Marcel Watch Co. v. US, Court No. 83-11-01578.
Citation | 16 CIT 474,795 F. Supp. 1199 |
Decision Date | 19 June 1992 |
Docket Number | Court No. 83-11-01578. |
Parties | MARCEL WATCH CO., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
Freeman, Wasserman & Schneider, Patrick C. Reed, New York City, for plaintiff.
Stuart M. Gerson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph I. Liebman, Attorney in Charge, James A. Curley, Atty., Intern. Trade Field Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, U.S. Dept. of Justice, New York City, Edward N. Maurer, Office of Asst. Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs Service, New York City, of counsel, for defendant.
This action had been suspended under Belfont Sales Corp. v. United States, 11 CIT 541, 666 F.Supp. 1568 (1987), reh'g denied, 12 CIT 916, 698 F.Supp. 916 (1988), aff'd, 878 F.2d 1413 (Fed.Cir.1989), a test case which is now final. In that case, this court had found, among other things, that a quartz analogue watch or "QAW" does contain a watch movement when viewed in the light of Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust.Ct. 272, C.D. 4810, 475 F.Supp. 1183 (1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 269 (CCPA 1980), Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States, 82 Cust.Ct. 287, C.D. 4811, 475 F.Supp. 1193 (1979), aff'd, 620 F.2d 272 (CCPA 1980), and Texas Instruments Incorporated v. United States, 1 CIT 236, 518 F.Supp. 1341 (1981), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1375 (CCPA 1982), but had concluded that such a timepiece was properly classifiable under Schedule 6 to the Tariff Schedules of the United States, specifically item 688.45, as opposed to TSUS item 715.05, upon which the defendant had relied in imposing duties. The courts in the last of those Texas Instruments cases had reached the same conclusion with regard to quartz digital watches.
The action at bar covers entries of wall clocks and alarm clocks, the electronic components of which are claimed in the complaint to be similar in all material respects to those of the QAWs which were the subject of Belfont, supra. After joinder of issue, this action was itself designated a test case within the meaning of CIT Rule 84(b) and removed along with eight other actions from the Belfont suspension disposition calendar.
The plaintiff has now interposed a motion for summary judgment1 on its first pleaded cause of action, including a statement pursuant to CIT Rule 56(i), which alleges, among other points:
Whereupon the plaintiff prays that its merchandise be held properly classifiable under TSUS item 688.43 (1982) ("Electrical articles and electrical parts of articles, not specially provided for: ... Other") or, in the alternative, item 678.50 ("Machines not specially provided for, and parts thereof").
In response, the defendant admits outright or in substance the foregoing averments numbered 5, 6 and 11. It denies in whole or in part the remaining, quoted Rule 56(i) representations and also cross-moves for summary judgment, setting forth its own statement of alleged material facts not in dispute, to wit:
Careful review and consideration of the cross-motions, after years of exposure to contentious, even extraordinary, litigation concerning the QAWs3, lead this court to conclude that the controlling issues raised herein are of law and not of fact and that summary judgment is thus appropriate for disposition of the first cause of action in this test case. Cf. CIT Rule 56(d) and Texas Apparel Co. v. United States, 12 CIT 1002, 698 F.Supp. 932 (1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 66 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 728, 107 L.Ed.2d 747 (1990), and cases cited therein.
Cases of classification always resort, first and foremost, to the governing statutes. Subpart E of Part 2 of Schedule 7 to the TSUS covered "Watches, Clocks, and Timing Apparatus". Headnote 2(c) defined clock movement as "any movement or mechanism, other than `watch movements' as defined in headnote 2(b), ... intended or suitable for measuring time".4 As indicated, the merchandise at issue herein was classified by Customs under item 715.15 ("Clocks: With watch movements; or with clock movements measuring less than 1.77 inches in width"). That item provided for duties equal to the "column 1 rates applicable to the cases, plus the column 1 rates applicable to the movements", the latter of which the Service derived from item 720.02, TSUS, to wit:
Another statute, the Customs Courts Act of 1980, provides that such a decision of the Service is "presumed to be correct" and the "burden of proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such decision." 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1).
Algoma Tube Corp. v. United States, 9 CIT 418, 422, 1985 WL 25774 (1985) (citations omitted). In other words, however precise the statutory provisions (or nature of the goods), interpretation thereof still depends on context. Clocks and watches have the same function of measuring and "telling" time, but in the tariff schedules Congress chose to differentiate between them, as entireties and also between their movements.5 When it did so for purposes of classification of the merchandise herein, winding (and rewinding) had been associated with watches since the 16th century, when the coiled steel spring as a motor for timepieces was invented, thereby leading to sizing small enough for a human wrist or apparel pocket. Cf. 14 McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology 440 (4th ed. 1977); 1 E.H. Knight, American Mechanical Dictionary 569 (1882). However, winding and rewinding have not necessarily been integral to clocks, which date almost to the moment of recorded history itself, from the clepsydra of Plato in 372 B.C. to the pendulum of 1000 A.D. to Big Ben's installment in the tower at Westminster in 1859.
When duties were imposed on the QAWs under items 716.27 and 716.29 (1980), it thus was to have been expected that the TSUS contemplated "not constructed or designed to operate for a period in excess of 47 hours without rewinding". The statute did not contemplate tiny batteries' oscillating quartz in ultrathin watchcases for acceptable periods, which fact was critical in Belfont6, but the same cannot be said of the quartz analogue clocks in this action. On its face, the TSUS purview of clocks was broader than that of watches. One need look no further than to the horological fact that clocks run by electricity are almost as old as that...
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...C.F.R. § 351.414 in order to comprehend the full meaning of the statute. See Def.'s Br. at 14; see also Marcel Watch Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 474, 477, 795 F.Supp. 1199, 1202 (1992) ("It is fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the w......
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