Paladino v. Adelphi University

Decision Date12 October 1982
Citation454 N.Y.S.2d 868,89 A.D.2d 85
Parties, 7 Ed. Law Rep. 190 Frank PALADINO, individually etc., et al., Respondents, v. ADELPHI UNIVERSITY, Defendant; The Waldorf School, Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Deegan & Reardon, Mineola (Robert J. Aurigema and Marian C. Rice, Mineola, of counsel), for appellant.

Lawrence B. Kahn, Great Neck, for respondents.

Before MOLLEN, P. J., and MANGANO, BROWN and RUBIN, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

At issue is whether recovery may be had against a private elementary school for breach of contract based upon its alleged failure to provide a quality education to a student enrolled in the school. We hold that such action does not lie. Further, we conclude that, under the facts here present, related claims predicated upon fraudulent misrepresentation and deceit must similarly be dismissed.

Michael Paladino was enrolled at the nursery grade level at the Waldorf School in 1972 and continued at the school through the fifth grade. His teachers during this period sent evaluation reports to Michael's parents that assessed his performance in each area of his curriculum. In 1979, while he was attending fifth grade, Michael evidenced certain learning problems and his parents sent him to a private testing institution for independent evaluation. The results showed that Michael was not equipped with sufficient skills for fifth grade and was several grades below fifth grade level in arithmetic, reading and writing. Thereafter, the school refused to promote Michael to the sixth grade and his parents enrolled him in public school where he repeated the fifth grade.

Michael's father alleged in his complaint that the Waldorf School breached its agreement by failing to provide quality education, qualified and expert teachers, necessary tutorial and supportive skills, accurate and factual progress reports; and that it furnished false and misleading progress reports which reflected that Michael was making satisfactory progress in his studies and promoted him each year to the next grade. A second cause of action was asserted on behalf of Michael as a third-party beneficiary of the agreement with the school and the father pleaded a third cause of action sounding in deceit based on the allegedly inaccurate progress reports and misrepresentations concerning the quality of the education. A fourth cause of action for deceit was also pleaded on behalf of Michael.

Special Term, 101 Misc.2d 314, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38, denied the school's motion for summary judgment holding that the established policy of our courts in refusing to entertain lawsuits for educational malpractice did not bar an action in contract nor one based upon fraudulent misrepresentation. Our review of the case law and the record herein compels a contrary conclusion.

The courts have uniformly refused, based on public policy considerations, to enter the classroom to determine claims based upon educational malpractice (see Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317; Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352; Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 115; D.S.W. v. Fairbanks No. Star Bor. Sch. Dist., Alaska, 628 P.2d 554, 556; Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582, 585-586; Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 824-825, 131 Cal.Rptr. 854, 859; Helm v. Professional Children's School, 103 Misc.2d 1053, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246).

In the context of a negligence action, the court in Loughran v. Flanders, supra, p. 115, stated that a "claim for damages necessarily hinges upon questions of methodology and educational priorities, issues not appropriate for resolution by this Court". In Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, supra, 439 A.2d p. 585, the court said that "to allow petitioners' asserted negligence claims to proceed would in effect position the courts of this State as overseers of both the day-to-day operation of our educational process as well as the formulation of its governing policies. This responsibility we are loathe to impose on our courts."

In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist. (supra) the Court of Appeals first considered the issue of educational malpractice. There, the plaintiff had claimed that his educational deficiency resulted from the institution's failure to perform its duties and obligations to educate him. Similar to the claimed offending acts in the case at bar, the plaintiff in Donohue specifically alleged in his complaint that the school 47 N.Y.2d p. 442, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352 " 'gave to passing grades and/or minimal or failing grades in various subjects; failed to evaluate mental ability and capacity to comprehend the subjects being taught to him at said school; failed to take proper means and precautions that they reasonably should have taken under the circumstances; failed to interview, discuss, evaluate and/or psychologically test in order to ascertain his ability to comprehend and understand such matter; failed to provide adequate school facilities, teachers, administrators, psychologists, and other personnel trained to take the necessary steps in testing and evaluation processes insofar as is concerned in order to ascertain the learning capacity, intelligence and intellectual absorption on the part of [appellant]'."

While concluding that the traditional tort elements were capable of proof, the court said (p. 443, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352) that showing proximate causation "might indeed be difficult, if not impossible". It then stated that (p. 444) "heart of the matter is whether, assuming that such a cause of action may be stated, the courts should, as a matter of public policy, entertain such claims. We believe they should not." It reasoned that (p. 445, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 391 N.E.2d 1352) "in the courts of this cause of action would constitute blatant interference with the responsibility for the administration of the public school system lodged by Constitution and statute in school administrative agencies".

In Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 126, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317, supra, the Court of Appeals again was asked to consider the issue and responded by stating that it "had thought it well settled that the courts of this State may not substitute their judgment or the judgment of a jury, for the professional judgment of educators and government officials actually engaged in the complex and often delicate process of educating the many thousands of children in our schools". The Hoffman case involved the wrongful placement of a student in a class for mentally retarded children where he remained for over 12 years even though it was recommended that he be retested within two years of his initial placement. In commenting upon the position in which the courts would be placed should they be deemed an appropriate forum to resolve claims for educational malpractice, the court said (pp. 126-127, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 400 N.E.2d 317):

"In the present case, the decision of the school officials and educators who classified plaintiff as retarded and continued his enrollment in CRMD classes was based upon the results of a recognized intelligence test administered by a qualified psychologist and the daily observation of plaintiff's teachers. In order to affirm a finding of liability in these circumstances, this court would be required to allow the finder of fact to substitute its judgment for the professional judgment of the board of education as to the type of psychometric devices to be used and the frequency with which such tests are to be given. Such a decision would also allow a court or a jury to second-guess the determinations of each of plaintiff's teachers. To do so would open the door to an examination of the propriety of each of the procedures used in the education of every student in our school system. Clearly, each and every time a student fails to progress academically, it can be argued that he or she would have done better and received a greater benefit if another educational approach or diagnostic tool had been utilized. Similarly, whenever there was a failure to implement a recommendation made by any person in the school system with respect to the evaluation of a pupil or his or her educational program, it could be said, as here, that liability could be predicated on misfeasance. However, the court system is not the proper forum to test the validity of the educational decision to place a particular student in one of the many educational programs offered by the schools of this State".

In our view, the soundness of this policy of noninterference is equally applicable when the action is brought against a private educational institution and is formulated in contract.

In Hunter v. Board of Ed. of Montgomery County, 292 Md. 481, 439 A.2d 582, supra the gravamen of plaintiffs' action sounded in negligence. Breach of contract and intentional misrepresentation were, however, advanced as theories of recovery as well. With respect to the contract claim, the court concluded that (439 A.2d p. 586, n.5) "the uncertainty of damages, the difficulty in determining legal cause, and the public policy factors preluding negligence claims remains true whether the allegations state breach of contract or tort".

Where the essence of the complaint is that the school breached its agreement by failing to provide an effective education, the court is again asked to evaluate the course of instruction. It is similarly called upon to review the soundness of the method of teaching that has been adopted by an educational institution. There is nothing novel about a contract action that would permit for judicial intervention into the process of learning. For in effect, the claim still requires judicial displacement of complex educational determinations made by those charged with the responsibility to instruct...

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