. Marbury does the same against Pace. Pace FAC ¶ 11. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to pro rata refunds of tuition and fees reflecting the difference in fair market value of the services that they were allegedly promised and the services that they actually received. See Columbia SAC ¶¶ 154-55, 195-96; Pace FAC ¶¶ 122-23, 156-57, 176-77.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are subject to the same legal standards. See Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills , 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001). In both instances, the Court must assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g. , Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. , 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). To survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). More specifically, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint that offers only "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. If a plaintiff has not "nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [those claims] must be dismissed." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

DISCUSSION

In each of these cases, the primary claim is that the Defendant University breached its contractual obligations to provide certain services, including in-person instruction and access to campus facilities and activities, when the Universities modified and curtailed their activities in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff or Plaintiffs in each case also bring claims for unjust enrichment (in the alternative to their contract claims), conversion, and violations of New York's consumer protection statutes. The Court will address each of these claims in turn.

A. Breach of Contract

Under New York law, it is well established that the relationship between an institution of higher education and its students is "contractual in nature." Prusack v. State , 117 A.D.2d 729, 498 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (2d Dep't 1986) ; see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ. , 633 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). "The rights and obligations of the parties as contained in the university's bulletins, circulars and regulations made available to the student[ ] become a part of this contract." Vought v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ. , 127 A.D.2d 654, 511 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 (2d Dep't 1987). Thus, "to make out an implied contract claim" against a university, "a student must identify specific language in the school's bulletins, circulars, catalogues and handbooks which establishes the particular ‘contractual’ right or obligation alleged by the student." Keefe v. N.Y. Law Sch. , 906 N.Y.S.2d 773, 2009 WL 3858679, at *1 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (unpublished table decision), aff'd , 71 A.D.3d 569, 897 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1st Dep't 2010) ; see also Jeffers v. Am. Univ. of Antigua , 125 A.D.3d 440, 3 N.Y.S.3d 335, 337 (1st Dep't 2015) ; Cheves v. Trs. of Columbia Univ. , 89 A.D.3d 463, 931 N.Y.S.2d 877, 877 (1st Dep't 2011). "The interpretation of a university's catalogue, like the interpretation of any contract, is a matter of law for the Court." Deen v. New Sch. Univ. , No. 05-CV-7174 (KMW), 2007 WL 1032295, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (citing Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London , 136 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) ).

In general, to sustain a contract claim against a university, a student must point to a provision that guarantees "certain specified services," Baldridge v. State , 293 A.D.2d 941, 740 N.Y.S.2d 723, 725 (3d Dep't 2002) (quoting Paladino v. Adelphi Univ. , 89 A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 873 (2d Dep't 1982) ), not merely to a "[g]eneral statement[ ] of policy," Keefe , 2009 WL 3858679, at *1, or to statements of "opinion or puffery," Bader v. Siegel , 238 A.D.2d 272, 657 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (1st Dep't 1997). Additionally, "to state a valid claim for a breach of contract" against a university, a student "must state when and how the defendant breached the specific contractual promise." Radin v. Albert Einstein...

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