Marcello v. Maine

• Decision Date: 13 December 2006
• Docket Number: No. CV-06-68 BW.,CV-06-68 BW.
• Citation: 464 F.Supp.2d 38
• Parties: James C. MARCELLO, and Olivia Marcello, Plaintiffs, v. State of MAINE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

464 F.Supp.2d 38

James C. MARCELLO, and Olivia Marcello, Plaintiffs, v. State of MAINE, et al., Defendants.

No. CV-06-68 BW.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

December 13, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James C. Marcello, Stetson, ME, Pro se. Olivia A. Marcello, Stetson, ME, Pro se.

Ronald W. Lupton, Maine Attorney General's Office, Augusta, ME, Edward R. Benjamin, Jr., Thompson & Bowie, Portland, ME, Jon Haddow, Farrell, Rosenblatt & Russell, Bangor, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

WOODCOCK, District Judge.

The state of Maine, the Third District Court of Newport, and William Anderson, a judge of the Maine District Court, move to dismiss James and Olivia Marcello's law suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ The Court concludes that Judge Anderson is absolutely immune under the doctrine of judicial immunity; that the Third District Court of Newport is absolutely immune under the doctrine of judicial immunity, is not a "person" under § 1983, and is immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity; that the state of Maine is not a "person" under § 1983 and is immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and, that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss (Docket # 54).

I. Standard of Review

The Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) provides in relevant part: "[e]very defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading ... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ... (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). "A motion to dismiss an action under Rule 12(b)(1) ... raises the fundamental question whether the federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action before it." United States v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 8 n. 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). The burden falls on the plaintiff "clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke federal jurisdiction." Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1281 (1st Cir.1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also R.I. Ass'n of Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.1999); Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 32, 33 (D.Me.1992). in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, "[t]he court, without conversion, may consider extrinsic materials and, to the extent it engages in jurisdictional factfinding, is free to test the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations." Dynamic Image Technologies, Inc. v. United States, 221 F.3d 34, 37-38 (1st Cir.2000). See also Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1209-10 (1st Cir.1996) ("In ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... the district court must construe the complaint liberally, treating all well-pleaded facts as true and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. ... In addition, the court may consider whatever evidence has been submitted. ...").

Likewise, in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs." Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1998)). A defendant is entitled to dismissal only if it "`appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be unable to recover under any set of facts.'" State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Denman Tire Corp., 240 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d 566, 569 (1st Cir.1996)); see also Nethersole v. Bulger, 287 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir.2002).

II. Judicial Immunity — Judge Anderson²

Plaintiffs' allegations against Judge Anderson are limited to the exercise of his judicial functions. They allege that on November 23, 2005, Judge Anderson conspired with Attorney Jon Haddow and Travis Gould, a code enforcement officer, "to preside without authority and to induce plaintiff James Marcello to take the stand against his objection to the jurisdiction of the court by ways of treats (sic) violating his 5th Amendment Constitutional rights." Compl. ¶ 8 (Docket # 1). Next, the Complaint alleges that on December 23, 2005, Judge Anderson "denied equal assess (sic) to justice by arbitrarily denying plaintiffs (sic) James C. Marcello application to proceed without payment of fees dated November 28, 2005 for an appeal filed against a contempt order dated November 23, 2005 that was void for want of jurisdiction over the person and obtained by fraud practiced by defendant attorney John (sic) A. Haddow, defendant Travis Gould, in collusion with said defendant William Anderson of the Waterville District Court." Id. ¶ 12. The Complaint further claims that on March 22, 2006 and March 29, 2006, Mr. Haddow and Judge Anderson conspired with Mr. Gould, who "broke the close of plaintiffs James & Olivia Marcello property located at 152 Cross Rd, Stetson, Maine with no trespassing signs posted and against the owners (sic) consent, entered the property and broke and entered into the outer skirting of their mobile home violating the plaintiffs (sic) 4th Amendment rights secured under the Constitutional laws of the land." Id. ¶ 9. The Complaint alleges that Judge Anderson "held purported contempt proceedings against the plaintiff James Marcello for the 3rd District Court of Newport, after special entry of appearance by said plaintiff objecting to the jurisdiction." Id. ¶ 21. Finally, Plaintiffs allege that "the Defendants Judge Anderson, Attorney Jon A. Haddow, Esq., and Travis Gould, CEO, are compelling plaintiffs, though extortion methods, to surrender property to them by designing a mechanism of a `pledge' attached to a purported Order dated and signed by Defendant Judge Anderson on 5/19/06 purporting on it's (sic) face a warrant of arrest to issue against plaintiff James Marcello for 30 day sentence." Id. ¶ 22.³ Plaintiffs do not seek any explicit relief from Judge Anderson, but request the Court to enjoin the Defendants "from further harassing, molesting, and any continuing proceedings against the plaintiffs."⁴ Id. at 8. Plaintiffs have included a catch-all demand that "the Plaintiffs may receive any and all other relief as the circumstances in the cause may require." Id.

The well-settled doctrine of judicial immunity bars the Plaintiffs' claims against Judge Anderson. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine. ..." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The origins of this doctrine in the United States can be traced to the 1872 Supreme Court case of Bradley v. Fisher, which itself traced the doctrine back to 1608 in England. 80 U.S. 335, 347-48, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872). The doctrine holds that judges performing judicial acts within their jurisdiction are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54, 87 S.Ct. 1213; Brown v. Ives, 129 F.3d 209, 212 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Maine's judges are absolutely immune from damage claims based on their judicial decisions."); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st. Cir.1989); Haven v. Worth, Civil No. 05-176-B-W, 2006 WL 197165, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2673 (D.Me. Jan. 25, 2006) aff'd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6949 (D.Me. Feb. 22, 2006). Furthermore, "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cok, 876 F.2d at 2. Pierson reassured would-be objectors that absolute immunity "is not for the protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences." Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, the First Circuit has held that the doctrine extends to injunctive and declaratory relief. See Adames v. Fagundo, 198 Fed.Appx. 20, 2006 WL 2624089 (1st Cir.2006).⁵

Absolute judicial immunity may be unavailable for: (1) functions not "normally performed by a judge" and outside his or her "judicial capacity;" Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. 1099; or, (2) "judicial actions taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction...." Cok, 876 F.2d at 2 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 357, 98 S.Ct. 1099). Neither limitation applies here. Plaintiffs' complaints against Judge Anderson go to the heart of his exercise of judicial discretion: ruling on applications, holding hearings, approving warrants, and issuing orders.⁶ Plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts for the Court to infer that Judge Anderson took these actions "in the clear absence of all jurisdiction." Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099; see also Cok, 876 F.2d at 2.

III. Statutory Authority, Judicial Immunity, and Sovereign Immunity — Third District Court

Although the Complaint lists the Third District Court of Newport as a defendant, the Complaint contains no factual allegations directed against the Court itself. Rather, to the extent the Plaintiffs make reference to the Third District Court, it is as the physical location for judicial...